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Preface 
This report is a deliverable of the EU 7th Framework Project STAR-FLOOD (www.starflood.eu). STAR-
FLOOD focuses on Flood Risk Governance. The project investigates strategies for dealing with flood 
risks in 18 vulnerable urban regions in six European countries: England in the UK, Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden. The project assesses Flood Risk Governance Arrangements 
from a combined public administration and legal perspective, with the aim of making European 
regions more resilient to flood risks. 
This report constitutes deliverable D3.2, a country report on the Netherlands. Work Package 1 
provided an extended problem analysis related to Flood Risk Governance in Europe. Work Package 2 
focused on how Flood Risk Governance in Europe can be researched. Work Package 3 forms the 
empirical core of the project, in which analyses, explanations and evaluations of each country, 
including three case studies, have been performed.  
The Netherlands has a long tradition of flood risk management, due to its special physical location in 
the delta of four major river systems. This low-lying country is historically characterised by a ‘fight 
against water’. The Flood Risk Governance Arrangement of the Netherlands is characterised by a 
strong focus on reducing flood probability and governmental responsibility. A key characteristic is the 
statutory right to flood protection from the state. The arrangement of actors, rules, resources and 
discourses is focused on probability-reduction by administrative organisations. Nevertheless, in 
recent years a number of changes towards a broader number of Flood Risk Management Strategies 
(FRMSs) can be observed and different modes of governance are starting to emerge. This report 
provides insights into the ways in which flood risk governance is changing in the Netherlands, as well 
as into the extent to which the system enables or constrains societal resilience to flooding.  
The six country reports, including case studies, of WP3, together with D3.1, the report on the case 
study workshops in each country, form the main input for the last two Work Packages of STAR-
FLOOD, being WP4 and WP5. WP4 focuses on a systematic comparison between the STAR-FLOOD 
consortium countries; WP5 focuses on the identification of design principles for appropriate and 
resilient Flood Risk Governance. 
We trust that the current report is of interest for a broad readership with an interest in Flood Risk 
Management and Governance. The content of this report may inspire researchers and professionals 
with an interest in social scientific and legal research into flood risk management, disaster risk 
reduction and climate change adaptation. 
Dr. Ann Crabbé   Prof. Peter Driessen  
Leader of WP3 STAR-FLOOD Project Coordinator 
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Overview of key findings 
 
1. Main characteristics of flood risks in the Netherlands 
Flood risk management (FRM) in the Netherlands has a long standing history. The country is famous 
for its flood defence strategy that reduces the probability of flooding. Recently, more attention has 
been paid to implementing a broader range of strategies to manage the consequences of flooding 
(see §2.3.1).  
Flood risk will increase in the future. 59% of the Netherlands is susceptible to flooding including the 
26% of the land situated below sea level. 55% of the country is protected by embankments or dunes, 
which leaves 4% unprotected. In particular, the economically valuable western part of the country is 
prone to flooding from the sea and the rivers. Flood risk will most likely increase in the future, due to 
climate change and soil subsidence. The consequences of potential flooding will also increase, due to 
the projected increase of socio-economic development in flood-prone areas. Furthermore, the 
probability of flooding is projected to increase due to the impact of climate change in the form of 
increased precipitation, rising sea levels and increase in river discharges (see §2.2) 
High prioritization of flood risk. The flood risk situation in the Netherlands can be characterised as a 
low probability, but high impact situation. It is traditionally the responsibility of functionally 
decentralised and specialised water management authorities, so that flood management is relatively 
independent of political whims. Flood risk is also the predominant focus of the national climate 
change adaptation programme, the so-called Delta Programme (see chapter 5). 
2. Main characteristics of flood risk governance arrangements 
All strategies are present; strong focus on flood defence. The flood defence strategy with 
probability-reducing measures, such as the construction and maintenance of dikes and dunes (dike 
rings), storm surge barriers and water storage locations, is historically predominant. In the last 20 
years, also consequence-reducing strategies have become more popular, even though they are 
mostly applied in exceptional cases where the flood defence approach is not efficient or feasible (the 
case studies in  §2.3, §2.4, and §2.5, are an illustration hereof).  
Five Flood Risk Governance Arrangements (FRGAs) can be identified: Water System Management, 
Spatial Planning, Emergency Management, Urban Water Management and Compensation. The 
water system governance arrangement is the most institutionalised and hegemonic. It includes the 
flood defence strategy and is characterised by governmental accountability, legal safety standards 
for dikes, specialised regional and national water authorities with detailed knowledge and, as far as 
regional water authorities are concerned, financially powerful positions (see §2.3.2). Table I gives an 
overview of the governance arrangements and the corresponding strategies. Urban water 
management, responsible for pluvial flooding, is under development and only partly institutionalised 
(see §2.3.3). The relevance of spatial planning and emergency management in FRM has been 
increasing since the beginning of the 21st century. Spatial planning is in itself highly institutionalised, 
whereas emergency management is currently characterised by a phase of reorganisation due to the 
merging of local emergency services into regional security regions (see §2.3.4, §2.3.5). The 
compensation arrangement, through which the recovery strategy has been implemented, is the least 
institutionalised and plays only a marginal role in Dutch FRM (see §2.3.6).  
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Bridging mechanisms between governance arrangements are present. The water system 
arrangement is at the centre of Dutch FRM. Other arrangements are correlated with this 
arrangement. The water test is a bridging mechanism that requires the consideration of flood risk in 
spatial planning, connecting the spatial planning arrangement with water system and the urban 
water arrangement. Flood risk management plans and a ‘steering group on flooding’ are bridging 
mechanisms that support information exchange and cooperation between emergency managers, 
spatial planners and water managers (see §2.3).  
 
Floods Directive. The Netherlands has rationally and expediently implemented the Floods Directive 
(FD) in national legislation, namely in the Water Act and the (governmental) Water Decree. The 
planning system of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) is followed. All new tasks are closely 
connected to already existing tasks and responsibilities of competent water management authorities.  
A preliminary flood risk assessment has not been conducted, because of the geomorphological 
elements of the Netherlands. This means that the flood hazard maps and flood risk maps cover the 
whole country, even though not the whole of the country can be considered to be flood prone. 
The provinces are responsible for the flood hazard maps and flood risk maps. The flood risks and 
flood hazards are included in already existing general risk maps and are publicly available via: 
www.risicokaart.nl. The flood risk management plans (FRMP) are made at sub river basin level (for 
the Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt and Ems). They consist of a national and an international part. From 
December 2014 until June 2015 they were open for public review. By using the general procedures 
for public consultation – and not also having a special consultation for FRMPs – it was considered 
that the criterion of article 9 FD (active involvement of interested parties) had been met (see §2.2.8).  
3. Explanations for stability and change 
High level of path dependency of the defence approach with only incremental and gradual change. 
Several aspects stabilise the water-system governance arrangement. Firstly, there is a utilitarian 
element. Due to previous high levels of investment in structural measures, it is nowadays more cost-
efficient to maintain the defence structures, than to invest in alternative measures (precipitated 
resources). Secondly, there is a more functional element based on specific legal regulations. The 
constitutional responsibility of the government, the safety standards and financing agreements make 
up a well-aligned arrangement. Furthermore, both this well-structured system and the absence of 
severe flood events reduce the awareness among other actors of taking flood risk into account (see 
§2.4, §3.4, §4.4, §5.4, and chapter 6). 
An incremental change is visible in the form of layering of additional governance arrangements 
alongside the existing ones. As a result of the introduction of a new risk-based approach (which is 
also at the basis of the EU Floods Directive (2007), and has later been adopted by the Delta 
Commission (2008) and implemented in the National Water Plan (2009) to be followed by 
implementation in the Water Act), one of the main trends is a shift towards multi-sector governance. 
Even though the water sector remains dominant, spatial planning and emergency management gain 
significance. They are increasingly aligned with water system management through bridging 
mechanisms. There are a number of essential factors that explain those changes. Change, i.e. a 
diversification of strategies, is mostly of an adaptive nature; that means a diversification of strategies 
  
viii 
 
often takes place in cases where the traditional probability-reducing approach cannot be 
implemented, because it is technically not feasible, because it has an adverse impact on cultural 
heritage, or because it is not cost-efficient. Flood shock events are often seen to accelerate change 
towards other strategies, because they bring new problems onto the agenda, or demonstrate the 
limitations of the current approach. Despite this, the change in the Netherlands is dominantly 
agency-driven. New epistemic communities have introduced and promoted new ideas, e.g. on 
integrated water resource management, risk management, sustainability and climate change. At the 
case study level, strong local actors have introduced and supported innovative ideas and facilitated 
communication among different stakeholders (see §2.4, §3.4, §4.4, §5.4 and chapter6). 
4. Evaluation of resilience, efficiency and legitimacy 
High capacity to resist. The flood defence strategy is the basis of Dutch FRM. This approach is highly 
institutionalised and long-established. Mechanisms are in place to continually adjust and improve 
this approach (e.g. periodical assessment, ongoing research). This approach can be considered rather 
effective: even though not all primary flood defence structures fulfil the legal safety standards, a high 
level of protection has been established and no major floods have occurred for six decades (see 
§2.5.1, §3.5, §4.5, §5.5, and §7.2.1). 
Buffer capacity is limited. In comparison with other countries, consequence-management seems to 
be limited. Even though there are some governance instruments, their effectiveness in practice tends 
to be inadequate. The procedural instrument – the water test – increases cooperation between 
water authorities and spatial planners. However, in practice it actually leads to mitigation and 
prevention measures only in ad hoc cases. The formation of security regions has improved 
emergency management, although the resulting reorganisation is still ongoing, particularly with 
regard to cooperation between other actors. Compensation for recovery is provided by the 
government, although that compensation is sometimes criticised for being based on political will and 
public pressure (see §2.5.1, §3.5, §4.5, §5.5, and §7.2.2) 
Increased consideration for resource efficiency. Safety standards prescribe a particular level of 
safety. Cost-benefit analysis, cost-sharing arrangements and efficiency-based procedures (e.g. MIRT1) 
are increasingly applied to achieve particular levels of protection in the most cost-efficient way (see 
§2.5.2, §3.5, §4.5, §5.5, and §7.3). 
Legitimacy requirements are fulfilled from a legal perspective. With regard to public participation, 
thorough legal arrangements are in place, which regulate and support public participation 
procedures. In addition, transparency, access to justice and access to information are also legally 
guaranteed. Nevertheless, actual public participation in general tends to be limited (see §2.5.3, §3.5, 
§4.5, §5.5, and §7.4). 
Distribution of costs and benefits might cause equity issues in the future. Studies criticise the cross-
subsidisation of spatial development in flood-prone areas in the western part of the country, and 
allude to growing equity issues in the future, when costs for flood risk management might increase. 
However, there is no scientific evidence for such a development. Furthermore, even though the 
                                                          
1
 National subsidising programme for decentralised governments. It asks for particular procedures to ensure 
efficiency: e.g. carrying out a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), an exploration phase where different alternatives are 
compared.  
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introduction of a basic safety level might be a positive development for an equal level of protection, 
areas outside the primary flood defences are not included; within these areas there is no right to 
protection in terms of probability-reduction based on the defence strategy. These areas have to rely 
on mitigation and preparation strategies, while recovery through compensation is based on political 
willingness (see §2.5.3, and §7.4).  
5. Good practices, options for improvement and recommendations 
Good practices are the highly institutionalised flood defence approach that provides basic and 
adequate protection. The flood defence approach is characterised by a clear responsibility division, 
explicit standards and regulations, and secure financing. It, moreover, is relatively independent of 
political whims. Furthermore, the strong knowledge and expertise base is a good practice. This 
ensures a sound implementation and maintenance of the structural measures, an ongoing 
adjustment and improvement of the flood defence approach. It also produces innovative 
technologies that can be exported (see §8.2.1). 
Reducing the potential consequences of flooding is only marginally established, but increasingly 
being developed. The integration of spatial planning and flood risk tends to be insufficient and 
emergency management is undergoing reorganisation. Identified weaknesses are financing and the 
expertise and knowledge base of emergency management, which is in the developmental stage. 
Moreover, the roles and responsibilities of utilities (e.g. electricity/energy companies and 
ICT/communication services) in consequence-reduction remain unclear (see §2.5.2, and §8.2.2). 
Due to a lack of other effective strategies in cases of major flooding, the consequences might be 
disastrous. Due to lack of effective preventive, mitigative and responsive strategies, the damage 
potential remains rather high. Depending on the scale of the damage, compensation is delayed or 
impossible, which could cause a delay in recovery and a marked disturbance of economic activity. 
Citizens could, moreover, react inadequately due to a lack of awareness and risk communication (see 
§8.2.2, and §8.4). 
To strengthen Dutch FRM, it is sensible to keep the foundation of flood defence and its ongoing 
adaptation to provide basic safety. Nevertheless, the integration of spatial planning and flood risk 
management and the implementation of prevention and mitigation strategies in spatial planning 
should be strengthened. Also the implementation of the preparation/response strategy in 
emergency management should be strengthened. Knowledge and expertise in the development of 
security regions should be supported to increase their potential to effectively respond to floods and 
to advice spatial planners and water authorities. During the implementation of consequence-
reducing strategies, fragmentation of responsibilities, unnecessary complexity and legal uncertainty 
should be avoided as much as possible. Finally, risk communication to citizens should be improved: if 
citizens are better informed about (local/regional) flood risks and opportunities to cope with these 
risks, their preparedness could be enhanced (see §8.4). 
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Table I: Summary of formal sub-FRGAs within the flood policy domain in the Netherlands 
Sub-FRGA Description Strategies Key actors Key rules/legislation Key discourses Key resources 
Water system 
management 
Sub-FRGA that describes 
aspects related to the 
management of the 
water system (i.e. 
coherent set of one or 
more surface water 
bodies and associated 
storage areas, dams and 
supporting structures) of 
fluvial flooding and 
coastal flooding 
 
Defence National: Ministry 
Infrastructure and 
Environment and 
Rijkswaterstaat  
Regional Water 
Authorities: Water 
boards 
construction 
companies,  
expertise centres 
Water Act 
 
Programmes 
HWBP 
Delta Programme 
Room for the River 
Technocratic 
discourses 
Integrated water 
management 
Efficiency 
 
Delta Fund 
 
Water board taxes 
 
Technical expertise 
Urban Water 
management 
Sub-FRGA that describes 
aspects related to the 
management of urban 
waters, i.e. pluvial 
flooding 
Defence  
Mitigation 
Recovery 
citizens  
Municipalities 
Wet gemeentelijke 
watertaken, as 
integrated in:Water Act 
(art. 3.5) 
Sewerage 
(Environmental 
Management Act) 
Delta Programme 
Sustainability 
Climate change 
Subsidiarity  
Provincial/ municipal funds 
Project budget 
Own expenses of house/ 
company owners 
Spatial 
Planning 
Sub-FRGA that 
comprises the spatial 
planning aspects in flood 
risk management.  
Prevention  
Mitigation  
Provinces 
Municipalities 
Regional Water 
Authorities 
 
Spatial planning Act 
Incl. Water assessment 
Delta Programme 
Climate change 
adaptation 
Sustainability 
Risk approach  
Integrated water 
management 
Provincial/ municipal funds 
Emergency 
Management 
Sub-FRGA that 
comprises the 
emergency aspects of 
flood risk management 
Preparation and 
response 
Recovery 
Ministry Security 
and Justice, NCTV 
(National 
coordinator for 
security and 
counterterrorism) 
Regional security 
regions 
Security regions Act 
 
Integrated risk 
approach 
Municipal funding (security 
regions) 
National funding 
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Compensation Minor sub-FRGA that 
comprises governmental 
and non-governmental 
compensation 
arrangements 
 
Regulations of liability 
Recovery Ministry Security 
and Justice,  
private insurance 
for pluvial flooding 
and to some degree 
for fluvial flooding 
property owner 
Water managers 
Calamities compensation 
Act 
Insurance policies 
Liability (Civil Code) 
Risk approach 
Solidarity 
National funding – 
compensation fund 
Funds of liable authority 
Private funding - insurance 
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Abbreviations  
AIA Access to information Act 
BAW Administrative Agreement for Water  
Dutch: Bestuursakkoord Water 
CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis 
CPA Civil Procedures Act 
DP Delta Programme 
EM Emergency Management arrangement 
FD Floods Directive 
FRGA Flood Risk Governance Arrangement 
FRM Flood Risk Management 
FRMS Flood Risk Management Strategies 
GALA General Administrative Law Act 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
I&M Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment  
Dutch: Infrastructuur en Milieu 
IWRM Integrated Water Resource Management 
MIRT Multiannual Programme of Infrastructure, Space and Transport 
Dutch: Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport 
MLS Multi-layered Safety  
Dutch: Meerlaagsveiligheid 
NAP Amsterdam Ordnance Datum 
Normaal Amsterdams Peil 
NCTV National coordinator for security and counterterrorism 
Dutch: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid 
NFPRD National Flood Policies and Regulations Domain 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
PAA Policy Arrangements Approach 
PDR Project Management Team for the Room for the River programme 
Dutch: Programma Directie Ruimte voor de Rivier 
RftR Room for the River 
RIVM Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Environment 
Dutch: Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu 
RWS Directorate-general for public works and water management 
Rijkswaterstaat 
SP Spatial Planning arrangement 
SPKD Spatial Planning Key Decision 
SRA Security Regions Act 
Sub-FRGA Sub-Flood Risk Governance Arrangement 
SuDS Sustainable urban Drainage Systems 
TMO Taskforce Management Flooding  
Dutch: Taskforce Management Overstroming 
UWM Urban Water Management arrangement 
VNK ‘Flood safety mapped in the Netherlands’ (Programme and report) 
Dutch: Veiligheid Nederland in Kaart 
VROM Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment  
Dutch: Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu 
V&W Ministry for Traffic and Water 
Dutch: Ministerie van Verkeer en Water 
WSM Water System Management arrangement 
ZPP Zuidplaspolder (case study, chapter 3) 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Introducing flood risk governance in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands has a centuries-long tradition of preventing the Dutch delta from flooding. This 
created vast opportunities for increasing socio-economic prosperity. Climate change, changing 
precipitation patterns and soil subsidence, in combination with a rather unrestrained increase in 
economic value and population density in flood-prone areas, however, increase vulnerability to a 
great extent: although the probability of a major flood event is rather low, the consequences of such 
an event will be ever more disastrous. This creates challenges to re-think the traditional system of 
flood risk management in the Netherlands (compare OECD, 2014).  
In this report, the current system of Dutch flood risk governance will be analysed and evaluated 
following a number of predetermined criteria – resilience, efficiency, and legitimacy (Larrue et al., 
2013). The report reaffirms the main conclusions of the 2014 OECD study on water governance in the 
Netherlands (OECD, 2014), but, taking another perspective, it also provides new insights into flood 
risk management strategies and opportunities for improvement. Its main conclusions build upon 
recent developments, and are reassuring and alarming at the same time: notwithstanding the 
importance of providing a high capacity to resist (i.e. to prevent flooding), the Netherlands should 
also put more effort into implementing consequence-reducing strategies creating buffer capacity in 
order to protect the Dutch from ‘drowning in safety’.    
1.2 Research aim and questions 
This report is a deliverable of the EU 7th Framework Project STAR-FLOOD (see www.starflood.eu for 
an outline of the project). STAR-FLOOD focuses on Flood Risk Governance. The project investigates 
how current flood risk governance arrangements can be strengthened or redesigned to enhance 
societal resilience to flooding. To this end, it is assessed to what extent governance arrangements 
support or constrain the diversification of Flood Risk Management Strategies as well as the extent to 
which such a diversification of strategies enhances societal resilience to flooding. Empirical research 
is carried out in six European countries – England in the UK, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Poland 
and Sweden – and eighteen vulnerable regions in these countries. The project is assessing Flood Risk 
Governance from a combined public administration and legal perspective.  
This report is deliverable D3.2 of the third Work Package of STAR-FLOOD. While the first Work 
Package provided an extended problem analysis related to Flood Risk Governance in Europe and the 
second Work Package focused on how Flood Risk Governance in Europe should be researched, Work 
Package 3 reports the main results of the empirical research. It does so through six country-specific 
reports, which each identify the architecture of flood risk governance, analyse flood risk governance 
and evaluate current arrangements of governance in terms of resilience, legitimacy and efficiency. 
These findings are supported by inter-disciplinary research conducted at the national and case study 
level. Box 1.1 lists the research questions that this report addresses.  
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Box 1.1: Research questions of the STAR-FLOOD project 
 
National level research questions 
1. How is the National Flood Policies and Regulations Domain (NFPR) structured? To what extent is there 
cohesion between sub-Flood Risk Governance Arrangements? (see §2.3.2) 
2. To what extent are the five Flood Risk Management Strategies distinguished within STAR-FLOOD (see 
below) embedded in the NFPR? Is there evidence to suggest efforts are being made to diversify Flood 
Risk Management Strategies and measures employed within these strategies? (see §2.3.1) 
3. In what ways is the National Flood Policies and Regulations Domain linked to other relevant policy 
domains? In what ways do these enable or constrain flood risk governance? (see §2.3.2) 
4. How has the NFPR changed over time? What explanatory factors account for periods of stability 
and/or change? (see §2.4) 
5. To what extent can the current NFPRD be characterised as resilient, efficient and legitimate? How has 
this changed over time? (see §2.5) 
 
Case study research questions 
6. To what extent do the governance arrangement(s) in selected case studies reflect those evident in the 
NFPR? (see §3.3, §4.3, and§5.3) 
7. To what extent are the five FRMSs embedded in the governance arrangement(s) in selected case 
studies? (§3.2, §4.2, and §5.2) 
8. How have arrangements for flood risk governance evolved over time? What are the driving forces for 
stability and/or change? In what ways do these compare with those seen at the national level? (see 
3.4, 4.4, 5.4) 
9. To what extent can the governance arrangement(s) in selected case studies be characterised as 
resilient, efficient and legitimate? (see §3.5, §4.5, and §5.5) 
10. To what extent do the governance arrangement(s) in the NFPR enable or constrain innovative 
initiatives in selected case studies? (see chapters 7 and 8)  
 
1.3 Research approach and methods 
1.3.1 The theoretical framework   
To analyse stability and change in Flood Risk Governance Arrangements, the STAR-FLOOD project 
draws on the Policy Arrangements Approach (PAA). Policy arrangements have been defined as ‘a 
temporary stabilisation of the content and organisation of a policy domain’ (Van Tatenhove and 
Leroy, 2000). By studying the development of these policy arrangements over time, the degree of 
stability or change in these arrangements can be analysed. The PAA claims to link up all relevant 
dimensions of a policy domain (actors, discourses, rules and resources) and hence enables a study of 
the policy arrangement as a whole. The approach has been applied in earlier studies of 
environmental policies, nature conservation and water management (Arts and Van Tatenhove, 2006; 
Wiering and Arts, 2006; Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000). Two features make the approach 
particularly useful for analysing FRGAs. First, the approach combines and integrates different 
concepts within frameworks of policy analysis (e.g. policy network models, discourse analysis, the 
advocacy coalitions framework and regime theory in international relations) and includes both 
structure and agency-related elements of institutional analysis, thus choosing a more sociological 
approach (Giddens, 1984). Other approaches are less comprehensive in terms of the dimensions that 
are included. Second, as is shown in figure 1.1, the four dimensions of the PAA allow for the inclusion 
and integration of legal factors in the analysis. 
Flood Risk Governance Arrangements (FRGAs) can be defined as institutional constellations resulting 
from an interplay between actors and actor coalitions involved in all policy domains relevant for 
flood risk management – including water management, spatial planning and disaster management; 
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their dominant discourses; formal and informal rules of the game; and the power and resource base 
of the actors involved (Hegger et al., 2013). FRGAs can be analysed at different levels, including local, 
regional, national and international. 
 
Figure 1.1: Overview of the set-up of the research, including all research steps 
 
To help us identify FRGAs, the STAR-FLOOD project refers to the notion of Flood Risk Management 
Strategies (FRMSs), which are categorised as prevention, defence, mitigation, preparation and 
response, and recovery (§1.2). A number of Flood Risk Management measures can be grouped into 
these strategies. By examining these, we can test our starting assumptions that diversity is a 
necessary feature of resilient governance. 
 
Figure 1.2: Overview of the five Flood Risk Management Strategies identified within STAR-FLOOD 
 
The empirical research reported in this document, both at country and case study level, comprises 
the following steps: (i) analysis of flood risk governance, including stability and change therein; (ii) 
explanations for the dynamics (both stability and change) found; and (iii) evaluations thereof. 
For the analysis of flood risk governance, the four dimensions of the flood risk governance 
arrangements approach (actors, discourses, rules, resources) have been used. Details on the 
operationalisation of the four dimensions and the indicators used can be found in Larrue et al., 2013 
(the framework and methodology report developed in WP2). 
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Explanations have been made by looking for five types of explanatory factors: (i) physical 
circumstances; (ii) physical and social infrastructure; (iii) structural factors; (iv) characteristics of 
agency and (v) shock events. We have borne in mind that these five factors may be found within but 
also external to flood-relevant policy domains (an example of the latter concerns e.g. major 
developments in political culture at the national level). We also bear in mind that each factor may 
contribute both to stability and to change (see also Larrue et al., 2013). 
Evaluations of flood risk governance have been made using the following evaluation criteria: 
resilience, efficiency and legitimacy. The criterion of resilience has been used to address the question 
of whether and to what extent (i) a diversified set of Flood Risk Management Strategies is actually in 
place at country and case study level; (ii) the strategies have been linked together and aligned; and 
(iii) there is a proven capacity to learn and adapt (i and ii refer to the capacity of the object of 
evaluation to resist floods, respond to them and recover from them, iii refers to the object of 
evaluation’s adaptive capacity). The criterion of resilience is linked to the other criteria in various 
different ways. Most notably, effectiveness (e.g. of strategies, measures) in terms of problem solving 
and goal achievement is seen as a necessary precondition for resilience. Several other relationships 
between the evaluation criteria have been conceptualised, both in terms of synergies and trade-offs. 
More background information on this can be found in Alexander et al. (2015). 
1.3.2 Data collection and analysis 
STAR-FLOOD is a coproduction between legal and policy scholars and makes use of qualitative 
research methods. Our data collection is constructed on three pillars: document analysis, interviews, 
and observations both at the national and case study levels.  
(1) The document analysis consisted of (i) primary sources in the form of policy documents 
(including policy visions and guidelines), legislation (including preparatory works), case law and 
scientific or assessment reports. The aim was to receive information for the three research tasks. 
Furthermore, we consulted (ii) secondary scientific literature. Scientific research on water 
management has a long tradition in the Netherlands and is accordingly broadly based. This 
critical literature review was therefore an important basis for our research and allowed us to 
embed our own empirical research in a broad realm of existing literature. Additionally, we could 
validate our empirical findings with scientific literature. (iii) To a limited degree we also followed 
discussions in the newspapers or professional internet forums, to get an overview of different 
relevant topics in Dutch FRM and to identify the different actor groups involved and their 
position in certain discussions.  
(2) We carried out 45 semi-structured interviews, 15 at the national level and ten at each case study 
level. The interviewees were selected according to a stakeholder mapping that identified the 
most relevant actor groups. Considering that FRM in the Netherlands is above all a governmental 
task, our interviewees were mostly from governmental organisations; that means that our 
findings might be biased towards a governmental view on FRM and private actors might be 
underrepresented. However, that correlates with the features of the Dutch FRGA, which is 
characterised by a limited degree of openness, i.e. the number of actors involved in FRM is 
limited, compared with more fragmented and complex FRGAs like those of England or Belgium. 
We interviewed civil servants and policy makers from different governmental levels (local, 
regional and national), as well as legal and scientific experts. Where relevant and available we 
interviewed private stakeholders. The aim of the interviews was to receive information for the 
three research tasks: topics included organisation of FRM in the Netherlands, changes and the 
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reasons for them, weaknesses and strengths of the Dutch approach. An overview of the 
conducted interviews can be found in Annex I. 
(3) We observed ten national and regional stakeholder meetings or symposiums, including two 
STAR-FLOOD workshops, to observe the policy makers, stakeholders and experts participating in 
the meetings. The aim was to gain practical insights regarding (i) currently relevant topics and 
problems and their development, (ii) the position and perception of different actor groups, and 
(iii) the interaction between different actor groups. A list of observed events can be found in 
Annex II. 
Our baseline year is 1953. In 1953 a storm surge hit the Dutch coast with over 1,800 casualties. This 
trauma influenced the Dutch approach and shaped the modern FRM approach. The shock event 
reinforced a probability-reducing approach that had been neglected during the Second World War, in 
line with the maxim ‘never again’. The first Delta Committee implemented safety standards and the 
huge infrastructure projects at the coast and the river that would shape the face of the country. In 
the following years, water safety became crucial for the economic success of the Netherlands, with 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam, in the western part of the country, being centres for trade. In recent 
decades the probability-reducing approach started to be challenged due to environmental 
movements, climate change and further development in knowledge. Choosing 1953 as the baseline 
for analysis allows us to trace this development, paying equal attention to factors of stability and 
change. 
In terms of document analysis, sufficient access to relevant information was available. Only when it 
came to the financing of FRM and the evaluation of costs in relation to the benefits of FRM was 
information limited, so that we could not derive statements for outcome efficiency from reliable 
documents or secondary literature. As for interviews, the stakeholders that have been interviewed 
are generally reliable representatives of the relevant organisations. However, certain stakeholders 
were not available for the requested interviews due to time constraints. This was deemed to be a 
shortcoming, but could be compensated for by alternative interviews or a more detailed document 
analysis.   
1.3.3 Case study selection 
The time frame – 1953- 2014 – allows us to trace the most important changes influencing FRM in the 
Netherlands. The analysis at the national level revealed that FRM is highly path dependent with only 
incremental changes. Therefore, case studies were selected that focus particularly on the changes – 
particular trends –- that can be identified. The Zuidplaspolder still illustrates the mainstream 
approach, i.e. despite a high flood risk, urban development is still carried out, but with innovative 
adaptation measures. The Nijmegen case study describes a shift towards a more eco-based 
management approach. It is one of 39 implementation sites of the national Room for the River 
programme. Lastly, Dordrecht is one implementation site of the concept of multi-layered safety, 
which prescribes a shift towards a multitude of strategies. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the main 
characteristics of the selected case studies.  
Table 1.1: Key characteristics of selected case studies and research motivation 
 Zuidplaspolder  Nijmegen  Dordrecht  
Region  South Holland Gelderland South Holland 
City 
population 
40,900 
Density: 689/km2 
168,000 
Density: 3,100/ km2 
119,000 
Density: 1,500/ km2 
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River basin  Rhine-West Rhine-West
 
Rhine-West 
Flood type  Fluvial, pluvial, sea  Fluvial Fluvial and sea  
Elevation Elevation: -6m Elevation: 7-88m Elevation: 1m 
Research 
motivation 
Example of a more or less 
mainstream approach, i.e. 
development in high flood risk 
area, but with adapting 
mitigative solutions 
One of 39 Room for the River 
project sites that adopt a 
more integrated, eco-system 
based approach to FRM 
One of around several pilot 
projects to explore multi-
layered safety focusing on 
probability-reducing and 
consequence-managing 
measures 
 
The cases give further insights into the conditions that allowed change in a highly path dependent 
arrangement. However, the consequence of this information-oriented case selection (Flyvbjerg, 
2004), is that no cases were chosen that illustrate FRM in different catchments (e.g. the Meuse) or in 
areas with limited flood risk (e.g. Limburg). Such cases were not chosen because their added value to 
the overall aim of this research was perceived to be limited. The aim was to understand the broader 
approach to FRM in flood-prone urban areas in the Netherlands, and the dynamics within this 
approach. The chosen cases are therefore illustrations of the approach to FRM in (highly) urbanised 
areas with high population density and economic value, and a significant flood risk. Marginal cases 
that illustrate a special situation in the Dutch context and do not reflect national developments were 
therefore not chosen. 
1.4 Outline of the report  
The outline of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on the National Flood Policies and 
Regulations Domain (NFPR) in the Netherlands, which is described in terms of an (overarching) flood 
risk governance arrangement (FRGA) and the identified sub-FRGA therein. This provides insights into 
the main features of the governance of flood risks at the national level. After elaborating on relevant 
context-related variables, a review is provided of the current FRGA and the extent to which Flood 
Risk Management Strategies (FRMSs) are embedded in this arrangement. To understand how and 
why governance has formed in this way, §2.4 aims to provide explanations for the current FRGA, 
including stability and change in the national arrangement (and relevant legal factors). §2.5 evaluates 
the FRGA at the national level. This chapter raises interesting questions to be taken up at case study 
level. Chapters 3-5 analyse, explain and evaluate developments in the case studies. Based on 
Chapters 2-5, Chapter 6 provides overarching explanations and Chapter 7 provides an overall 
evaluation of the developments studied. Chapter 8 concludes this report by providing suggestions for 
strengthening and redesigning flood risk governance in the Netherlands. 
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2. Analysis of national flood risk governance 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on an understanding of the national flood policies and regulations in the 
Netherlands. This provides insights into the main features of the governance of flood risks at the 
country level. After elaborating on relevant context-related variables (§2.2) an overview is provided 
of national flood risk governance (§2.3). Explanations for this are provided (§2.4), followed by an 
evaluation at the country level (§2.5). §2.6 concludes this chapter. 
2.2 The context level  
2.2.1 Physical circumstances 
The Netherlands is situated in Western Europe, bordering on the North Sea, Belgium and Germany. It 
is situated in the delta of four major river systems: the Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt and Ems (Van Rijswick 
& Havekes 2012). The terrain itself consists mostly of coastal lowlands, polder areas (reclaimed land) 
and hills in the South-East. Table 2.1 gives an overview of the most relevant physical properties. 
Table 2.1: Overview of physical properties of the Netherlands  
Criteria Properties of the Netherlands 
Area
2 
41,000 km
2
 (7,600 km
2
 water) 
Coast line
3 
451 km 
Elevation
4 
Lowest: -7 m 
Highest: 322 m 
Climate
5 
Temperate - Maritime 
Mean annual precipitation
6 
700mm – 900mm 
Flood-prone land area
7
 Susceptible to flooding: 59% 
Below sea level: 26% 
Susceptible to river flooding: 29% 
Protected by embankments or dunes: 55% 
Projected climate change (1990 – 
2100) (PBL 2013) 
Annual precipitation: 
Sea level rise: 
Discharges Rhine: 
 
 
-5% to +6% 
35cm to 85 cm 
Summer: -41% to +1% 
Winter: +12% to +27% 
 
Due to those physical characteristics 59% of the Netherlands is susceptible to flooding from the sea, 
fluvial flooding, and increasingly also pluvial flooding. Flood risk is projected to increase due to 
                                                          
2
 CIA, ‘The World Factbook’ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nl.html, n.d., 
(Accessed 15 October 2013). 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 KNMI, ‘Weer en klimaat in Nederland’, 
http://www.knmi.nl/cms/content/90757/regional_differences_in_the_extreme_rainfall_climatology_in_the_n
etherlands, 2010, (accessed 2 April 2014). 
7
 PBL, ‘Correction wording flood risks for the Netherlands in IPCC report’ 
http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/content/correction-wording-flood-risks, n.d., (accessed 2 April 
2014). 
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climate change. Ongoing soil subsidence and economic growth in flood-prone areas will additionally 
increase the risk. The low-lying, flood-prone area in the western part of the country, is also the area 
with the highest economic value called ‘the Randstad’, where 70% of the GDP is produced and the 
population density is the highest (1,180 inh./km2) (V&W 2008; V&W, VROM, and LNV 2009). 
However, due to the extensive structural measures that protect 55% of the country, the probability 
of flooding is greatly reduced,8 but the potential impact of flooding might be catastrophic (low 
probability – high impact situation). Flood risk management is therefore highly prioritised and, thus, 
it is the main focus of the national climate change adaptation programme, the Delta Programme.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Overview of population density and flood prone areas9.  
2.2.2 Historical events and related responses 
Table 2.2 lists the historical events of influence for flood risk management in the Netherlands. The 
storm surge of 1953, and the following Delta Commission in 1956, is the baseline for this analysis, 
                                                          
8
 PBL, ‘Correction wording flood risks for the Netherlands in IPCC report’ 
http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/content/correction-wording-flood-risks, n.d., (accessed 2 April 
2014). 
9
Left map: SEDAC, ‘Low Elevation Coastal Zone (LECZ)’, 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/downloads/maps/lecz/lecz-urban-rural-population-estimates-
v1/netherlands-population-density-and-lecz.jpg, 2009, (accessed 16 September 2014).  
Right map: PBL, 2009. *) Floodable stretch of the undyked part of the River Meuse within the 1/250 contour. 
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because it institutionalised the probability-reducing approach to FRM that would shape the country 
in the coming years (see also table 2.2). 
 
 
Table 2.2: Historical events in the Netherlands and related responses (base year is marked red) 
Year Event Response 
1916 Zuiderzeestorm  IJsselmeer Enclosure dam (Afsluitdijk) 
1925/ 1926 Flooding of the river Rhine and 
Meuse 
Extensive dike reinforcement 
1953 Storm surge  First Delta Commission 
Delta Works (Deltawerken 1956 - 1997) 
1993/ 1995 High river discharges Rhine and 
Meuse 
Reinforcement of dikes (Delta Plan Great Rivers, 1996) 
Flood defence Act (1996) 
Policy Room for the River (1997) 
1998 Intensive rainfall event Tielrooy Committee (2000) 
Policy ‘Dealing differently with water’ (2000) 
2003 Dike breach by Wilnis due to drought Supported the realization that dikes can breach and 
fail even in the absence of high water levels, so that 
failing mechanisms of dikes are increasingly 
investigated and taken into considerations  
2.2.3 General characteristics of the demographic and socio-cultural context 
Table 2.3 gives an overview of the major demographic characteristics of the Netherlands. The 
Netherlands is one of the most densely populated countries in Europe. The ongoing population 
growth in recent decades increased flood risk, by increasing the potential consequences of a flood 
(RIVM, 2004).  
Table 2.3: Major demographic characteristics of the Netherlands. 
Year #residents #house-
holds 
#residents/ 
household 
Population 
density/ km
2 
 
Average 
age 
%male/ 
female 
Average 
household 
income in € 
1950 10,026,773 2,535,000 3.93 309 30.8 49.85/50.15 Nd 
1960 11,417,254 3,171,000 3.56 352 31.7 49.80/50.20 Nd 
1970 12,957,621 3,896,000 3.21 384 32.5 49.89/50.1 Nd 
1980 14,091,014 5,006,000 2.78 415 34.4 49.64/50.36 Nd 
1990 14,892,574 6,061,000 2.42 439 36.6 49.41/50.59 Nd 
2000 15,863,950 6,801,000 2.30 468 38.2 49.46/50.54 42,300 
2012 16,730,348 7,513,000 2.20 496 40.6 49.51/50.49 57,200 
Based on http://statline.cbs.nl 
2.2.4 Major socio-economic development 
The Dutch economy is the sixth largest in the euro-zone. The transhipping and refining activities 
around Rotterdam and the Amsterdam Airport Schiphol – referred to as the ‘gateways of Europe’ – 
are important centres for the Dutch economy (Shetter, 2002: 55). Those centres are examples of an 
important issue: 70% of the GDP is produced in the western part of the country. This part is 
especially susceptible to flooding, so that flood consequences are even more increased due to the 
high economic value of the area (V&W, 2008).  
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2.2.5 Administrative structure 
The Netherlands is a decentralised unitary state. It consists of three kinds of generic administrative 
bodies: the state, the provinces and the municipalities. Besides this generic decentralisation, the 
country is characterised by functional decentralisation. This means that specific responsibilities are 
transferred from central government to specific administrative bodies which are especially created to 
fulfil these responsibilities (Burkens et al., 2012). The regional water authorities are a clear example 
of functional decentralisation (Van Rijswick and Havekes, 2012). Chapter 7 of the Dutch Constitution 
provides the legal basis of all of Dutch administrative bodies. Every decentralised body has its own 
‘organic’ or institutional Act, which provides for the legal tasks, powers and obligations of that body. 
There is a top-down hierarchical relationship between the state, the provinces, and the 
municipalities and regional water authorities. There is no further hierarchical relation between the 
municipalities and the regional water authorities (see figure 2.2).   
 
Figure 2.2 Administrative structure of the Netherlands  
 
All administrative bodies consist of general and executive administrative organs; the former – in a 
nutshell – have legislative/regulatory competences, whereas the latter have executive competences 
(Burkens et al. 2012). The legislative power at the national level is constituted by both Chambers of 
Parliament (Staten-Generaal) and central government (Regering), consisting of the Ministers and the 
King (Chapter 5 Constitution). The state’s executive power lies with the Ministers and the Crown 
(Chapter 2 and 3 Constitution). Chapter 7 of the Dutch Constitution contains general provisions on 
the decentralised administrative bodies; these have been further elaborated in organisational 
legislation. The twelve provinces are governed by a directly elected Provincial Council (Provinciale 
Staten), the highest organ of the provinces. The executive power of the provinces lies with the 
Provincial Executive (Gedeputeerde Staten). The City Council (gemeenteraad) is the highest and 
directly elected organ of the municipalities. The Municipal Executive (college van burgemeester en 
wethouders) has the executive power. All regional water authorities have a general council 
(Algemeen Bestuur) consisting of directly elected members and appointed representatives of several 
stakeholder groups, and an executive administration (college van dijkgraaf en heemraden). All 
‘layers’ of the decentralised state have direct elections every four years and thus form a democracy 
(Nehmelman, 2014). Figure 2.3 and 2.4 show the administrative boundaries within the Netherlands.   
By virtue of the Joint Arrangements Act (Wet gemeenschappelijke regelingen), provinces, 
municipalities and regional water authorities are provided with legal instruments for inter-
governmental cooperation (Greef, 2010). On the basis of this Act – which itself has a legal basis in 
Article 134 of the Dutch Constitution – specific public responsibilities and competences can be 
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transferred to newly established public bodies (referred to as Joint Arrangements). Cooperation on 
the basis of this Act, in general, is voluntary. However, provinces, municipalities and regional water 
authorities can also be legally obliged (for instance by Act of Parliament) to establish Joint 
Arrangements and to transfer certain tasks and competences to these legal entities. The Security 
Regions Act (Wet veiligheidsregio’s) is a good example of this, as it obliges all municipalities to 
establish Joint Arrangements (referred to as Security Regions or Veiligheidsregio’s) and to transfer 
specific public tasks and competences concerning emergency management to these public entities 
(Greef, 2009). Currently, there are 25 Security Regions in the Netherlands (see figure 2.4). Their 
boards – unlike those of other public bodies – are not democratically elected, but consist of the 
Mayors of the municipalities represented by the region. One of them is appointed as Chair. Despite 
the fact that the boards consist of Mayors, the Security Regions as such count as independent public 
legal entities with specific tasks and competences of their own.                    
Chapter 6 of the Dutch Constitution contains provisions on the judiciary. A distinction is made 
between civil jurisdiction and administrative jurisdiction (Article 112 Constitution). The Civil 
Procedures Act (CPA) and the General Administrative Law Act (GALA) contain more specific 
provisions about court competences in civil and administrative cases, as well as on the procedural 
aspects thereof (Damen et al., 2009; Hugenholtz and Heemskerk, 2012). In most – there are some 
exceptions – cases in which an interested party wishes to contest an appealable decision of a 
competent authority, this party can – after having filed a complaint with the decision-making 
authority – lodge an appeal with the administrative jurisdiction division of a district court 
(rechtbank). At the next (and last) stage, he can appeal against this court’s judgment to the 
Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad 
van State). In all other cases in which the government is a party (e.g. cases in which a party is not an 
interested party, a decision is not appealable, or there is no concrete decision to contest), appeals 
can be made to the civil jurisdiction division of a district court, with a possibility of appeal against its 
judgment to a court of appeal (gerechtshof), and of appeal in cassation at the Supreme Court (Hoge 
Raad).      
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Figure 2.3: Administrative borders of provinces and municipalities in the Netherlands  
Source: MarCom-Carto – Faculty of Geoscience – Utrecht Univeristy 
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Figure 2.4: Overview of administrative borders of regional water authorities and security regions 
in the Netherlands  
Source: MarCom-Carto – Faculty of Geoscience – Utrecht Univeristy 
2.2.6 Political and administrative culture 
The political power in this state is most often dispersed (Shetter, 2002), as is the case with the 
current coalition government. However, flood issues are mostly independent of political whims and 
have a rather stable place on the political agenda (interview 43). ‘As the popular Dutch saying goes, 
there are no left-wing or right-wing dikes’ (quoted in Keessen et al., 2013). The Dutch ‘Polder Model’ 
describes the decision-making process in the country. It is based on consultation with decentralised 
governmental bodies and interest groups, and on consensus, and compromise (Lijphart, 1968). 
Another characteristic is the Dutch spatial planning culture, which used to be characterised by a 
separation of rural and urban areas (Faludi and Van der Valk, 1994). The compact urban 
development facilitated the collective protection of citizens via large scale infrastructure. 
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2.2.7 Legal context  
The General Administrative Law Act (GALA – Algemene wet bestuursrecht) forms the legal basis for 
the decision-making process of administrative bodies and the legal protection of interested parties. 
The GALA and other general administrative legislation, e.g. the Access to Information Act, are 
particularly relevant for assessing transparency, legitimacy and participation (see §2.4). The GALA is 
generally applicable. However, when a special administrative Act (for example the Water Act) 
provides for specific procedural provisions which are contrary to the provisions in the GALA, then the 
special Act takes precedence (Michiels, 2014).   
Some definitions and principles provided in the GALA are of particular importance for all 
administrative procedures in the Netherlands, as well as for decision-making in FRM. These are listed 
below.  
 An ‘administrative authority’ is a) an organ of a legal entity which has been established under 
public law, or b) another person or body which is invested with any public authority (Article 
1:1(1) GALA); 
 An ‘order’ is a written decision of an administrative authority constituting a public law act 
(Article 1:3(1) GALA); 
 An ‘administrative decision’ is an order which is not of a general nature, including the 
rejection of an application for such an order (Article 1:3(2) GALA), e.g. a water permit; and 
 An ‘interested party’ is a person or legal body whose interests are directly affected by an 
administrative order (article 1:2 GALA). For example, action groups can be considered as an 
interested party, if they look after a specific environmental or land use interest.  Interests of 
interested parties have to be balanced by a competent authority in different stages of the 
decision-making process. Only interested parties may file objections or appeal against 
decisions.  
 
 Principle of due care: When preparing an order an administrative authority shall gather the 
necessary information concerning the relevant facts and the interests to be weighed (Article 
3:2 GALA); 
 Weighing of interests: When making an order the administrative authority shall weigh the 
interests directly involved in so far as no limitation on this duty derives from a statutory 
regulation or the nature of the power being exercised (Article 3:4(1) GALA); and 
 Duty to give reasons: An order shall be based on proper reasons (Article 3:46 GALA). 
The authorities mentioned in §2.2.5 are all ‘administrative authorities’ and may take ‘orders’ and 
make ‘decisions’.  
If the object of dispute is an administrative decision, Chapters 6 and 7 GALA are applicable. In these 
chapters, the interested party has the possibility of lodging a formal complaint about the decision to 
the administrative body that was competent to make the challenged decision and can lodge an 
appeal.  
If the object of dispute is an administrative order of general interest or a complex decision, Chapter 
3.4 GALA has to be applied. The interested parties can submit their opinions during the decision-
making procedure. Only the ones having submitted their opinions in time are able to go to a district 
court or to the Council of State. Some orders and decisions are excluded for legal protection. Annex 2 
  
15 
 
of the GALA includes the so-called ‘negative list’. This list includes for instance the national water 
plan and the ledger, the latter being a document listing the conditions that water management 
structures shall be subject to in terms of orientation, shape, dimension and construction (article 5.1 
Water Act). This is relevant, because the flood risk management plans are part of the national water 
plan and therefore not open to judicial review. Even though people can actively participate in the 
decision-making process, they cannot challenge the outcome before an objective court, as is the case 
for other plans. No data is available whether this is seen as a deficiency within the participation 
procedure or if people would have filed an appeal if they had the opportunity.   
2.2.8 Implementation of the Floods Directive 
The Netherlands has rationally and expediently implemented the Floods Directive (FD) in national 
legislation, namely in the Water Act and the (governmental) Water Decree. The planning system of 
the Water Framework Directive (WFD) is followed. All new tasks are closely connected to already 
existing tasks and responsibilities of competent water management authorities.  
A preliminary flood risk assessment has not been conducted because of the geomorphological 
elements of the Netherlands. This means that the flood hazard maps and flood risk maps cover the 
whole country, even though not the whole of the country can be considered to be flood prone. 
The provinces are responsible for the flood hazard maps and flood risk maps. The flood risks and 
flood hazards are included in already existing general risk maps and are publicly available via: 
www.risicokaart.nl. The flood risk management plans (FRMP) are made at sub river basin level (for 
the Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt and Ems). They consist of a national and an international part. From 
December 2014 until June 2015 they were open for public review. By using the general procedures 
for public consultation and not also having a special consultation for FRMPs, it was considered that 
the criterion of article 9 FD (active involvement of interested parties) had been met. The FD 
enhanced the institutionalisation of the risk approach that was already present (see §2.4.2). 
2.2.9 Conclusion 
Based on this short exploration of the contextual properties of the Netherlands, a number of 
important aspects that influence flood risk management in the Netherlands can be highlighted: 
 High vulnerability to flooding. This is a historical situation due to its physical location, but it 
is projected to increase in the future due to climate change and ongoing increase of 
economic value in flood-prone areas.  
 Specialised public system based on administrative law to manage floods. This comprises 
specialised authorities of the regional water authorities, and a prioritisation of flood risk 
mostly independent of political parties. 
 For public participation and access to the courts the general procedures are applicable. 
However, not all plans are open to judicial review, e.g. the flood risk management plans.  
2.3 Flood Risk Governance: analysing the arrangements 
2.3.1 Introduction 
To what extend can the five FRMS be identified in the Netherlands, and is a diversification of 
strategies visible? Although within the current FRGA all five strategies (prevention, defence, 
mitigation, preparation and response, and recovery) are present to some extent (see table 2.4), the 
flood defence strategy has been the predominant FRMS in the Netherlands since the mid-1950s. As a 
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reaction to the near-floods of the early and mid-1990s and the impact of hurricane Katrina in the US, 
however, flood risk perception started to change and the focus on other FRMSs increased. As a 
result, separately distinguishable sub-FRGAs emerged over time, each with their own characteristics 
in terms of actors, rules, discourse and resources. In addition, the adaptation approach gradually 
found its way into Dutch flood risk management (Gilissen, 2014c). Another noteworthy step in this 
development was the introduction of the policy concept of Multi-Layered Safety (MLS) in 2009. The 
policy concept describes three layers of FRM: (1) probability-reduction through dikes or river-
widening; (2) sustainable urban planning and water-robust construction, and (3) disaster 
management. It (re)affirms flood defence in general as the primary strategy in Dutch flood risk 
governance, supplemented by flood mitigation and preparation/response (Rijksoverheid, 2009). This 
concept is expected to develop further in areas suitable for this concept, for instance within the 
framework of the Delta Programme (I&M, 2014), creating an ever more solid and resilient basis for 
Dutch flood risk governance in the years to come (see table 2.5). Chapter 5 introduces a pilot project 
of MLS. The strategy of flood recovery/compensation has received the least attention over time, and 
is only partly institutionalised. It plays a minimal role. 
Table 2.4: Flood risk management strategies in the Netherlands 
Flood 
prevention 
Flood defence Flood mitigation Flood preparation and 
response 
Flood recovery  
Expropriation 
policy; 
Re-allotment 
policy; 
Spatial plans; 
Water test; 
Prohibition of 
construction 
after a flood 
 
3,650 km of primary 
flood protection (dikes, 
dunes); 
808 coastal protection 
works; 
3,000 polders that 
need to be drained 
daily; 
14,000km of non-
primary structures; 
Erosion prevention 
measures; 
Retention basins 
outside area to be 
protected; 
Widening, deepening, 
dredging; 
Weirs (if used to drain 
faster or for water 
retention outside area 
to be protected); 
Water course 
maintenance; 
Quay walls; 
Compartment dikes; 
Winter beds 
Man-controlled 
flood zones; 
Rain water 
reservoirs; 
Separate sewers; 
Retention basins 
inside area to be 
protected; 
SuDS (including 
green roofs, 
urban green); 
Flood safe 
building; 
Permeable 
pavements 
Sand bags; 
Pumps (if used to 
manage a flood when it 
occurs); 
Repair works of flood 
protection measures (in 
case of emergency, not 
regular maintenance); 
Flood warning systems; 
Intervention and 
evacuation plans; 
24-hour monitoring and 
intervention teams; 
Forecasting; 
Crisis communication; 
General information 
about flooding (e.g. 
flood maps) 
One insurance 
company Repair 
works; 
National 
solidarity fund 
 
How is the National Flood Policies and Regulations Domain (NFPRR) structured and to what extend is 
there cohesion between the sub-Flood Risk Governance Arrangements (sub-FRGA), including the link 
to other policy domains? Today, five sub-FRGAs can be distinguished (see figure 2.6), namely the 
arrangements of Water System Management (WSM), Urban Water Management (UWM), Spatial 
Planning (SP), Emergency Management (EM) and Compensation. On the one hand, those sub-FRGAs 
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are distinguished by their purpose, goal or mission (i.e. on the different flood risk strategies identified 
within the STAR-FLOOD project). On the other hand, the arrangements are characterised by 
differences in the actor, rules, resource and discourse dimension of the PAA. As a consequence, the 
identified sub-FRGAs are not completely similar to the STAR-FLOOD strategies. Although separately 
distinguishable, these sub-FRGAs nowadays are highly interconnected by specific legal and policy 
instruments and other bridging processes and mechanisms. Within each sub-FRGA a combination of 
FRMSs is represented. Nevertheless, dominant strategies per sub-arrangement are identifiable 
(figure 2.5), illustrating the high degree of integration in Dutch FRM. Below, we will discuss the five 
sub-FRGAs in further detail, referring to the four dimensions of the PAA: discourse, rules, actor and 
power. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Simplified overview of the strategies present in the Netherlands and their relative 
dominance, i.e. dark blue most dominant (flood defence), medium blue present and in further 
development, and light blue relatively low importance.  
  
18 
 
Table 2.5: Summary of sub-FRGAs within the flood policy domain in the Netherlands 
Sub-FRGA Description Strategies Key actors Key rules/legislation Key discourses Key resources 
Water system 
management 
Sub-FRGA that describes 
aspects related to the 
management of the 
water system (i.e. 
coherent set of one or 
more surface water 
bodies and associated 
storage areas, dams and 
supporting structures) of 
fluvial flooding and 
coastal flooding 
 
Defence National: Ministry 
Infrastructure and 
Environment and 
Rijkswaterstaat  
Regional Water 
Authorities: Water 
boards 
construction 
companies,  
expertise centres 
Water Act 
 
Programmes 
HWBP 
Delta Programme 
Room for the River 
Technocratic 
discourses 
Integrated water 
management 
Efficiency 
 
Delta Fund 
 
Water authority taxes 
 
Technical expertise 
Urban Water 
management 
Sub-FRGA that describes 
aspects related to the 
management of urban 
waters, i.e. pluvial 
flooding 
Defence  
Mitigation 
Recovery 
citizens  
Municipalities 
Wet gemeentelijke 
watertaken, as 
integrated in:Water Act 
(art. 3.5) 
Sewerage 
(Environmental 
Management Act) 
Delta Programme 
Sustainability 
Climate change 
Subsidiarity  
Provincial/ municipal funds 
Project budget 
Own expenses of house/ 
company owners 
Spatial 
Planning 
Sub-FRGA that 
comprises the spatial 
planning aspects in flood 
risk management.  
Prevention  
Mitigation  
Provinces 
Municipalities 
Regional Water 
Authorities 
 
Spatial planning Act 
Incl. Water assessment 
Delta Programme 
Climate change 
adaptation 
Sustainability 
Risk approach  
Integrated water 
management 
Provincial/ municipal funds 
Emergency 
Management 
Sub-FRGA that 
comprises the 
emergency aspects of 
flood risk management 
Preparation and 
response 
Recovery 
Ministry Security 
and Justice, NCTV 
10
 
Regional security 
regions 
Security regions Act 
 
Integrated risk 
approach 
Municipal funding (security 
regions) 
National funding 
Compensation Minor sub-FRGA that 
comprises governmental 
Recovery Ministry Security 
and Justice,  
Calamities compensation 
Act 
Risk approach 
Solidarity 
National funding – 
compensation fund 
                                                          
10
 National coordinator for security and counterterrorism 
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and non-governmental 
compensation 
arrangements 
 
Regulations of liability 
private insurance 
for pluvial flooding 
and to some degree 
for fluvial flooding 
property owner 
Water managers 
Insurance policies 
Liability (Civil Code) 
Funds of liable authority 
Private funding - insurance 
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Figure 2.6: Overview of the Dutch flood risk governance arrangement and its sub-arrangements.  
The sub-FRGAs are further elaborated in § 2.3.2-2.3.6. The more a sub-FRGA is within the blue FRM field, the 
higher is its relevance for FRM in the Netherlands. The larger a circle is, the more institutionalised  the sub-
FRGAis. The sub-FRGA ‘Compensation’ will not appear in the case studies because it is a nationwide sub-
FRGA.  
2.3.2 Sub-FRGA ‘Water System Management’  
The WSM sub-FRGA is highly institutionalised and characterised by a programmatic and technocratic 
approach, mainly incorporating the flood defence strategy. From a point of view of the discourse, the 
underlying assumption is that nature could be controlled by mankind through technical or 
engineering measures (Ten Brinke, 2007; Van den Brink, 2009). This paradigm is to some degree still 
supported by the epistemic community of water engineers. In the 1970s the awareness of 
environmental issues increased (see for example Meadows, 1972; Tellegen and Willems, 1978; 
Schwartz, 1993; Bosch & Van der Ham, 1998). The idea of Integrated Water Resource Management 
(IWRM) was officially introduced in 1983 in the Third National Water Plan (Derde Nota 
Waterhuishouding) and supported a change within the strategy of flood defence towards a more 
natural approach that gave more room for the river, in the form of the ‘Room for the River’ 
programme (VROM and V&W, 1996). In chapter 4, the Nijmegen case study further explores this 
integrated water system-based approach to FRM. 
The main actors are the dike management authorities, namely the regional water authorities and the 
Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat). The Minister of 
Infrastructure and the Environment (the Minister) and the Provincial Executives function as 
supervisory organs, to which the dike management authorities are accountable. Furthermore, 
several national and provincial authorities share legislative competences, mainly regarding the 
establishment of legal safety standards, assessment tools, and technical guidelines. Strategic 
planning is done through ‘water plans’ (waterplannen) at the central and provincial level by the 
Minister and the Provincial Councils respectively. The implementation of measures is done through 
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‘management plans’ (beheerplannen) by the competent central or regional water management 
authorities. These plans provide for a programmatic basis for more concrete project plans and 
decisions.    
One of the integral purposes of the Dutch Water Act is to prevent, and where necessary limit, floods 
and water logging (Gilissen, 2013; Groothuijse, 2009). In view of this public duty of care, a legal 
distinction is being made between primary and non-primary (also referred to as ‘regional’ or 
‘secondary’) flood defence structures. For the so-called ‘dike rings’ (i.e. areas protected by primary 
flood defence structures), legal safety standards have been established in Annex II of the Dutch 
Water Act. For (most) regional flood defence structures, safety standards have been established in 
provincial by-laws. So far as water logging is concerned, legal standards have been established in 
provincial by-laws. The competent water authorities must make an effort to achieve these standards. 
For this purpose, they have specific instruments at their disposal (e.g. the strengthening or relocation 
of dikes, the designation of conservation zones, and the designation of retention/water storage 
areas). As to the implementation of their legal duties, they have a wide margin of policy discretion, 
but they periodically have to report to the supervisory organs mentioned. Their reports must 
primarily be based on pre-set hydraulic conditions and technical guidelines. Although the supervisory 
authorities can give legally binding instructions about the implementation of the duty of care for 
water safety, hierarchical steering generally takes place on a political level through strategic 
planning.  
The national and regional water authorities, together with a broad network of scientific institutes, 
including universities and consultancies, have a strong knowledge resource base in the field of 
engineering and water governance. This establishes the central position of water authorities, which is 
supported by a relatively stable financial resource base. Regional water authorities have their own 
system of taxation (Havekes et al., 2011), and on the national level financial means are provided in 
special funds, the Delta Fund based on Chapter 7 of the Water Act.   
Besides their traditional tasks in flood defence, water authorities also have a legal responsibility 
regarding flood preparation and response, as they have to establish emergency plans 
(calamiteitenplannen) as part of their water plans. These plans substantively must be aligned with 
the crisis plans (crisisplannen) established by the Security Regions on the basis of the Security 
Regions Act (see §2.3.5). Thus, the preparation and response strategy is also to some extent 
embedded within the WSM sub-FRGA, even though this is not the dominant strategy there. By virtue 
of a specific coordination mechanism, there is a close relation between the FRGAs of water system 
management and emergency management.  
Water authorities, lastly, have a legal responsibility to restore their public works (such as dikes) as 
soon as possible after a flood event. This can be interpreted as the implementation of the recovery 
strategy within the WSM sub-FRGA.                          
2.3.3 Sub-FRGA ‘Urban Water Management’ 
A recently developed sub-FRGA within the Dutch water management framework is that of Urban 
Water Management. After heavy rainfall events of 1998, a committee was set up to improve 
adaptation to climate change (Tielrooij Commissie, 2000). This sub-FRGA is related to the discourse 
of sustainability and climate change. The concept ‘retaining, storing, draining’ describes a shift from a 
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technical approach, consisting of sewer management, towards a more sustainable approach, which 
comprises ideas of a Sustainable Urban Drainage System (SuDS). The underlying idea in the discourse 
is that every region should try to address its problems itself (Tielrooij Commissie, 2000; and Rijk et 
al., 2003).  
Mainly addressing floods due to rainwater run-off and groundwater surpluses, this sub-arrangement 
is to be functionally and organisationally distinguished from the WSM sub-FRGA. Still in the process 
of being developed, this sub-FRGA has a rather low degree of institutionalisation. Although non-
binding standards have been agreed upon within the framework of the ‘National Administrative 
Agreement on Water Issues’ (‘Nationaal Bestuursakkoord Water’), until now no single strategy has 
emerged as predominant in efforts made to achieve these standards. Instead, in practice there is a 
regionally differing mixture of chiefly preventive, defensive and mitigative measures. The main actors 
within this sub-FRGA are (private) landowners and municipal authorities (the Municipal Council and 
the Municipal Executive). The legal basis of this arrangement, nowadays, is to be found in Articles 3.5 
and 3.6 of the Water Act, supplemented with some relevant provisions on sewerage in the 
Environmental Management Act.  
The responsibility for urban water management on private property primarily lies with landowners. 
For public property, the municipality is responsible. Only as far as landowners ‘cannot reasonably be 
expected’ to take measures themselves, municipal authorities become responsible. In particular, this 
can be the case in densely populated/built-up/paved areas. Landowners can freely choose between 
different kinds of measures/strategies. Besides a possibility to insure themselves against damage due 
to pluvial floods, they can, for instance, choose to create rainwater storage capacity (defence) or to 
prevent their built property (houses, barns, cellars) from flooding by adjusting thresholds 
(mitigation). There are hardly any legal instruments for public actors to influence decisions made by 
landowners in this respect (Heger, 2009; Uittenbroek et al., 2012). Landowners can also choose to 
increase the infiltration capacity of the soil by removing paving from their property or by keeping 
their property at least partly unpaved (defence). Municipal authorities have spatial planning 
instruments at their disposal to implement their UWM policy, for instance by adopting maximum 
paving/building percentages in their zoning plans. They are, however, not legally obliged to do so 
and, although some have explicitly established policies in this respect, it is unclear on what scale this 
is being done throughout the country.       
As far as landowners cannot reasonably be expected to take measures themselves – and this, 
admittedly, is a rather vague criterion – the responsibility for collecting and processing rainwater lies 
with municipal authorities. This can inter alia be done through increasing water storage capacity in 
the public domain or through transporting the water via sewerage or other systems (both defence 
measures in terms of the STAR-FLOOD project). If necessary, sewerage transport capacity can be 
increased, or so-called storm water drains (hemelwaterriolen) can be constructed. Also water 
management authorities can be involved, for instance by increasing the storage capacity of water 
bodies under their control. The responsible authorities have a wide margin of policy discretion, both 
as to decide whether or not measures should be taken, as well as to decide which (types of) 
measures should be taken. There are, in other words, no clear legal standards giving substance to 
this municipal duty of care. Increasing/creating water storage capacity is mainly done through spatial 
planning instruments, so in this respect there is some overlap between the UWM and the SP sub-
FRGA. Sewage management takes place through sewage plans (based on the Environmental 
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Management Act), containing both strategic and operational aspects. Although practice shows many 
(regional) experiments and developments in urban water management, there is still no clear and 
general line in UWM policy. Moreover, inter-governmental supervision and hierarchical steering, and 
accountability instruments are (still) relatively underdeveloped.       
2.3.4 Sub-FRGA ‘Spatial Planning’  
From the point of view of the discourse, this sub-FRGA in its relation to FRM is closely connected to 
the paradigm of IWRM. However, it also has connections to ideas in the discourse about 
sustainability, climate change adaptation and an integrated risk approach. Those discourses are 
combined within the MLS concept, which developed the sub-arrangement further (Rijksoverheid, 
2009; V&W et al., 2009). The case study Zuidplaspolder demonstrates that ideas of economic growth 
are an important discourse hampering the integration of flood risk in SP. 
From the late 1990s onwards, ‘water’ has been referred to as one of the major guiding principles in 
21st century spatial planning (V&W, 2000). Although not specifically developed for water 
management purposes, in that respect the Dutch spatial planning system does provide for a number 
of particularly useful instruments. The spatial planning system is a highly institutionalised and legally 
refined system, which is mainly policy driven and has the purpose of optimally balancing all spatially 
relevant interests, among which are those related to water management. Its central instruments are 
strategic spatial development plans (structuurvisies) and legally binding spatial zoning plans 
(bestemmingsplannen). With the decentralisation doctrine at its very heart, its main actors are to be 
found at the municipal level, where the Municipal Council is responsible for establishing both 
strategic and normative spatial policy, and the Municipal Executive is mainly responsible for licensing 
and enforcement. Provincial and state authorities, nonetheless, play a supervisory and (politically) 
steering role in spatial planning as, at the provincial/central level, strategic spatial policy has to be 
established, legally binding instructions can be given, and generally applicable norms can be 
established. These instructions and norms are always directed towards Municipal Councils, and have 
directly to be implemented into their normative zoning plans. Water authorities do not play a 
formally decisive role in Dutch spatial planning, but – by virtue of the so-called water test 
(watertoets) – they do play a formalised advisory role during the process of drafting strategic and 
normative spatial policies.    
As stated above, the Dutch system of spatial planning provides for instruments suited to implement 
certain FRMSs. A preventive strategy, for instance, can be implemented through adopting a 
construction ban or construction restrictions in spatial zoning plans for flood-prone areas, such as 
polders. Practice shows, however, that this was not regularly done in the past, as many polders and 
other low-lying parts of the country are amongst the most densely populated/intensively used areas. 
This is still happening, as the case study Zuidplaspolder will show. An example of preventive 
(national) policy, which is to be taken into account in zoning plans within the riverine area, is to be 
found in the Major Rivers Policy (Beleidslijn Grote Rivieren) of 2006. Also a mitigative strategy can be 
implemented within spatial policy, for instance through adopting specific building criteria or 
restrictions in building codes accompanying zoning plans. One could think of adjusted floor levels, 
building on ‘terps’ (or mounds, which are artificial hills), or restrictions to building basements. Finally 
– despite the fact that defensive measures are regularly taken within the framework of the WSM 
sub-FRGA – in addition a defensive strategy, most of the time, needs spatial implementation. One 
could think of dike relocation projects or the designation of water storage areas. The programme 
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‘Room for the River’ provides several examples of such projects; the project ‘Dike Relocation Lent’ 
(see chapter 4), in light of the above, is an illustrative case.  
Besides the water test – as a formalised advisory construction to foster water management interests 
to be taken into account in spatial planning and decision making – there are a number of other 
arrangements linking the WSM and the SP sub-FRGA. Whereas developments within the WSM sub-
FRGA can have some spatial impacts (e.g. a dike relocation), the national and provincial water plans 
(containing strategic water policy to be taken into account in (day-to-day) operational water 
management) legally are to be considered to be spatial development plans as well. In fact, this 
means that strategic water policy – concerning its spatially relevant aspects – counts at the same 
time as strategic spatial policy, which has in turn to be taken into account in spatial planning. Since 
the last decade, water authorities are also playing an increasing, yet informal role in strategic spatial 
planning processes.   
2.3.5 Sub-FRGA ‘Emergency Management’  
As in the course of the first decade of the new millennium a shift occurred in discourse, Dutch policy 
makers started to realise that flood risks can at best be minimised, but can never be eliminated; this 
is in accordance with the integrated risk approach (V&W and BZK, 2006b; V&W, 2008; Rijksoverheid, 
2009; V&W et al., 2009). With the formation of the temporary Taskforce Management Flooding in 
2006, which had the task of improving the organisational crisis response for flooding, more focus was 
put on the preparation and response strategy (TMO, 2009). In 2009 the Steering Group Flooding was 
set-up as a permanent communication and coordination forum between water managers and 
emergency managers (V&W et al., 2009). Additionally, the Multi-Layered Safety concept will increase 
the focus on preparation and response as an independent strategy. With the entry into force of the 
Security Regions Act in 2010, within the broader domain of emergency management, a new sub-
FRGA emerged, in this report referred to as the sub-FRGA of ‘Emergency Management’. This sub-
FRGA is characterised by its strategic and planned approach of emergency situations, such as floods, 
and its tendency towards centralisation (‘up-scaling’ of responsibilities) of emergency management 
in case of (expected) severe floods. Its main actors are the Mayors of the municipalities involved, the 
Chairmen of the Security Regions, and the General Boards of the Security Regions. There are, 
moreover, clear coordinative arrangements between the WSM and the EM sub-FRGAs.  
Within the EM sub-FRGA, a distinction can be made between responsibilities for preparation and 
response. The Boards of the Security Regions are responsible for emergency management planning 
(i.e. preparation). These Boards consist of all the Mayors of those municipalities included in a 
Security Region. Besides these Mayors, the Chairman of the relevant regional water authority is also 
invited to participate in meetings of the Security Region’s Board. Strategic planning is done through 
so-called policy plans (beleidsplannen), which have to be based on concrete risk profiles. Operational 
policy and the exact division of responsibilities are set out in so-called crisis plans (crisisplannen), 
which have (as stated above) to be aligned with the emergency plans (calamiteitenplannen) of the 
relevant regional water authorities. In these plans, a wide range of possible emergency situations 
have to be addressed, among which – although not explicitly mentioned – are flood events. It 
remains unclear, however, to what extent flood risks are actually profiled and addressed within these 
plans. Recent developments show a slight increase in participation of emergency management 
authorities in FRM planning processes, but their capacity and knowledge remains limited.      
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When an actual flood occurs or is expected to occur, action needs to be taken (i.e. response). For 
instance, people need to be evacuated. In case of such an emergency, the Mayor of the municipality 
where the flood occurs or is expected to occur has supreme command over all parties and persons 
involved in the actual emergency management. However, in the case where a flood is or is expected 
to be of a regional scale, the Chairman of the Security Region has supreme command instead of the 
Mayor in whose municipality the flood occurs or is expected to occur. In those situations, a regional 
policy team is established, in which all relevant Mayors and the Chairmen of the relevant regional 
water authority are invited to participate. Unless urgency requires immediate action, all decisions are 
taken in consultation with the regional policy team. Decisions can also involve emergency 
competences, such as forced evacuation or general street bans. In exceptional cases, eventually the 
Minister of Security and Justice can take over certain competences. Despite these responsibilities and 
competences, inhabitants of flood-prone areas are to a large extent also expected to be self-reliant; 
they should be (more) aware of flood risks and should also be (better) prepared themselves for 
actual floods to occur. The lack of knowledge of inhabitants regarding their own responsibilities can 
be considered to be problematic, since they do not know how they should prepare themselves and 
how to handle properly in case of a flood as well.         
2.3.6 Sub-FRGA ‘Compensation’ 
Within the recovery strategy, a distinction can be made between restoration measures aimed at 
recovering the status quo (for instance rebuilding a house or a public work) and compensation 
measures (financial compensation through, for instance, public compensation mechanisms, liability 
claims, or insurance mechanisms). Within the Dutch FRGA, the latter type of measures appears as an 
independently distinguishable sub-FRGA which can be referred to as the sub-FRGA of 
‘Compensation’.  
It has been possible to insure against damage from pluvial flooding in the Netherlands since 1998. 
The market penetration seems to be relatively high (based on observations made during the 
Symposium of Association of Dutch Insurers), because the insurance is combined with house 
insurance. In contrast, insurance for damage from fluvial flooding is only available on a limited level. 
Since 2012, one insurance company has offered insurance (Neerlandse), but market penetration is 
low. Injured parties are mainly dependent on the system of liability law in order to be compensated 
(Gilissen, 2013; Gilissen, 2014b). Under specific circumstances, flood damage can also be 
compensated for on the basis of the Calamities Compensation Act. This happened, for instance, after 
a minor flood incident in Wilnis in 2003. Nonetheless, flood recovery through compensation is not a 
dominant strategy in Dutch FRM. The sub-FRGA ‘Compensation’, in comparison with the other sub-
FRGAs, plays a minor role and can be considered as the least institutionalised sub-FRGA, mainly due 
to the low frequency of flood events.    
A specific compensation mechanism in the Netherlands is the so-called system of no-fault liability 
(‘nadeelcompensatie’). The regime of no-fault liability is based on the French principle ‘égalité devant 
les charges publiques’ (equality for public burdens). The basic assumption of this principle is that 
compensation is granted to those who have endured a disproportionally large burden or loss caused 
by lawful activities pursued by the administration in the public interest (Fairgrieve, 2003; Tjepkema, 
2010; Van Doorn-Hoekveld, 2013; Van Doorn-Hoekveld, 2014a). Both the Water Act 2009 and the 
Spatial Planning Act 2008 contain specific provisions on the compensation of lawfully inflicted 
damage, for instance as a result of dike relocations.        
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2.3.7 Modes of Governance 
The five identified arrangements differ in their mode of governance, as indicated in the previous 
sections. The main conclusion is that the comprehensive FRGA in the Netherlands is shifting from a 
mainly single-sector-based approach towards a multi-sector governance arrangement, where 
especially spatial planning and emergency management gain in importance. Another conclusion is 
that no shift took place in regard to multi-actor governance, i.e. towards private actors. 
Administrative authorities stay as the main responsible parties for providing protection from 
flooding. Within the single sub-governance arrangements, a number of minor shifts in modes of 
governance can be identified. Table 2.6 summarises those modes of governance per sub-FRGA and 
the observed shifts.  
 
Table 2.6: Modes of governance adopted by sub-FRGAs in the Netherlands  
(Based on: Driessen and Dieperink, 2012). 
Sub-FRGA Mode of governance Shifts in modes of governance 
Water System 
Management 
Centralised/decentralised No significant changes, financing became again 
more decentralised with the cost-sharing 
arrangement, but the national assessment 
framework is an added central steering possibility  
Urban Water 
Management 
Interactive, decentralised From self-governance to interactive governance 
(increased involvement of insurance and 
decentralised government) 
Spatial Planning Decentralised No major change 
Emergency 
Management 
Decentralised From locally to regionally decentralised with 
upscaling in case of emergency  
Compensation Interactive governance From centralised towards more interactive 
governance in case of pluvial flooding 
 
2.4 Explanation of stability and change in Flood Risk Governance in the 
Netherlands 
2.4.1 The explanandum  
How has the NFPR changed over time? At least since the baseline year, the flood defence strategy 
has been the most dominant in the Netherlands. Accordingly, FRM is characterised by a highly 
technocratic, engineering approach, as well as a high governmental (central and decentral) 
dominance when it comes to the governance of those measures. The reason for this is above all the 
historical response to the high flood risk caused by the physical characteristics of the country. Even in 
the Middle Ages land reclamation works and later river channelling measures were being carried out 
(Lintsen, 2005; Ten Brinke, 2005; Van Heezik, 2006). Those structural measures were managed 
collectively by regional water authorities that were later constitutionally embedded in the 
administrative structure of the Netherlands and thereby highly institutionalised (Van den Ven, 2004; 
Havekes, 2009). Nowadays, the flood defence strategy is still the dominant strategy in Dutch FRM. It 
is not likely that this strategy will be abandoned or replaced by other strategies; although Dutch flood 
risk governance is becoming less technocratic and shows more attention to governance aspects. 
However, other strategies have emerged/are emerging, mostly as strategies which are instrumental 
or additional to the flood defence strategy (see §2.4.2).  
On the one hand, the FRGA is characterised by a high level of stability and path-dependency. The 
sub-FRGA Water System Management is very stable. It was reinforced in 1996 with the Flood 
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Defence Act that defines legal safety standards. The current update of those safety standards is 
another refinement, but also a stabilisation of this sub-arrangement. On the other hand, even though 
no radical changes can be observed, incremental, evolutionary changes have occurred. The observed 
changes can be characterised by what Valman (2013) would have termed layering: i.e. new rules and 
practices emerge next to existing ones. Therefore, a diversification of both FRMS and FRGA is visible, 
which is mainly based on the alignment of different sub-FRGAs, i.e. spatial planning and emergency 
management, with the historically stable sub-FRGA water system management. This is done through 
bridging mechanisms, e.g. legal instruments, or consultative bodies (see figure 2.7).  
 
Figure 2.7 Development of sub-FRGAs in FRM in the Netherlands 
The figure illustrates the movement of sub-FRGAs in the FRM domain. The sub-FRGA Water System 
Management is traditionally dominant and highly institutionalised. However, even if less institutionalised 
and dominant the sub-FRGA Compensation was already present before 1950 in the form of compensation 
funds (Van Doorn-Hoekveld, 2014b). At the beginning of the 21st century, spatial planning and Urban Water 
Management gain in importance with the establishment of instruments like the Water Test, or the SPKD 
Room for the River that improve the consideration of water quantity issues in spatial planning and therefore 
the integration of the two policy domains. Around 2010, emergency management is further institutionalised 
with the formation of security regions and it gains in importance in FRM, due to increased cooperation with 
water management in the Steering Group Flooding.  
 
The changes in FRGA emerge mostly in the discourse dimension, and have consequences for the 
organisational dimensions. The integrated water management discourse influenced the rules 
dimension by facilitating the setting-up of the legal instrument Spatial Planning Key Decision applied 
to implement the Room for the River programme. It also influences the actor dimension due to an 
increased cooperation between water managers and spatial planners. As illustrated in figure 2.7 the 
sub-FRGA Spatial Planning entered increasingly into the realm of flood risk management due to its 
alignment with the sub-FRGA WSM.  
 
Over time, urban water management increasingly developed as an independent sub-FRGA, mostly 
due to intensifying precipitation patterns and a number of urban flood events at the end of the 20th 
century, which forced an acknowledgement of the problem. This  change in discourse triggered a 
change in the rules dimension through the enactment of the Act on Municipal Water Tasks in 2008, 
which was preceded by a political debate on the matter, resulting in non-legally binding agreements 
in the National Administrative Agreement on Water Issues in 2003 (Rijk et al., 2003). In the past it 
was only a minor problem, which was managed in a technical way through sewer systems. However, 
it is acknowledged that often those systems cannot be enlarged easily, therefore spatial planning 
measures (e.g. green infrastructure, or use of kerbstones) gained in significance. As a consequence, 
the water test was implemented in the Spatial Planning Decree by 2001. Additionally, new actors and 
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resources were introduced due to the setting-up of a private insurance scheme to compensate for 
damage from rainfall (interview 3). The sub-FRGA Urban Water Management gained in significance in 
the realm of FRM. Later, the Water Test was not only used to consider pluvial flooding but all kinds of 
water issues. This spatial planning instrument nowadays constitutes the alignment of the sub-FRGA 
SP with the sub-FRGAs UWM and WSM (see figure 2.7).  
At the beginning of the 21st century, a risk approach to FRM became popular in the discourse 
because 100% safety was seen as unachievable (Rijksoverheid, 2009). This realisation was supported 
by the effects of Hurricane Katrina and the insights received from national study, e.g. on dike failing 
mechanisms (Veiligheid Nederland in Kaart, 2005; Inspectie Verkeer en Watertstaat, 2011), or the 
adverse impact of spatial development (RIVM, 2004). The consequence was a change in the actor 
dimension in the form of increased cooperation by water managers and emergency managers within 
the ‘Taskforce Management Flooding’, which became later the ‘Steering Group Management 
Flooding’ (TMO, 2009). Another change in the rules and actor dimension was the formation of 
security regions, which strengthened the significance of the sub-FRGA Emergency Management 
(interview 16 and 17). However, although floods are not explicitly mentioned in the Security Regions 
Act (SRA) of 2010, floods do match the broader definitions of ‘disaster’ and ‘crisis’ in the SRA. With 
the introduction of the SRA, the sub-FRGA Emergency Management gained significance in the realm 
of FRM (see figure 2.7).  
To what extent can the changes as mentioned above be described as ‘deep’ or ‘fundamental’? ‘Deep 
shifts’ are constituted through changes in all the dimensions of the PAA and especially the power and 
resource dimension (Wiering and Arts, 2006). In the Netherlands, major changes in the resource 
dimension are limited. Most financial means and expertise is still directed towards flood defence. 
Even though other strategies are supported by research (e.g. Delta Programme, Taskforce 
Management Flooding), the financial means for implementing those measures mostly need to be 
provided by the actors of the relevant policy sector. For spatial planning, in particular, this is ad hoc 
and depends on the region and political choices or consequences. Additionally, due to the traditional 
dominance of water managers, the awareness of flood risk among other actors is limited, and so is 
their willingness to invest (interview 8). That means, even though changes have occurred, they 
cannot be described as ‘fundamental’. The historically stable sub-FRGA Water System Management 
is still dominant, because water managers are still legally responsible and accountable for providing 
safety, and the legal safety standards and procedures still favour flood defence measures. Even 
though new bridging mechanisms have been implemented, no strong legally binding legislation or 
procedures have been set up. The Delta Programme brought all the different actors together, but the 
involvement of private sectors/actors was criticised as too limited (Van Buuren and Teisman, 2014). 
Successors might expand this trend in the future. Nevertheless, the cooperation between different 
sub-FRGAs is often based on communication, (informal) collaboration, consensus-finding and 
coordination between the actors within the different policy sectors. The degree of cooperation is 
therefore dependent on the respective parties.   
2.4.2 Explanatory factors for change and stability in the Dutch flood risk governance 
How can those incremental changes and stability be explained? Table 2.7 summarizes the main 
drivers of stability and change visible in the Netherlands. The paragraphs below will explain the 
dynamics in more detail.  
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Table 2.7: Overview of drivers of change and stability 
Significant explanatory factors are indicated in ‘bold’, and summarised in chapter 6 
 Drivers of stability Drivers of change 
Factors 
internal to 
the FRGA 
- Historical background; experience  
- Precipitated resources (high past 
investments in structural 
infrastructure) 
- Existing legislation /stable 
institutionalisation of actors 
- Existing legal safety standards 
- Conservative actor groups 
- Adaptation through learning: 
Knowledge development and 
technology improvement 
- Change agents 
o Environmental group 1990s 
o Policy entrepreneurs  
o Climate change adaptation group 
- Learning (e.g. dike assessment, VNK 2005, 
Risks in diked areas) 
- Rigidity of existing infrastructure (e.g. sewer 
systems that cannot be widened) 
Factors 
from 
outside the 
FRGA 
- Shock events 
o Rhine/Meuse 1993/1995 
o Dike collapse Wilnis 2003 
 
- Change in discourses 
o IWRM 
o Sustainability  
o Climate change 
o Risk approach 
- Shock events 
o Rhine/Meuse 1993/1995 
o Pluvial flooding 1998 
o Hurricane Katrina 2005 
 
Internal and external drivers of stability 
The factors stabilising the sub-FRGA water-system management are many. An important aspect is 
that once a system of dike rings has been constructed, the possibilities and perceived necessity 
among spatial planners to implement mitigative spatial measures are minimised (interview 21, see 
also Wesselink, 2007). That means, by choosing an engineering path, the number of future 
alternatives in the subsequent reactive sequence was reduced (theory based on Mahoney, 2000). 
Nowadays, cost-benefit studies support the fact that maintaining defence measures is more cost-
efficient than other measures (Rijk et al., 2003). That coincides with Mahoney’s (2000) utilitarian 
explanation of path dependency, which states that institutions are stabilised by rational CBA, 
because the aim is to ensure an efficient use of tax money (Keessen et al., 2013). Therefore, what 
Hughes (1987) calls precipitated resources, strongly stabilise this arrangement. In the first place, the 
shock event of 1993/1995 stabilised the existing arrangements by strengthening the rules through 
the setting-up of the Flood Defence Act (Driessen and De Gier, 1999). As a consequence the legal 
structure (e.g. legislation, safety standards, responsibility/accountability of actors) became very 
stable (see also interview 1). In the 1990s water authorities finally had the technology to start 
developing new risk-based safety standards and research started to be undertaken. Those learning 
processes helped to adapt the existing system to the changing contexts, with the effect that it 
becomes more stabilised.  
Internal and external drivers of change 
Kingdon’s (1984) theory on policy change explains many factors of incremental change that have 
occurred. Change is the result of the interaction between factors internal and external to the FRGA. 
The following process can repeatedly be identified: the occurrence of a shock event (e.g. domestic 
fluvial floods of 1993/1995, the pluvial flood events from 1998 (and the increase of such events in 
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the future), or Hurricane Katrina in the US, which raised the question whether something similar 
could happen in the Netherlands), which opens a window of opportunity to be exploited by a policy 
entrepreneur or actor coalition that favoured a different approach to FRM. The actor groups are 
often supported by preceding changes in discourse (like Integrated Water Resource Management, 
IWRM), or learning processes (like the national dike assessment, or research projects). Eventually 
legal instruments are applied to integrate spatial planning and water management (like programme 
Room for the River, Water Test), or new committees and steering groups are set up.  
In the 1970s due to a global change in discourse (Schwartz, 1993), protests against structural 
measures increased in the Netherlands (Bosch and Van der Ham, 1998; Disco, 2002). As a response, 
biologists were brought in to Rijkswaterstaat. During the high river discharges of 1993/1995 they 
were situated in the right venue; even though the first reaction was dike strengthening measures, 
those actor coalitions could introduce ideas of integrated water management, eventually setting up 
the programme Room for the River (Van der Brugge, Rotmans, and Loorbach, 2005).   
Incremental changes in the Netherlands tend to be more actor-driven, and less influenced by 
external structures, like the EU Floods Directive, than is the case in other Member States, except for 
the implementation of the risk approach in the Water Act. After the pluvial flooding event of 1998 
the Tielrooij Committee was set up to study the preparedness of Dutch water management for 
climate change. Dike wardens of urban areas that felt the adverse consequences of spatial planning 
decisions were supported by the State Secretary and used this venue to lobby for the water test 
(interview 21). The water test was eventually introduced in 2001 (Gilissen et al., 2014). After 
Hurricane Katrina, climate adaptation researchers asked whether something similar could happen in 
the Netherlands. A first step was to improve the organisational emergency response to a crisis via the 
Taskforce Management Flooding (V&W and BZK, 2006a). It was increasingly acknowledged that 
absolute safety is not possible, so, based on a risk approach, the policy concept of Multi-Layered 
Safety was introduced in 2009 (V&W, 2008; Rijksoverheid, 2009). This development was also 
supported by a shift within the ministry and Rijkswaterstaat, where more and more employees have 
a public administration background rather than a water engineering background. Technical issues are 
mostly outsourced. Nevertheless, the epistemic community of water engineers in expertise centres 
like Deltares or the TU Delft still function within the existing system. Furthermore, the legal 
framework stipulates tasks, processes and accountability for regional water authorities (interviews 1 
and 34). In addition, other actor groups rely on the water authorities to be responsible, so that 
spatial planners are often reluctant to consider flood risk in their spatial planning (interviews 1, 8 and 
9). 
2.5 Evaluating flood risk governance at the national level 
To what extent can the current NFPRD be characterised as resilient, efficient and legitimate? Table 
2.8 gives an overview of the main findings of the evaluation. 
Table 2.8: Overview of evaluation criteria and the corresponding features of governance 
Evaluation criteria + or - Feature of governance 
Resilience + Resistance: high ability of the system to reduce the likelihood and 
magnitude of flooding; defence strategy is to be considered effective, 
especially when supplemented by emerging mitigation and 
preparation/response strategies;  
-/+ Ability to absorb and recover: measures are undertaken to improve the 
ability, but effectiveness of instruments like the water test and emergency 
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management tend to be still limited; no insurance system for fluvial 
flooding present (only pilot); 
+ Ability to adapt can be described as high, many learning opportunities are 
present (e.g. periodical assessments, research etc.); 
Efficiency ? (+) Economic efficiency: input/output ration cannot be evaluated. Increasing 
focus on resource efficiency in water management, e.g. ‘Administrative 
Agreement Water’; 
+ Resource efficiency: increased concern for resource efficiency is present, 
e.g. application of CBA, MIRT procedure, etc.; 
Legitimacy +/- Social equity: FRM in NL is a public concern; citizens pay risk-dependent 
taxes to the regional water authorities; financing of measures is based on 
solidarity; national taxes and regional water authorities among others 
support each other financially; citizens living outside the dike protected 
area are not part of the solidarity agreement and besides basic emergency 
management, they do not receive any protection or compensation; 
+ Accountability: opportunities for stakeholders to challenge decisions are 
present, both at the decision making authority (‘bezwaar’), and before a 
judge (‘beroep’); also vertical accountability mechanisms between levels of 
administration (supervision and reporting) are present; 
+/- Transparency: decisions and policies must be published; in some cases 
there is a lack of clarity about the concrete division of responsibilities and 
competences; 
+ Participation: stakeholders are generally stimulated to participate in 
decision-making; legal participatory mechanisms are in place; 
 + Access to information: decisions, policies and other relevant documents, 
such as flood risk maps, are publicly available; awareness raising campaigns 
through apps and websites are being carried out; 
 - Equity: potential problems with distribution of costs-benefits for FRM in 
the future have been identified 
2.5.1 Resilience   
With the defence strategy traditionally at its very heart (V&W, VROM, and LNV, 2009; I&M, 2014), 
other strategies have always played a minor role in Dutch FRM. The focus, in other words, has mainly 
been on probability reduction, and less on the reduction of consequences (mitigation, preparation 
and response) and recovery (status quo/compensation). Since the beginning of the 21st century, 
however, increasing attention has been paid to other strategies (especially mitigation, preparation 
and response), as flood risks were increasingly addressed within the framework of other policy 
domains (i.e. spatial planning and emergency management), and later explicitly became part of the 
emerging policy concept of Multi-Layered Safety (Delta Programme 2014). As a result, as shown in 
§2.3, new sub-FRGAs started to emerge. Moreover, specific mechanisms have been developed over 
time to foster cooperation and coordination between these domains/sub-FRGAs (e.g. the water test 
and the mandatory alignment of emergency management plans). Despite these developments, the 
strategy of flood recovery (through compensation) in the Netherlands has remained rather 
underdeveloped.         
Reasoning from the STAR-FLOOD’s starting assumption about resilience, a rigid focus on only one 
strategy (defence), in terms of buffer capacity, is to be considered as less resilient. The ongoing 
increasing focus on other back-up strategies (mitigation, preparation and response), however, 
indicates that the Dutch system of FRM is becoming increasingly resilient. But there is more that 
needs to be discussed, as the factual level of resilience not only depends on the mere availability of 
back-up strategies, but also on the extent to which these strategies are institutionalised, as well as on 
the effectiveness of these strategies and the level of cooperation and coordination mechanisms 
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mentioned above. Below, the degree of institutionalisation and effectiveness of the strategies and 
instruments in Dutch FRM will be assessed, in order to draw more accurate overall conclusions about 
the level of resilience of FRM.   
Capacity to resist 
The defence strategy (as a resistance approach) is highly institutionalised within the framework of 
the WSM sub-FRGA. It is characterised by specialised and accountable actors, a clear system of 
strategic and operational planning, a relatively secure financing system, legal safety standards and 
monitoring/assessment frameworks. The resistance approach is supported and adjusted by 
knowledge institutes (e.g. TU Delft, Deltares, STOWA) that further the learning processes, e.g. the 
update of the safety norms and technical guiding documents, which now also consider several failure 
mechanisms of dikes (I&M, 2014). As over the last decades no (major) floods have occurred, the 
defence strategy is to be considered rather effective in terms of problem-solving, although recent 
periodic assessments show that about 30% of the Dutch primary flood defence structures do not 
meet the imposed legal safety standards (Inspectie Verkeer en Watertstaat, 2011). So from the point 
of view of achieving quantified legal/policy objectives, this strategy is to be considered less effective. 
Recent policy developments (e.g. the Delta Programme) aim to reduce this discrepancy: all primary 
flood defence structures should meet their (renewed) safety standards at the latest by 2050. 
Capacity to buffer and recover: Spatial Planning 
The Dutch system of spatial planning as such is highly institutionalised, but the flood prevention and 
mitigation strategies do not (yet) seem to be fully internalised within this broader policy framework. 
Despite several policy developments since the start of the 21st century aimed at integrating the 
policy domains of spatial planning and water management, flood awareness of spatial planners in 
general remains rather low (interviews 8 and 43). Moreover, safety issues are often said to be in 
conflict with economic interests of local actors (interviews 8, 9, 14 and 22), and water safety is seen 
predominantly as a responsibility of the water managers (interview 1). The water test in many cases 
has proved to be a useful coordination/integration tool, but its actual influence generally speaking 
seems to be limited (Steenstra and Kwadijk, 2010: 11; Commissie van Advies inzake de 
Waterstaatswetgeving, 2008). In conclusion, there are virtually no (legal) impediments to adopting a 
preventive and mitigative approach in the Dutch system of spatial planning, but in practice, because 
of its non-committal nature, this is mostly done only on an ad hoc basis (observation Workshop). This 
indicates a lack of effectiveness, which – in terms of buffer capacity – negatively affects, or at least 
does not significantly increase the level of resilience of Dutch FRM. In spite of positive developments, 
this remains one of the main matters of concern for the years to come, especially regarding the 
implementation of the policy concept of MLS.   
Also private and semi-public organisations managing vital infrastructural networks (e.g. electricity 
companies, ICT/communication services, drinking water companies and other utilities) can play an 
important role in flood mitigation, or at least in reducing the societal consequences of flooding as 
much as possible. They are responsible for properly protecting their networks against flooding and 
guaranteeing the continuity of their services. Research claims that many of these actors are unaware 
of such responsibilities, resulting in a low level of preparedness (Gilissen et al., 2015; Runhaar et al., 
2015). Increasing awareness or introducing more explicit legal responsibilities can encourage utilities 
to create better flood-resistant networks and infrastructures, which can enhance the level of societal 
resilience to flooding.    
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Capacity to buffer and recover: Emergency Management 
In 2009, the Taskforce Management Flooding evaluated the organisational response to emergency 
management in case of flooding as inadequate. It proposed the setting-up of a Steering Group to 
improve communication between water and emergency managers, and recommended periodical 
exercises and the setting-up of an assessment framework (TMO, 2009). With the establishment of 
Security Regions (2010), the Dutch system of emergency management as such became more 
institutionalised. In 2013, the Hoekstra Committee generally assessed the establishment of security 
regions as beneficial for the quality of emergency management due to the improvement of expertise 
and effectiveness (Hoekstra et al., 2013). Due to the lack of actual flood events, it remains difficult to 
assess the factual effectiveness of the preparation strategy as such. Provided that the 
institutionalisation process continues and water and emergency managers keep investing in 
cooperation and coordination, the effectiveness of this strategy can be assumed to increase. In terms 
of buffer capacity, Dutch FRM consequently can be assumed to become more resilient. Increasing 
societal awareness about flood risks and the citizen’s own responsibilities can increase effectiveness 
even more, especially as evacuation possibilities tend to be limited (Terpstra and Gutteling, 2008; 
OECD, 2014). Information measures are undertaken with the aim of increasing awareness, via apps, 
information and flood websites (interviews 5, 4 and 20), but its behavioural effects remain unclear.  
As stated above, the flood recovery strategy is less developed in Dutch FRM. Compensation can take 
place through liability claims, but these generally have a low chance of success, mainly due to high 
procedural and substantive thresholds (Gilissen, 2013). Besides that, flood victims can be 
compensated through the 1998 Calamities Compensation Act, but this general calamities fund is not 
capable of compensating large numbers of victims in cases of major flood events (interview 3). 
Furthermore, there is no private insurance system widely available to compensate for fluvial flood 
damage, as there is for pluvial flood damage. In conclusion, the recovery strategy is not structurally 
institutionalised and hence cannot be considered effective, nor does it significantly contribute to the 
level of resilience in Dutch FRM. Increasing buffer capacity through establishing more effective public 
recovery mechanisms can be considered, but is likely to meet political resistance. In the literature it 
has been argued that public compensation could, moreover, negatively affect social resilience. 
Instead, the possible benefits of a private insurance system have been stressed (Kunreuther, 2001; 
Botzen and Van den Bergh, 2008; Botzen, Aerts, and Van den Bergh, 2009; Botzen, De Boer and 
Terpstra, 2013; Seifert et al., 2013). Indeed, it could be worthwhile to explore these possibilities 
further in the near future.                        
Capacity to adapt and learn  
The capacity to adapt is generally present and facilitated by learning opportunities, like the Delta 
Programme, problem-oriented committees that aim to explore and improve the current approach 
(e.g. Commissie Boertien I, 1993; Commissie Boertien II, 1994; Tielrooij Commissie, 2000; Delta 
Commissie, 2008), evaluating mechanisms in the form of committees (Steenstra and Kwadijk, 2010; 
Steenstra et al., 2012; Hoekstra et al., 2013), and periodical evaluation mechanisms (Inspectie 
Verkeer en Watertstaat, 2011). In addition, innovative research within the knowledge institutes 
offers learning possibilities, especially for flood defence, but slowly also for the other strategies. 
From this point of view, Dutch FRM is to be considered rather resilient.   
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Résumé 
In conclusion, the Dutch defence strategy, on the one hand, proves rather effective in terms of 
problem-solving, and the adaptive capacity in FRM is rather high. On the other hand, buffer capacity 
is somewhat limited, because of a lack of firmly institutionalised and effective strategic back-ups 
within arrangements outside of the traditional water management arrangement. This, however, does 
not entail an obvious need to abandon and integrally redesign the Dutch system of FRM. Firstly, the 
effectiveness of the defence strategy has proven highly beneficial to Dutch society to develop both 
from an economic and a social perspective. Moreover, recent policy developments are proceeding at 
full speed and – provided that they are properly implemented – are likely to increase resilience in 
terms of buffer capacity. This, of course, takes time and effort.  
2.5.2 Efficiency  
Although the probability of (fluvial) flooding in the Netherlands is rather low, full water safety cannot 
be guaranteed. As the most densely built and populated parts of the country are situated below sea 
level or are otherwise flood-prone, the consequences of a flood event can be disastrous, disrupting 
Dutch society as a whole and resulting in indeterminable, but considerable (socio-economic and 
other) losses/damage. These potentially severe impacts justify considerable investment in Dutch 
FRM, but due to a lack of data the question remains as to what is the most efficient investment 
strategy in terms of costs (i.e. input of resources of any kind, such as money, knowledge, skills, 
personnel, and infrastructural assets) and benefits (i.e. an increase in robustness and/or resilience).      
This report does not aim to answer this question in quantified details, but builds upon the 
assumption that there is at least one optimal balance between costs and benefits. It is important to 
understand, however, that decisions about strategic investments are of a political nature; efficiency 
is not a legal norm or principle (Gilissen, 2014a). However, efficiency gained on importance in the last 
years. In the Netherlands efficiency is a policy ambition, and policy/decision makers in that respect 
have a wide margin of policy discretion to both determine their objectives and to define concrete 
measures to achieve their goals. From this point of view, efficiency plays a central role in Dutch 
national policy on water management in a broad sense (including waste water management). The 
main objective is to drastically reduce the input of resources (costs) at the national level by 2020 
(BAW, 2011), without negatively affecting safety levels. Efficiency is supposed to be increased in the 
Flood Protection Program via a cost-sharing arrangement, the MIRT working procedure and the 
increased use of CBA. This strategy, however, has yet to prove effective.  
The introduction of the policy concept of MLS also raises efficiency-related questions. What is, for 
instance, more efficient from a strategic point of view: investing in water safety in terms of the 
reduction of flood probability (defence), or investing in developing strategies and measures 
mitigating the effects of possible flood events by means of adaptive spatial planning or evacuations 
(mitigation and preparation/response)? On the one hand, investing in defence seems to be most 
efficient (Brouwer and Van Ek, 2004), as this investment will directly and certainly positively affect 
the chance of flooding (decreasing damage potential) and thus increase robustness. On the other 
hand, investment in the development and implementation of the other strategies is needed for the 
concept of MLS to be effective anyway, and thus to increase resilience. The effects of this latter type 
of investment, however, remain uncertain. Again, the choice is of a political nature and therefore 
should be the result of a transparent and democratic decision-making process. From a critical point 
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of view, however, it can be questioned whether efficiency should play a guiding role in strategic 
policy and decision-making in FRM.  
2.5.3 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a multi-faceted concept, which is closely related to other concepts, such as democracy, 
transparency and participation. In recent literature, four types of legitimacy have been distinguished: 
input legitimacy, output legitimacy, social legitimacy, and formal legitimacy (Curtin & Meijer 2006). In 
this report, and within the STAR-FLOOD project as such, the main focus is on input and output 
legitimacy. These types of legitimacy are generally defined by Buijze (2013) as the extent to which 
‘people have a fair chance to exert influence over decision-making’, and the extent to which ‘people 
agree that an authority should exist because they are convinced that it brings them a net benefit’ 
(Buijze 2013: 42-43). This report, furthermore, builds upon three general assumptions. The first 
assumption is that democracy increases input legitimacy, as it creates generally accepted 
opportunities to exert influence over decision-making, or – in other words – it invites/stimulates the 
public to make an input into decision-making (Buijze, 2013). The second assumption is that 
transparency increases both input and output legitimacy, as it generates the general public’s insight 
into decisions and decision-making processes and it helps them to realise that these decisions and 
processes are beneficial to them (Buijze, 2013). Transparency in terms of access to information, 
moreover, is a requirement for effective participation, which – as a final assumption – increases both 
input and output legitimacy, as it gives the general public a better chance to influence decision-
making, increasing the ‘quality’ of decisions (Buijze, 2013).  
Within the STAR-FLOOD project, access to information, participation (stakeholder engagement), 
transparency, and access to justice have been selected as indicators for legitimacy. Below, the Dutch 
system of FRM will be assessed following these indicators and in the light of the assumptions 
presented above (see also Nehmelman et al., 2013). It must be stated at the outset that most of 
these indicators have a legal basis in general administrative legislation, such as the General 
Administrative Law Act and the general Access to Information Act, and so apply to administrative 
decision-making in general, including decision-making in relation to FRM. Only in some cases, 
however, have these general provisions been complemented by or specified in provisions of a less 
general nature, for instance in the Water Act or the Spatial Planning Act. It should, moreover, be 
mentioned that – as far as the authors know – there is no comprehensive data available about the 
legitimacy of Dutch FRM.    
Access to information 
The Access to Information Act generally refers to access of information about any kind of 
administrative affairs as ‘a matter of public interest’ (Article 2(1) AIA). Access to information, 
according to the AIA, has a ‘passive’ and an ‘active’ component. First, everyone is entitled to hand in 
a request to receive information about documented administrative matters of any nature, even if 
he/she is not an ‘interested party’ from a legal point of view (Article 3(1) and 3(3) AIA). Secondly, 
administrative authorities must, of their own accord, provide information about their policies, 
including the preparatory and implementation aspects thereof (Article 8(1) AIA). There are some 
grounds for exception concerning access to information; these are exhaustively listed in Article 10 
AIA, and include, for instance, national security and privacy aspects. These provisions also apply in 
relation to information about flood risk management. So, based on the above, it can be argued that 
the AIA provides for appropriate provisions to guarantee access to information about FRM. This leads 
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to the conclusion that everyone has the same chances of being appropriately informed about FRM-
related subjects, and has the same chances of participating in the decision-making process and of 
influencing decision-making. From a theoretical perspective, this positively affects both input and 
output legitimacy.   
Participation (stakeholder engagement) 
In general, public participation in the Netherlands is provided, because citizens could participate in 
FRM via the democratic election of the Second Chamber of Parliament, the provincial and municipal 
councils and the councils of regional water authorities. This positively affects input legitimacy 
(Nehmelman 2014), although the question remains to what extent this reflects a high degree of 
public knowledgeability and awareness.  
The Dutch General Administrative Law Act (GALA) contains procedural provisions about decision-
making in general, and more specific provisions about stakeholder participation. A distinction is 
made between two types of procedures, namely ‘ordinary’ and ‘comprehensive’ procedures 
(Chapters 4.1.2 and 3.4 GALA respectively). Within both procedures, stakeholders (commonly 
referred to as ‘interested parties’; Article 1:2 GALA) are invited to participate in the decision-making 
process, but stakeholder participation in comprehensive procedures from a legal point of view can be 
considered to be more formalised. Whereas during ordinary procedures stakeholders are ‘just’ given 
the opportunity to give their opinion (Articles 4:7 and 4:8 GALA), stakeholders during comprehensive 
procedures are invited to give their opinion about a formally published draft decision within a fixed 
term (Articles 3:11, 3:12, 3:15 and 3:16 GALA) as a formal step within this procedure. Moreover,  
‘others’ (i.e. persons or entities not meeting the requirements of the term ‘interested party’ as 
specified in Article 1:2 GALA) can, for instance by virtue of a specific legal provision, also be given the 
opportunity to give their opinion about a draft decision (Article 3:15(2) GALA). In that respect and 
relevant to FRM, for instance, ‘everyone’ can give their opinion about draft zoning plans (Article 
3.8(1)(d) Spatial Planning Act) or a draft of the national strategic water plan (Article 4.3(1)(d) Water 
Act and Article 4.1(1) Water Decree).   
So, as stakeholders – at least all interested parties, but sometimes a broader group – have the 
opportunity to actively participate in decision-making procedures and influence a decision before it  
has been formally made, the right to stakeholder engagement can be considered to be appropriately 
embedded within the Dutch system of administrative law. From a theoretical perspective, this 
positively affects both input and output legitimacy. However, these provisions do not guarantee that 
stakeholders do actually participate, as to a significant extent it is their own decision whether they do 
or not. On the one hand, decision-makers increasingly try to actively involve stakeholders in area 
development processes through informal participation procedures, referred to for instance as ‘living 
room conversations’ or ‘kitchen table conversations’ (Keessen et al., 2014). But on the other hand, 
based on voter turnout figures of regional water authority elections, the conclusion could be drawn 
that actual public participation in Dutch FRM in general is rather low. According to the OECD, this 
might be the result of a lack of awareness about flood risks in the Netherlands (OECD 2014). 
Additionally, the extent to which Dutch society relies on the expertise of the authorities involved in 
FRM and the effectiveness of the system of FRM influences the actual level of participation.   
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Transparency     
The GALA also contains general provisions about transparency of decision-making. Other 
sectoral/thematic administrative legislation (Water Act; Spatial Planning Act) contains provisions 
about transparency, but these can always be traced back to the general provisions in the GALA.  
Transparency relates to both the procedural and material aspects of decision-making. Where the 
ordinary procedure is applicable (as mentioned above), stakeholders in general are informed about 
the start of such a procedure and its formalities. Where the comprehensive procedure is applicable, 
after a general public notification containing procedural formalities, a draft decision is published 
(Articles 3:11 and 3:12 GALA). Directly interested parties will also personally be informed about the 
publication of a draft decision (Article 3:13 GALA). A decision will not enter into force without proper 
public notification and publication (Chapter 3.6 GALA). All decisions must, moreover, mention 
possibilities for stakeholders to lodge complaints and/or appeal against a decision (Article 3:45 
GALA). All decisions must be based on a proper justification (Article 3:46 GALA), which must – for the 
sake of transparency – be published alongside the notification of the decision (Article 3:47(1) GALA).  
So, based on these general provisions, stakeholders are informed about the possibility to participate 
during the decision-making procedure, about the rationale of the decision itself, and about the 
possibility to lodge complaints and/or to appeal against decisions. This gives stakeholders insight into 
procedures and decisions as such. From a theoretical perspective, this positively affects legitimacy 
and can, moreover, increase public support for decisions amongst stakeholders.   
Information about flood risks is available in the Netherlands via webpages or apps. However, citizens 
are not actively informed if they live behind a dike not fulfilling safety standards, in order to avoid 
panic (interview 35, 36).  
Access to justice/accountability 
Decisions as specified in Article 1:3 GALA are generally appealable. Interested parties as specified in 
Article 1:2 GALA can appeal against a decision before an administrative judge (Article 8:1 and 8:2 
GALA), unless the decision is legally determined to be non-appealable (Article 8:3 – 8:5 GALA). Non-
interested parties cannot appeal to an administrative court. In general, interested parties must first 
lodge a formal complaint with the decision-making authority, before being able to appeal to a court 
(Article 7:1 GALA). Where the comprehensive decision-making procedure is applicable, interested 
parties can directly appeal against the decision. If an interested party did not lodge a complaint 
against the decision or – where Chapter 3.4 GALA was applicable – did not give a formal opinion 
about the draft decision, this party cannot appeal against the decision any further (Article 6:13 
GALA). Interested parties can, finally, appeal against a first instance court’s judgment to the 
Administrative Law Division of the Council of State. In some specific cases (for instance in case of 
complaints against zoning plans), interested parties can directly appeal against decisions to the 
Administrative Law Division.  
So, only interested parties can appeal against a decision to an administrative court, but some types of 
decisions (regulations, policy) are determined to be non-appealable. Interested parties can, 
moreover, lose their right to appeal, for instance by not filing complaints at an earlier stage or by not 
appealing within a fixed term. The civil courts function as so-called ‘safety net courts’ to guarantee 
there is always a possibility to institute an action against any kind of government behaviour. On the 
one hand, access to administrative court procedures is subject to restrictions and strict rules about 
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competence and admissibility. Administrative court procedures, on the other hand, are more easily 
accessible (as long as all criteria have been met) and by far less expensive than civil court procedures. 
Despite the restrictions and rules, there is no reason to consider the Dutch system of administrative 
jurisdiction generally to be in breach of legitimacy requirements.                  
Social equity 
From a social equity point of view, FRM in the Netherlands is a public concern and financed on the 
basis of solidarity. Every Dutch citizen living within a dike-ring pays a risk-dependent tax to the 
competent regional water authority. Dike strengthening or construction measures are financed via a 
solidarity percentage by all regional water authorities, or via national tax revenues. However, the 
solidarity is not extended to the approximately 100,000 citizens who live outside the dike protected 
areas (Deltaprogramma Nieuwbouw en Herstructurering en Veiligheid, 2012) and therefore they do 
not pay taxes to regional water authorities for flood risk management. They have no right to 
protection, because the Water Act only contains standards for areas which are protected by dikes 
(interview 36; Article 2.2 Water Act), but emergency management is provided. However, their flood 
risk is often more limited, because they mostly live on higher ground (interviews 31 and 36). 
Depending on the municipality, they are – more or less – informed about their risk (interviews 31, 15 
and 22). They also cannot take out private insurance (interview 3).  
Even though the regional water authority tax system is based on a ‘beneficiary pays’ principle, it does 
not reflect real individual benefits and is not uniform across the country (Van Rijswick and Havekes, 
2012; Filatova, 2014). Furthermore, flood protection measures (e.g. coastal defence), which are 
financed by national tax revenues, increase development in high risk areas. The OECD (2014) 
criticises this ‘snowballing effect’ of increased risk as not being future-proof. The spatial developers 
get the benefits from their increased economic value, but the water authorities bear the costs for the 
increased flood risk (OECD, 2014). The national compensation scheme is sometimes criticised for 
being based on political will and public pressure (Botzen et al., 2009; OECD, 2014), which indicates 
that there are no standards on the equal use of this instrument. The residual risk is mostly carried by 
the private sector (OECD, 2014). 
Résumé 
The Dutch system of (general) administrative law meets all legitimacy requirements selected within 
the STAR-FLOOD project. It provides for proper instruments for the public to have access to 
information about documented administrative matters of any nature, including administrative 
matters concerning FRM. Furthermore, it provides proper instruments for active participation in 
decision-making procedures, and it guarantees transparency of decision-making procedures and 
decisions. Lastly, although subject to restrictions and strict rules, it properly provides access to 
(administrative) justice. However, despite these legal guarantees, the actual level of participation in 
FRM decision-making in practice seems to be rather low, supposedly because of a general low level 
of public awareness about flood risks in combination with a high level of reliance on the expertise of 
the authorities involved in FRM. Increasing awareness might increase participation, which might also 
positively affect legitimacy in practice.                      
2.6 Conclusion  
The Netherlands is, historically, highly susceptible to flooding due to its physical location and its high 
economic value and population density in flood-prone areas. Accordingly, the FRGA is adapted to this 
  
39 
 
situation, via five national sub-FRGAs. Those arrangements cover all STAR-FLOOD strategies – to 
different degrees. The main pillar of FRM in the Netherlands is flood defence – the reduction of the 
probability of flooding. The corresponding sub-FRGA ‘Water System Management’ is highly 
institutionalised. Other strategies and their corresponding sub-FRGAs, i.e. ‘Spatial Planning’, and 
‘Emergency Management’, are aligned to this arrangement. At the moment they have only a minor 
supporting role, even though there are visible signs of a further diversification of strategies. The sub-
FRGAs ‘Urban Water Management’ and ‘Compensation’ play only a minor role at the moment, but 
the importance of the former in particular might increase in the future due to the projected 
consequences of climate change. This diversification corresponds with an ongoing shift from single-
sector governance towards multi-sector governance. Governmental actors are mainly responsible for 
FRM, only ‘Urban Water Management’ and ‘Compensation’ show a minor shift towards a more 
interactive form of governance with private actors also involved. However, they only play a minor 
role in the comprehensive FRGA, which is still dominated by ‘Water System Management’ and a 
flood defence approach. 
The Netherlands is characterised by a high capacity to resist, but if a flood event should occur, the 
ability to respond and recover tends to be limited. Even though change in FRGA in the Netherlands is 
mainly of an incremental nature, where new forms of governance are layered alongside the already 
existing rules, actors and resources, there are visible signs of a further diversification of strategies 
(see §2.2 – 2.5). Three major trends are of importance here. (1) A trend towards a further integration 
of spatial planning and water system management in connection with adaptive urban development is 
visible. The case study Zuidplaspolder (chapter 3) will analyse this field of tension in more detail, 
because development in flood-prone areas is ongoing in the Netherlands. (2) The second trend is 
towards a more integrated water system-based management approach in the course of the discourse 
of Integrated Water Resource Management. The case study Nijmegen (chapter 4), as an exemplary 
implementation site of the ‘Room for the River’ programme, will analyse this trend further. (3) 
Finally, the third case study will explore the recent trend towards a more dominant risk-based 
approach that will increasingly also consider the consequences of flooding. The case study Dordrecht 
(chapter 5), as one of the Multi-Layered Safety pilot projects, will explore this development further.  
The national analysis is focused on path dependency and the flood defence approach. The case 
studies will therefore provide important information regarding change in Dutch FRM by exploring the 
introduced trends in more detail, as well as their consequences for FRM. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will 
eventually combine the findings at national and case study levels to give recommendations for 
strengthening FRGA in the Netherlands. 
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3. Case Study Zuidplaspolder 
3.1 Introduction and scope of the analysis  
This chapter provides an analysis, explanation and evaluation of flood risk governance of the 
Zuidplaspolder (ZPP), the deepest polder of the Netherlands. At the beginning of the 21st century it 
was chosen as an urban extension area for the expanding the Randstad in the western part of the 
country. This area is, on the one hand, very flood-prone, were it not for the protection of dikes; on 
the other hand, it is also the area with the highest economic value and population density. This kind 
of combination is criticised in the report ‘Risk in embanked areas’ (RIVM, 2004), which states that 
urban development in flood-prone areas should be avoided. However, spatial planning measures like 
the water test, introduced in 2001, are only partially successful in influencing location choice 
(Steenstra and Kwadijk, 2010). The Zuidplaspolder is not the only example. Urban development has 
also taken place in other low lying areas, e.g. the Alexanderpolder, Watergraafsmeer and several 
developments in the municipality of Lansingerland. The case study illustrates how the integration of 
spatial planning and FRM can be strengthened. 
The case study illustrates a common area of conflict in the Netherlands, namely that between urban 
development and water safety issues. We will first provide the main characteristics of the case study 
area (§3.2). This is followed by an analysis of dynamics (stability and change) in the flood risk 
management strategies and their embedding in local/regional sub-arrangements (§3.3). We will 
explain these dynamics (§3.4) and evaluate them (§3.5), before we provide our conclusions for this 
case study. 
The case study describes FRM in the ZPP. The development project ZPP is central to the case study, 
but the case study is not limited to it and is broader in scope. It should be noted that two separate, 
independent development projects took place: Westergouwe, as an urban expansion of the 
municipality of Gouda in the mid-1990s, and the development project Zuidplaspolder, which started 
in 2004. The development project Zuidplaspolder is a separate project from the development of 
Westergouwe (interview 26). This case study focuses mainly on the development project ZPP. Only 
when necessary will references be made to the Westergouwe project. Accordingly, the time frame 
for the analysis is limited to 1995 to 2014 for feasibility reasons. A broader time frame would not 
have been relevant for understanding the development. It should be noted that the development 
project and thus the FRM strategies are at the moment only slowly being implemented, due to the 
economic crisis. 
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3.2 Main characteristics of the case study  
 
Figure 3.1: Location of the ZPP  
Source: Carto – Faculty of Geoscience – Utrecht University 
 
The Zuidplaspolder is situated in the western part of the Netherlands in the triangle made up of 
Rotterdam, Zoetermeer and Gouda (RZG), see figure 3.1. The main physical characteristics of the 
area are summarised in table 3.1.  
Table 3.1: Physical characteristics of the ZPP  
Indicators Characteristics 
Size 4,902ha
11
 
Inhabitants 41,000
12
 (municipality Zuidplas) 
Elevation  -4.5m NAP (Moerkapelle) to -7m NAP (Nieuwerkerk aan de IJssel) 
Soil subsidence  7 to 10mm per year 
River Hollandse Ijssel 
Land use Land reclamation processes  
Until 1960s: pastureland and horticulture (Gemeente Zuidplas 2010: 24). 
In 1970s: urban expansion (Gemeente Zuidplas 2010).  
Source: Gemeente Zuidplas 2010 
                                                          
11
 RZG Zuidplas, http://ontwikkelingzuidplaspolder.nl/project/feiten-en-cijfers/, n.d.,(accessed 15 October 
2014). 
12
 Gemeente Zuidplas, http://www.zuidplas.nl/gemeente, n.d., (accessed 13 December 2014). 
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The Zuidplaspolder is potentially prone to flooding from the river (Hollandse IJssel) and from the sea 
and, to a minor degree, from pluvial flooding. However, it is protected by a primary flood defence 
(dike ring 14) and the storm surge barrier Krimpenerwaard, which greatly reduces the probability of 
flooding (safety standard of 1: 10,000). If the Hollandse IJssel dike is breached in the south of the 
polder, which is the lowest part and is prone to soil subsidence, the water depth will rise from 0.5m 
to 1.3m within 6 hours. The River Hollandse IJssel is strictly regulated; it can be closed off from the 
delta at Capelle and at Gouda. Therefore it is assumed that only the water which is in the in-between 
part of the river can enter the polder (interviews 26 and 28). It could also be that the Waal-dike is 
breached. In that case it would take 10 days before the Zuidplaspolder will be flooded, which offers 
sufficient time for evacuation.  
The polder is an example of adaptive spatial planning with regards to water safety issues. 
Development is prohibited in the southern part of the polder, because of the soil type, flood risk 
from heavy rainfall and fluvial flooding, the decreased manageability of the water system in the case 
of urbanisation, and the aquatic ecological potential of the area. The area in the north of the polder 
is less flood-prone, because it is higher, with better soil conditions and highway A20 will function as a 
partition (Deltaprogramma Nieuwbouw en Herstructurering en Veiligheid 2013: 20) (interview 26). It 
was decided to implement mitigative measures for new developments in this area: the floor level of 
new developments should be raised to at least NAP -4.70 m (HHSK & Grontmij 2007: 29).  
Table 3.2: Identified measures per strategy  
Recovery is not included, because those measures are managed at the national level. 
 Flood prevention Flood defence Flood mitigation Flood preparation 
Pluvial  Increased water 
storage capacity of 
water system (widen 
channels) 
Raised floor level 
1.20m above water 
level 
 
Fluvial Prohibition of 
construction in 
certain areas, e.g. in 
parts of the south, or 
close to the dike 
Hollandse IJssel dike 
Storm surge barrier 
Raised floor level to 
NAP-4.70  
Partition of the polder 
via the A20 
Evacuation exercise 
Flood risk 
management plans 
 
Pluvial flood risk is enhanced due to the increase in paved areas, and the fragmentation of the water 
levels, which is partly caused by the different soil types, but also by the fact that every new 
development area has its own water level (HHSK & Grontmij 2007). In accordance with assessments 
stipulated in the ‘Nationaal Bestuursakkoord Water’, it was analysed that the storage capacity of two 
water level management areas needed to be increased by widening the channels (HHSK & Grontmij 
2007). Table 3.2 and figure 3.2 summarise the measures per strategy present in the Zuidplaspolder.  
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Figure 3.2: Schematic overview of strategies present in the case study ZPP.  
Dark blue indicates the most dominant strategy, medium blue emerging strategies, and light blue minor 
strategies. 
3.3 Analysis of flood risk governance in the Zuidplaspolder  
The case study ZPP reflects the national FRGA. In particular, the connection between the sub-FRGA 
Water System Management, and the sub-FRGA Spatial Planning are important. The other two sub-
arrangements play a minor role and are less institutionalised. Non-governmental actors and research 
institutes act across several sub-FRGAs (see figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.3: FRGA of the ZPP consisting of four sub-arrangements 
The sub-FRGAs are elaborated in the text below. A clear connection is visible between Spatial Planning and 
Water System Management and between Spatial Planning and Urban Water Management due to the 
bridging mechanisms of the water test. Emergency Management and Water System Management are also 
connected due to cooperation and communication arrangements. The sub-FRGA Compensation is not 
depicted as it is only relevant for the national level.  
3.3.1 Spatial planning 
A number of competing discourses can be identified in the case study Zuidplaspolder. The discourse 
on urban expansion and economic growth represented by the municipalities, provinces and the 
Ministry of VROM (interview 26; Pols et al., 2007) was initially in conflict with the discourse on 
climate change (Tielrooij Commissie, 2000). The latter was taken up by the regional water authority 
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which argued that the local conditions in combination with the threat of climate change would not 
support further urban development. Eventually, during a communication and cooperation process, 
the actors developed a solution in the form of mitigative measures (Pols et al., 2007).  
Those discussions preceded the national decision to choose the ZPP as an urban expansion area for 
the Randstad. An Interregional Steering Group RGZ Zuidplas consisting of 23 actors was set up to 
develop a plan to guide urban expansion in the ZPP (RZG Zuidplas, 2006). This Steering Group had 
learned from the preceding discussions that had taken place in the course of urban extension plans 
for the area Westergouwe. The underlying notion in the discourse was an integrated approach to 
appropriately combine water aspects in spatial planning, especially in regard to climate change 
(interview 26; Xplorelab Hotspot ZPP, 2008). The integration was facilitated by applying the layered 
approach (Lagenbenadering,13 not to be confused with the Multi-layered Safety concept), whereby 
three layers are distinguished in order to assess the spatial layout: (1) substrate: soil, surface water 
and groundwater; (2) networks: existing infrastructure; (3) occupation of space. It facilitated a 
context-specific identification of functions per location (HHSK, Provincie Zuid-Holland and Grontmij, 
2006: 14). In 2008 the Regional Development Organisation Zuidplas (Regionale 
Ontwikkelingsorganisatie Zuidplas, RDOZ) was established by means of the Intermunicipal Statutory 
Regulations Act. The province Zuid Holland and five municipalities are part of the RDOZ and the 
regional water authority is its advisor.14  
The province of South Holland was a leading actor, coordinating the process of cooperation 
(interview 26). It has multiple roles regarding water management in the Zuidplaspolder. For the 
spatial development, the Interregional Structural Vision 2004 (ISV) is relevant. It has no legal basis, 
but contains administrative agreements about the development of the Zuidplaspolder. It is the 
starting point for the development of the polder (RZG Zuidplas, 2006). In 2006 the five municipalities 
of the RDOZ approved the Intermunicipal Structural Plan Zuidplas. With this approval the 
municipalities have committed themselves to realising the plan, but private parties cannot derive 
rights from the plan.   
The regional water authority was actively involved in the planning process (interview 21). The water 
test procedure enables the water authority to give advice to the spatial planner with regard to the 
spatial zoning plans (3.1.1 and 3.1.6 Spatial Planning Decree). As part of this procedure the regional 
water authority Schieland and the Krimpenerwaard has advised the spatial planners several times.15 
In the water test, floor levels for housing are included in figure 3.4.16 The raised floor levels are 
nowadays framed in the discourse as ‘extra safety’ for the property buyers (interview 23). Besides 
the official advice (as part of the water test), the regional water authority has advised the province 
regarding the development of the polder. This advice has no legal basis, but did influence the policy-
making of the polder. For example, in the draft Inter-municipal Structural Plan (ISP, June 2005) the 
most important aspects of the Water Opportunities Map – a map in which the regional water 
                                                          
13 This layered approach has already been elaborated in the Nota Water en Ruimtelijke Ordening in Schieland 
(2001), and the Deelstroomgebiedsvisie Midden Holland (2003). The regional water authority and the water 
department of the province influenced the ISV with those documents.  
14
 Intermunicipal Statutory Regulations Regionale Ontwikkelingsorganisatie Zuidplas, 1 November 2008. 
15
 Part of the Water Test procedure is the ‘Spatial Zoning Plan Advice Zuidplaspolder (Bestemmingsplanadvies 
Zuidplaspolder), regional water authority Schieland and the Krimpenerwaard, 20 September 2007. 
16
 Spatial Zoning Plan Advice Zuidplaspolder (Bestemmingsplanadvies Zuidplaspolder), p. 30. 
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authority together with the province have given their view of spatial development in the ZPP from a 
water perspective – were adopted.17 The ISP 2006 is based on article 7 of the (old) Spatial Planning 
Act.18 It contains legally binding provisions only for the competent administrative authorities. Private 
parties cannot derive rights from this plan. In this plan it is stated that, in particular by means of 
construction measures (Inrichtingsmaatregelen) and flood defences, the vulnerability of the area to 
flooding would be dealt with.19  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Floor levels Zuidplaspolder  
Source: Grontmij 2007 (Spatial Zoning Plan Advice) 
Various spatial zoning plans are relevant for the Zuidplaspolder. The polder can be divided into eight 
sub areas with different spatial zoning plans.20 The municipal executive has the competence to 
include exact standards for floor levels in spatial zoning plans on individual parcel level.21 
The private entity for cooperation, the Land Bank (Grondbank), established by means of the Joint 
Arrangements Act (Wet gemeenschappelijke regelingen) is important for this case study. The Land 
Bank has derived revenues from all concerned public authorities and has the freedom of purchase 
and selling of land in the Zuidplaspolder. Neither in the regulation nor in any other document is it 
                                                          
17
 E.g. The memorandum Water and Spatial Planning in Schieland 2001 (Water en Ruimtelijke Ordening in 
Schieland) and the Sub River Basin Vision Mid Holland 2003 (Deelstroomgebiedsvisie Midden Holland), the 
Water Opportunity Map Zuidplaspolder 2006 (Waterkansenkaart), Regional water authority Schieland and the 
Krimpenerwaard. 
18
 Which was repealed on 1 July 2008. 
19
 Inter municipal structural plan, 2006, pp. 16, 81 and 116. 
20
 Zuidplas North, Zuidplas West, Nieuwerkerk, Zevenhuizen, Het Nieuwe Midden, Gouweknoop, Restveen & 
Groene Waterparel, Rode Waterparel and Waddinxveen. 
21
 E.g. Article 2.4 Alteration plan Zevenhuizen-Zuid Fase 1, October 2013. 
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stated that flood risk should be taken into account in the mode of operation of the Land Bank. 
Moreover, it was stated in an interview that the Land Bank has nothing to do with flood risks in its 
territory (interview 27).  
The Environmental Association (Milieuvereniging) has lodged several appeals to the Council of State 
on the following grounds: it challenged among other things the permission granted by the regional 
water authority on the basis of a water management by-law (Keurontheffing) and the approval of the 
spatial zoning plan by the provincial executive (goedkeuringsbesluit GS). The Association claimed that 
water logging would be transferred to low lying areas, such as Moordrecht, because of the 
development of the district Westergouwe. It also claimed that the research for water logging and 
flood risks was not elaborate enough. The Council of State, however, rejected the appeals. It stated 
that research regarding flood risks had been done and that the provincial executive had approved 
the spatial plans for the following reasons: on the one hand because the probability of a water level 
occurring that would exceed the dike was very low (1:10.000) and, on the other hand, because in the 
case of a flood the water level would rise 10-20 cm as a result of the proposed urban development, 
which was perceived as a small rise.22  
3.3.2 Water system management 
Despite the application of spatial measures in the case study the traditional discourse on safety 
seems to be prevailing. An interviewee summarised it as follows, ‘We have the dike. I live -2.70m NAP 
therefore I pay regional water authority tax. The regional water authority is responsible for keeping 
dry feet. They have to manage that.’ (interview 27). Correspondingly, the trust in technical measures 
and scientific calculations/estimations is high: ‘People in the Netherlands are sure that the dikes will 
offer sufficient protection’ (interview 21). Even though the ZPP is the deepest polder in the 
Netherlands, it is argued that depth is not decisive, because ‘the most floods occur in Limburg 
[highest part of the Netherlands.]’ (interviews 26 and 21). The last quote is an oft-repeated 
statement. 
The main actor involved in this sub-FRGA is the regional water authority Schieland and the 
Krimpenerwaard, which is responsible for water management in the Zuidplaspolder. The regional 
water authority takes decisions with regard to target levels for designated bodies of surface water 
(hereafter: ‘water level decisions’; peilbesluiten) for the area of Zuidplas. Rijkswaterstaat, the 
competent water management authority of the Hollandse IJssel and the national road A20, was 
consulted, but was not involved in the development of the polder, because it is not responsible for 
the management of areas inside the dike ring.  
The dike Oosteinde Moordrecht will be strengthened, because it does not meet safety standards. The 
provincial executive is the coordinating authority23 and published the draft version of the project 
plan, which was set up by the executive of the regional water authority, in August 2014 (Article 5.4 
Water Act).24 A permit of the Environmental Licensing (General Provisions) Act (Wet algemene 
bepalingen omgevingsrecht ) is also necessary. The dike strengthening will be carried out between 
                                                          
22
 Council of State, 25 April 2012, No. 201111008/1/A2 and Council of State 29 June 2011, No. 
200905117/1/R1. 
23
 Based on articles 5.8 -5.12 of the Water Act.  
24
 The draft project plan was open for public inspection from 28 August until 8 October 2014.  
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2016 and 2018 (see figure 3.5).25 It is part of the Flood Protection Programme (FPP, 
Hoogwaterbeschermingsprogramma). The FPP is a national programme in which the regional water 
authorities and the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment cooperate. The main goal is for 
primary flood defence structures to meet the safety standards. The FPP finances measures that are 
being realised in order to achieve this goal. The dike strengthening project remained separate from 
those discussions surrounding the spatial planning measures, indicating the limits of integration. 
 
Figure 3.5: Locations of urgent sections along the Hollandse IJssel  
Source: Draft project plan Dike strengthening project Moordrecht Oosteinde, p. 7 
3.3.3 Urban water management 
The national discourse of ‘capture-store-drain’, which states that water issues need to be managed 
on site (Rijk et al., 2003), can be found at the local level within the discourse of the ‘robust water 
system’, which describes a system with enough storage capacity which will be ensured by widening 
the drainage channels (interview 21).  
In the risk profile of the security region Hollands Midden pluvial flooding has a substantial or limited 
impact (aanzienlijk of beperkt) and is very likely to occur. The main actors involved in this sub-FRGA 
are the citizens, municipality, the regional water authority and the province. In the Provincial water 
regulation (provinciale waterverordening),26 standards of water logging are included in Article 2.3. 
Title 4.3 of the regulation (and Article 5.2 of the Water Act) obliges the regional water authority to 
take water level decisions. In the regulation, standards are included for inundation from surface 
                                                          
25
 Draft project plan dike strengthening Moordrecht, July 2014, p. 5. 
26
 Provincial water regulation, 14 October 2009 (Prov. Blad 2009, no. 79). Changed by decision of 25 June 2014 
(Prov. Blad 2014, no. 1607). 
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water for the built-up area. The built-up area is a legally established area in the urban area in which, 
in general, the municipality is the competent authority. The standards have been adopted from the 
National Agreement on Water Management (1 in 100 years for urban areas, 1 in 50 years for 
glasshouses, 1 in 10 years for other areas). 
The standards are connected to the existing land use of the area. In the case of land use changes (e.g. 
resulting from the development of Zuidplaspolder, from agricultural land to urban), the standards 
have to be adapted. It should be noted that the obligation to meet the standards (see above) is a so-
called ‘obligation of best effort’.27 The management of water levels in combination with certain 
measures should reduce water logging in the area.28  
 
Figure 3.6: Responsibilities concerning the prevention of water logging29 
3.3.4 Emergency management 
Emergency managers play a small role in the ZPP. Emergency managers were involved in the 
planning process by advising on the accessibility of the polder, which is only indirectly related to 
water issues (interview 23). In the risk profile of the security region Hollands Midden, flooding of dike 
ring 14 is classified as catastrophic but very unlikely. In the Agreement on administrative and 
operational coordination for dike ring 14 (Convenant bestuurlijke en operationele coördinatie dijkring 
14) the tasks of all interested (administrative) parties are specified.  
Xplorelab is a transdisciplinary innovation laboratory of the province of South Holland and Hotspot 
ZPP is a knowledge co-creation30 project on climate proof development in the ZPP (Xplorelab Hotspot 
ZPP 2008). This research helped to legitimise the developments in the ZPP. Furthermore it represents 
a discourse on ideas of climate change, and also on a risk approach. For the case of flooding an 
evacuation-calculation study was carried out, with the result that not all areas should be evacuated 
due to time-consuming decision-making processes and a potentially weakened dike as the 
                                                          
27
 E.g. Court of Appeal ‘s-Gravenhage, 21 December 2006, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2006:AZ5784. 
28
 Memorandum of Response of Water Level Decision Zuidplaspolder (Nota van Beantwoording Peilbesluit 
Zuidplaspolder), 28 November 2012, HHSK, p.10.  
29
 Regional water authority Schieland en de Krimpenerwaard, 
http://www.schielandendekrimpenerwaard.nl/wat_doet_hhsk/waterpeil/wateroverlast, n.d. (accessed 13 
November 2014) (the figure is slightly adapted). 
30
 Different disciplines work together to develop and explore new approaches for climate change adaptation 
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evacuation route. In this case the citizens are advised to evacuate to a higher storey (vertical 
evacuation) and to be prepared to survive for 72 hours. Within the project evacuation exercises were 
also carried out (interview 26). 
3.4. Explaining dynamics in flood risk governance at the case study level  
3.4.1 Explanandum 
The approach to FRM in the ZPP is the result of a historical development including land reclamation 
and dike construction undertaken by water authorities as part of a technocratic-engineering 
discourse (Gemeente Zuidplas, 2010). The observed strategic changes are the outcome of an 
agreement that aims to combine further economic development, on the one hand, and water safety 
concerns, on the other hand.  
The traditional approach to FRM, i.e. flood defence measures, has not been abandoned. Additional 
measures were chosen to support the existing approach. Table 3.3 summarises the main dynamics 
per PAA dimension most relevant for the case study. Regarding the rules dimension an important 
change was the water test, which was introduced at the national level. The procedure influenced the 
subsequent setting-up of local spatial plans and their consideration of water issues. Regarding the 
actor dimension, even though the distribution of responsibilities remained the same, the 
communication between water management and spatial planning actors increased due to the water 
test and the setting-up of the Interregional Steering Group ZPP (interview 21, 26). The management 
of pluvial flooding in the sub-FRGA UWM was adapted through a shift in discourse that aimed for a 
climate-proof, robust regional water system with a higher storage capacity, which would have 
consequences for the management of water levels. Regarding the resource dimension, the changes 
are limited. More research was carried out to analyse the consequences of climate change for the 
ZPP and potential management aspects (Xplorelab Hotspot ZPP, 2008). However, from a financial 
point of view the contributions did not change. The national government and regional water 
authorities did not take money away from dike strengthening to use it for spatial planning measures. 
Most likely, the costs for those measures need to be carried by the developer and/or house buyer. 
Because of the economic crisis, development in the ZPP is currently limited, so that it is not clear how 
this is perceived.  
Table 3.3: Summary of main changes per PAA dimension 
Dimension Changes in the PAA dimensions  Contributed to Change/ Stability 
Rules  Water test – influenced subsequent local plans  
Floor levels  are regulated in spatial zoning plans  
Change: sub-Spatial Planning gains 
in importance in FRM 
Separate procedure for dike strengthening  Stability 
Actors  Distribution of responsibility stays mainly the same  Stability  
Increased cooperation between all stakeholders, e.g. by 
intermunicipal cooperation 
Change: towards closer connection 
between sub-FRGAs 
Discourse  Climate-proof Change in coherence of sub-FRGA 
Water-robust system Change in sub-Urban Water 
Management 
Perception on responsibilities remains  
High degree of trust in dikes and modelling  
Stability of sub-Water System 
Management  
Resources  Within governmental actors no change in spread of 
financial resources  
Stability  
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New knowledge and expertise  
In the future, spread of costs to developer/house buyers 
(interview 23)
31
 
Change  
 
To some degree changes occurred in all dimensions of the PAA. However, the changes are mainly 
connected to an increased consideration of flood risk in spatial planning, via mitigative measures or 
locally limited preventive measures. Essentially one cannot speak of a marked shift. It is an 
incremental change, i.e. a second order policy change, in the form of a new policy instrument, i.e. the 
water test (based on theory of Hall, 1993).  
3.4.2 Explanatory factors 
To some degree the changes that occurred in the ZPP are also influenced by national developments, 
such as the Tielrooij Committee, which investigated impacts of climate change (Tielrooij Commissie, 
2000: 19). The committee triggered a strengthening of the integration of spatial planning and water 
management through the water test (Rijk et al., 2003). Another influential development at the 
national level is the need to find new urban expansion areas for the western part of the country (RZG 
Zuidplas, 2006; VROM, LNV, V&W, and EZ, 2006: 142).  
The development project ZPP and Westergouwe are two independent projects. The minister of 
VROM asked about exploring the polder as an urban extension location for the western part of the 
country at the beginning of 2000. The insights and learning experiences resulting from Westergouwe, 
and the personal connections between spatial planners and water authorities made during this time, 
influenced and facilitated cooperation in the Interregional Steering Group. The cooperation of the 23 
parties was also supported by the province and the Commissioner of the Queen32, who was a 
proponent of the integral stakeholder-wide governance process in order to reduce complaints 
(interview 26). The cooperation eventually produced the idea to implement mitigative and to some 
degree preventive measures. Table 3.4 summarises the main factors of change and stability.  
The development of Westergouwe was not directly influential for the development project ZPP; 
however, those preceding discussions need to be mentioned in order to understand the 
development project ZPP. The municipality of Gouda and the province wanted to develop a new 
neighbourhood in the ZPP, but the regional water authority was against the plans on the grounds of 
water safety (Pols et al., 2007). Eventually, the municipality was supported by the minister of VROM, 
responsible for spatial planning (Pols et al., 2007), who stipulated that a solution had to be found 
that would allow spatial development.33 The regional water authority had good connections to the 
State Secretary of the ministry V&W (Transport and Water, the later ministry I&M, Infrastructure and 
the Environment). They lobbied the national Tielrooij committee for an improvement of the water 
test to be able to have a greater influence on spatial planning (interview 21). This also demonstrates 
the interaction between regional and national levels.  
  
                                                          
31
 There is a clear increase in costs of several thousands of euros per house  for the houses in Westergouwe. 
This is a disadvantage in a highly competitive housing market. 
32
 Representative of the national government in the provinces 
33
 See also Oremus, http://edepot.wur.nl/115078, 2005, (accessed 29 September 2014). 
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Table 3.4: Overview factors describing change and stability in the ZPP 
Significant explanatory factors are indicated in ‘bold’, and summarised in chapter 6. 
 Factors explaining stability Drivers of change 
Endogenous 
change 
- Local actors’ interest 
regarding urban 
expansion  
- Legal structure 
- Change in national legislation (water test)
34
 
- National agency: decision by minister of VROM for 
urban expansion 
- Local policy entrepreneur (dike reef) – regional water 
authority, province 
- Local interaction of advocacy coalitions 
Exogenous 
change 
- locally precipitated 
resources  
 
- Shift in discourse:  
- Climate change (Tielrooij Committee) 
- Further economic and urban development 
in Randstad  
3.5 Evaluating flood risk governance at the case study level  
Table 3.5: Summary evaluation of FRGA in ZPP 
Evaluation criteria +/- Features of governance 
Resilience + Resistance measures present 
+/- Measures developed to increase the ability to absorb and recover, but 
dependent on awareness of citizens, which might be limited 
+/- Learning possibilities present, but their implementation hindered by lack of 
financial means 
Legitimacy +/- Public participation process described as fair, but population was against 
plans 
+ Plans could be challenged 
- Potential future dilemma of equity (raised houses vs. lower houses) 
Efficiency + Concern for research efficiency: cost-benefit analysis 
3.5.1 Resilience  
The following paragraphs will discuss the capacity to resist, respond/recover and adapt to flooding.  
Capacity to resist 
As illustrated in table 3.5, several measures are applied in the ZPP and risk is therefore addressed in a 
holistic way: the ability to resist is the underlying basis. Nevertheless, the decision to build in the 
deepest polder in the first place was a political one and based on minimal scientific evidence 
regarding the flood risk and the appropriateness of urban development; afterwards an attempt was 
made to make the plan suitable for the location.35 However, the potential consequences of flooding, 
calculated in a scientific study (see Asselman, 2005), were assessed as acceptable. The decision to 
build in the ZPP demonstrates, therefore, a high degree of trust in technical measures, and a belief in 
the ability to reduce uncertainty to a minimum. This high level of trust is also based on good and bad 
experiences in developing similar areas in the past decades. Uncertainties, like the unlikely inability 
to close the storm surge barriers, are thus not given priority.  
Capacity to buffer and recover 
Measures that increase the ability to absorb and recover are slowly implemented. That implies that 
the FRGA offers the possibility of innovation and adaptation, at least after an external stimulus, i.e. 
climate change concerns. Due to the coordinating role of the province and the Interregional Steering 
                                                          
34
 Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 2000, nr. 234. The new article 10 of the Spatial Planning Decree 1985 
includes the obligation to consult the water manager. Before 2000 this consultation was voluntary. 
35
 Compare Wessels, J. (2010) http://www.ziedaar.nl/print-article.php?id=374, accessed 12.10.2014. 
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group, the spatial planning measures will most likely be set up in an aligned way. This is supported by 
their representation in local plans and agreements. On the other hand, the safety standards of the 
dike that needed to be strengthened in the course of the Flood Protection Programme 2014-2019, 
were not adjusted to the planned urban development in the polder at that time. This might indicate 
that the spatial planning developments and flood risk management are still not integrated in all 
areas, at least not in the Zuidplaspolder. The application of the layered approach (lagenbenadering) 
and the cooperation within the Steering Group facilitated the consideration of context-specificities. 
In the north of the polder the soil is mainly clay. This area is designated as urban development. In the 
middle of the polder the heterogeneity is high as is also the groundwater pressure, which is 
beneficial for aquatic ecosystems, so that this area became the area designated as a ‘water pearl’ 
(waterparel), in which water is combined with other functions. In the south-west there is peat, which 
is unstable due to the groundwater pressure. This is designated as a nature area (HHSK et al., 2006: 
15). 
As a result of the high safety standards the chances of fluvial flooding in the ZPP are limited. The goal 
of the ZPP project was climate-proof urban development with a water robust system, the plan to 
raise the floor levels and reduce the fragmentation of the water levels will, according to the relevant 
studies, fulfil this goal. However, implementation is lagging behind because housebuilding at the 
moment is only being carried out on a small scale, due to the economic crisis (interview 27). That 
means that it remains to be seen how far those measures work successfully in practice. An increase 
of awareness for flood risk might be limited to the actors directly involved in the Steering Group 
(interviews 26, 21 and 27); that seems to be confirmed by a study that revealed that, beside the 
regional water authority, no other actor feels responsible for water safety issues (VROM-raad, 2007: 
37). So far as pluvial flooding is concerned, measures are undertaken to increase the storage capacity 
of the water system.  
Capacity to adapt and learn  
Learning opportunities were provided within the provincial innovation laboratory (Xplorelab). It gave 
new insights into emergency management, such as that citizens should be able to survive for 72 
hours on their property, because possibilities to evacuate might be limited (Xplorelab Hotspot ZPP, 
2008). A limitation of this vertical evacuation might be the lack of awareness and self-reliance among 
citizens. To overcome this, information campaigns were carried out (Van den Brink, 2014). Their 
success is unknown. The management of the consequences of flooding is highly dependent on the 
awareness of citizens and their knowledge of appropriate behaviour. It is unknown to what degree 
this is actually present. Some possibilities for awareness-raising might have been missed, like 
mentioning the flood risk in the buyers’ contract, as in Belgium. In the ZPP the ‘Land Bank’ might 
have been one way of testing this manner of information distribution. However, it is often assumed 
that ‘everybody knows we are living in a polder’, ‘everybody is aware of the risk’ (interview 27). 
Many of the experimental measures developed in the provincial innovation laboratory (Xplorelab) 
were not implemented (interview 26). Due to the economic crisis, governmental authorities were 
reluctant to invest in more expensive measures (Van den Brink, 2014). The implementation of 
learning processes was hindered by lack of financial means.  
3.5.2 Legitimacy  
Information availability was generally described as sufficient (interviews 29 and 30; Van den Brink et 
al., 2014: 991). For the dike strengthening project ‘kitchen table’ talks were carried out with the 
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directly affected citizens and property owners in 2013, followed by round-table meetings for other 
citizens. The aim was to include all relevant interests,36 so that a broad range of stakeholders was 
consulted and public participation ensured (Van den Brink et al., 2014). According to a survey 
commissioned by the Environmental Organisation (Milieuvereniging), the population was against the 
Westergouwe development (RIGO Research en Advies, 2008). However, even though the citizens did 
not get the result they hoped for, they felt that it was a good and fair participation and accepted the 
outcome (interviews 29 and 30). Van der Wal (2010) also showed that citizens’ views were not 
always considered in the decision-making process. It is doubtful whether this limits the legitimacy of 
the process, however. The legal procedures have been followed, which means that everyone could 
have given his or her view about the draft spatial zoning plans. Some parties did that and also filed an 
appeal with the Council of State. The decisions of the public authorities were upheld on appeal. That 
means the decision-making process was transparent, and could be challenged (accountability).  
The new houses will be situated higher than the old houses and in a ‘safer’ position; that might cause 
some social dilemmas regarding equal protection of and questioning by citizens in the future. From a 
social equity point of view, one might argue that the houses that are situated higher have also cost 
the homeowners more, so that the distribution of costs and benefits is equal.  
3.5.3 Efficiency 
The cost of elevating the houses are carried by the developer and eventual house owner (interview 
23), so that for the state it can be seen as cost-efficient. On the other hand, it could be argued that 
this investment is not cost efficient, as its objective is to reduce a flood risk that is already very low 
(interview 23). However, at the moment the land is only slowly being sold, due to the economic 
crisis, so that in general no statements about cost-effectiveness can be made, regarding the double 
protection of dike and raised floor levels.  
In the course of the climate adaptation project a cost-benefit analysis was carried out (Xplorelab 
Hotspot ZPP 2008), which indicates that there was concern for resource efficiency. 
3.6 Conclusions  
The aim of this case study was to explore the tension between water safety and spatial planning, 
which is supposed to be overcome by the water test. As is illustrated by the case study, the water 
test is at the moment hardly used to make informed decisions about the location of urban 
development. The test does not seem to support the prevention strategy, as was also shown in an 
evaluation of the water test (CAW, 2008, Steenstra and Kwadijk, 2010). In this case, the water test 
mainly supported the setting-up of the mitigation strategy, but in general this is an exception and 
only occurs occasionally. However, the outside intervention in the form of the minister might have 
been rather crucial in this regard, meaning that FRM is influenced by political debate and interests 
and not by the precautionary principle. In the end the case study seems to confirm that safety issues 
do not necessarily prevail over economic interests. The distribution of economic value in the 
Netherlands in the flood-prone western part of the country seems to be in accordance with this 
observation. This prioritisation of interests is facilitated by a high degree of trust in engineering 
measures, and the perception that uncertainty can be significantly reduced via those measures. This 
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 Project Plan Dike Strengthening Moordrecht, 18 November 2014, p.6. 
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correlates with the control paradox, which describes an increase of the potential consequences of 
flooding, as a response to a decrease in the probability of flooding.  
Nevertheless, the case study provides important suggestions as to how to support the integration of 
water management and spatial planning. It stresses the importance of interpersonal connections and 
communication (interviews 21 and 26), the benefits of combining different views and knowledge 
systems in a local steering group, underlining the advantage of cooperation at the local level 
(interviews 21, 26 and 28), and shows the facilitating role of the Layered-approach (lagenbenadering, 
see §3.3.1) when it comes to integrating water issues in spatial planning (interview 26).  
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4. Case Study Nijmegen 
4.1 Introduction and scope of the analysis  
This chapter provides an analysis, explanation and evaluation of the implementation site ‘Dike 
relocation Lent’ at Nijmegen of the national ‘Room for the River’ (RftR) programme. Nijmegen is one 
of 39 project sites. The case is exceptional and an example of the often promoted ‘paradigm shift’: 
from a technocratic-engineering focus based on dikes, to a more integrated water system-based 
approach that gives more space to the natural processes of the river. Considering the long-standing 
history of the engineering approach, this change is described as a crucial turning point (Van der 
Brugge et al., 2005; Wesselink, 2007).  
The case study aims to analyse how the project influenced the flood risk governance in Nijmegen. 
The focus will be on Nijmegen; however, due to its embedding in the broader Room for the River 
programme, relevant insights from the national programme will also be presented to facilitate the 
explanation. 
We will first provide the main characteristics of the case study area (§4.2). This is followed by an 
analysis of dynamics (stability and change) in the flood risk management strategies and their 
embedding in local/regional sub-arrangements (§4.3). We go on to explain these dynamics (§4.4) and 
to evaluate them (§4.5), before providing our conclusions for this case study (§4.6). 
The case study will focus more on fluvial FRMS of the Room for the River project and less on other 
flood management measures undertaken in the city of Nijmegen.  
4.2 Main characteristics of the case study  
The city of Nijmegen is located in the eastern part of the Netherlands close to the German border. It 
is located at a bottleneck of the River Waal, a branch of the River Rhine. The main centre of the city is 
located south of the river. Lent, a former village which was annexed by Nijmegen in 1998, is situated 
north of the river, as is the housing development area Waalsprong (a Vinex-location37) with around 
11,000 apartments. The Ooijpolder, a nature area, is located in the south-east of Nijmegen.  
Flood risk in Nijmegen is mainly fluvial and, to a lesser degree, pluvial in nature. Fluvial flood risk is 
increased due to the city’s location at a bottleneck, where the river width is reduced to 350 metres. 
During the high river discharges of the River Rhine in 1995, 250,000 inhabitants in the area of the 
river Rhine needed to be evacuated, because the dikes threatened to collapse but eventually held. 
This was a big shock for the Dutch and especially for the inhabitants of the area of Nijmegen. 
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 Fourth Memorandum Spatial Planning Extra – Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening Extra – describes the 
construction of new housing development areas from 1995 to 2005 (Evaluatie Verstedelijking VINEX 1995 tot 
2005 ‒ Eindrapport.Ministerie van VROM(2005). 
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Figure 4.1: Map of Nijmegen and Lent 
Source: MarCom-Carto – Faculty of Geoscience – Utrecht Univeristy 
 
The ‘Room for the River’ measures are categorised as flood defence measures, but are in contrast to 
the traditional, technical approach, more integrated and water system-based. They consist of a dike 
relocation 350m inland38 and the implementation of a blue (i.e. water carrying) side channel39 (see 
figure 4.2).  
                                                          
38
 The new dike will be a green dike with a ‘hard’ flood defence structure – a quay. The quay consists of a 
concrete wall and below is a seepage protection structure (kuilscherm), which is covered by a soil layer, so that 
development can be carried out on it (Interview 22).  
39
 The objective of the side channel is to lower the water level in the main river bed. At the upstream end of the 
side channel a construction is to be implemented that will prevent the accidental entering of ships into the side 
channel (interview 23). The construction of the side channel leads subsequently to the formation of an island in 
the river. 
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Figure 4.2: Measures undertaken within the dike relocation project40 
 
Due to the side channel, a part of the former dike has become an island of which three hectares will 
be raised by two metres, so that it will level with the existing dike. The three hectares that are raised 
are projected to be flood-free and will be used for urban development (i.e. mitigation strategy). 
Accessibility of the island for emergency services and an escape route for citizens is ensured via two 
flood-free routes (interview 16), i.e. preparation and response strategy. Table 4.1 summarises the 
identified strategies for fluvial flooding. 
Table 4.1: Identified measures per strategy 
Recovery is not included, because those measures are managed at the national level. 
 Flood prevention Flood defence Flood mitigation Flood preparation 
fluvial Prohibition of 
construction in the 
flood plain (Policy 
Great Rivers, 1997) 
Dike 
relocation, 
side channel 
Raising of the residential 
part of the island 
Extra infrastructure for 
accessibility and evacuation of 
the island 
Flood risk management plans 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Schematic overview of strategies present in the case study Nijmegen 
Dark blue indicates the most dominant strategy, medium blue emerging strategies, and light blue minor 
strategies.  
                                                          
40
 Gemeente Nijmegen, ‘Ruimte voor de Waal 
Nijmegen’,http://www2.nijmegen.nl/mmbase/attachments/1076344/GN281_aanp_fld_RvdW_NL_v3_def.pdf, 
2012, (accessed 13 April 2014). 
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4.3 Analysis of flood risk governance in Nijmegen (Room for the River 
project)  
Figure 4.4 illustrates the FRGA connected to the Room for the River project. The sub-FRGAs Water 
System Management and Spatial Planning are the most stabilised and the main focus of this case 
study, with Emergency Management playing a minor role. This is also reflected by the overarching 
discourse relevant for the FRGA in Nijmegen: integrated water resource management. It challenged 
the dominant engineering approach, and continually raising the dikes was not perceived as a sound 
solution anymore. Since the 1970s an environmental discourse had already been introduced into 
Dutch water management leading to the establishment of an integrated water management 
approach in 1985 (V&W, 1985).  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Overview of the FRGA in Nijmegen.  
The sub-FRGAs are elaborated in the text below. The Water System Management arrangement is closely 
aligned with the Spatial Planning arrangement through the bridging mechanism ‘Spatial Planning Key 
Decision: Programme Room for the River’. Both sub-FRGAs are the most stabilised and relevant for this case 
study. Emergency Management only has a minor role in the Room for the River programme, but is linked to 
other sub-FRGAs by giving advice to Spatial Planning and having a cooperation arrangement with Water 
System Management. Urban Water Management was not relevant for the analysis, but is present in the 
municipality. The sub-FRGA Compensation is not depicted as it is only relevant for the national level. 
From a discursive point of view, the Room for the River project in Nijmegen does not only include a 
different strategic approach to FRM but also includes new ideas regarding governance and 
decentralisation. Instead of a water-sector-based approach, actors of other policy sectors were 
consulted, informed and actively involved in the planning process. The central government and RWS 
framed the project in terms of a collective task to achieve benefits for everyone. Other parties were 
supposed to see the project as ‘theirs’ in order to be encouraged to be on time (interview 11). The 
decentralised governmental levels perceived their improved influence as positive. Nijmegen 
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perceives the project as ‘theirs’, but instead of a community feeling, the decentralised parties, 
especially Nijmegen, perceived it more as a development of democratisation of municipalities and 
citizens that ‘forces’ central government to increasingly involve other actors in an integral working 
procedure (Schwartz, 1993).  
The discourse of decentralisation or empowerment was combined with a new approach as to how to 
manage the relationship between central and decentralised actors initially via ‘controlled 
governance’ by setting up a supervising programme management team (programmadirectie) that 
monitors whether the decentralised actors use the given design freedom within the given boundaries 
set up by central government (Berkes, 2009). In the end, it turned into a collaborative planning and 
collegial monitoring by regional and national authorities (Van Herk et al., 2015).  
4.3.1 Spatial planning 
At the beginning the national discourse ‘more room for the river’ clashed with the development 
project Waalsprong and the economic interests of the municipality. Initially, the city decided not to 
orient development towards the river, but that changed. Eventually, the municipality saw the chance 
offered by the project and promoted it with slogans like ‘Nijmegen embraces the Waal’ actively 
framing the project as a chance for better aesthetic quality of the environment of the city, and the 
municipality as the ‘leader’ of the project, because it set up the spatial plans, thereby influencing the 
design of the project, and it contracted with the commercial bodies which eventually implemented 
the project (interviews 11, 12, 14, 15 and 22). The province had a more passive role in the project 
(interviews 11 and 13).  
The State Secretary of the Ministry of I&M used the instrument of the Coordination Decision 
(rijkscoördinatiebesluit) of Article 3.35 (1b) Spatial Planning Act to carry out the project and therefore 
a project plan (of the Water Act) by the regional water authority was no longer necessary: the 
relocation of the dike is included in the spatial zoning plan of the municipality.41 However, the 
measures were financed by central government, giving it, despite the leading involvement of 
decentralised actors, the main position of power.  
For Lent, the municipal spatial zoning plan ‘Room for the river Waal’ (Ruimte voor de Waal) is 
relevant. It has been irrevocable since 27 December 2012. This spatial zoning plan includes the dike 
relocation and the spatial development on the island of Lent. In the preparation process of this 
spatial zoning plan, inhabitants have filed 17 reactions. Two interested parties have filed an appeal 
with the Council of State, which rejected the appeal on 27 December 2012.42  
At an early stage of the project it was decided that the relocation of the primary flood defence 
structure would not be legally enabled by a project plan of the regional water authority, but by a 
spatial zoning plan. Therefore, the regional water authority had no other function than the right to 
give advice to the municipality (and of course with the administrative agreements between the 
authorities). After the first advice43 of the three water authorities, the municipality did not include all 
the advice in its spatial zoning plan. The water authorities felt forced to give a negative advice about 
                                                          
41
 Decision of 9 October 2009, Government Gazette 2009, 15167. 
42
 Council of State, 27 December 2012, no. 201204832/1/R1. In Annex II the most important reactions are 
included. 
43
 Water Test of three water managers (regional water authority Rivierenland, RWS and province of 
Gelderland) 11 December 2003. 
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the spatial zoning plan.44 After this negative advice, the municipality adjusted its conceptual spatial 
zoning plan by including some rules about water management and the retention of rainwater, but 
the regional water authority still had some doubts and submitted written views (zienswijzen) 
regarding the danger of piping and the stability of the flood defence structures.45 As a result, the 
municipality consulted the regional water authority again, which this time led to an agreement. 
4.3.2 Water System Management 
An important actor in this sub-arrangement is Rijkswaterstaat (RWS). The project management team 
of the project Room for the River (PDR) is formed by RWS. PDR is responsible for the exploration 
phase, design of the project, and implementation of the programme (supervision and monitoring). 
Rijkswaterstaat is also the competent authority for the management of the river Waal. It has 
established a so-called ‘Damage Office’ for compensation claims concerning the project. Although 
the Spatial Planning Key Decision Room for the River can be seen as the legal basis of the project, 
decentralised bodies (municipality and regional water authority) have to take concrete decisions 
(spatial zoning plan, water permit) in order to have a legal basis for the realisation of the project. 
From a legal point of view the municipality and the regional water authority are the competent 
authorities for these decisions which can potentially cause damage to property. The different 
authorities agreed to create the Damage Office to assess the claims and decide upon them.46 The 
project has affected private property and some of the property needed to be removed 
(approximately 50 buildings) (interview 22). For the expropriation, Title IV of the Expropriation Act 
(Onteigeningswet) was applied. For other damage caused by the project, a specific compensation 
regulation was made for Room for the River.47 This is extraordinary, because normally the damage-
causing authorities have their own regulations. This regulation streamlines the different procedural 
regulations of no-fault liability that are applicable for the different measures (Van Doorn-Hoekveld, 
2014b). However, the substantive standards of those different regulations still apply for the 
assessment of every request for compensation (interview 19). The reason for this specific regulation 
is twofold: it creates an easier way for affected parties to file a request and to streamline procedures; 
and affected parties do not have to search for the right competent authority (or, in some cases, 
authorities). This should create more public support for the project.48  
The role of the municipality is remarkable in this sub-arrangement. Normally, the municipality is 
(only) involved in the spatial planning arrangement, but in this case, the municipality was getting 
involved in water system management as well, by using the spatial zoning plan as the legal 
instrument for the relocation.  
The regional water authority is also an important actor in this sub-arrangement. It is responsible for 
water management and the new dike, once the project is completed. It is striking that the regional 
                                                          
44
 Advice of 23 May 2011 (201114169/15228). 
45
 Based on Article 3:15 GALA. Opinion of 13 October 2011 (201133201). 
46
 As is agreed in the Agreement No ON-1421 of State Secretary of the Ministry of Traffic and Water 
Management and the State Secretary of the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Nijmegen, the province of Gelderland, 
regional water authority Rivierenland, and the Regional Public Body of Arnhem-Nijmegen (Regionaal Openbaar 
Lichaam knooppunt Arnhem-Nijmegen), 22 April 2002, (Overeenkomst No ON-1421). 
47
 Regulation Compensation Room for the River, Government Gazette (Strct) 2009, 82. This is specific for the 
project Room for the River.   
48
 At this moment (June, 2015), only one request has been received from the town of Lent. At this moment, the 
Damage Office has informed the panel of experts which is going to assess the requests.  
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water authority was involved in this project only in a passive way and did not bring in its own visions 
(Rijswick et al., 2013). The relocation is legally embedded in a spatial zoning plan of the municipality 
instead of a project plan, so the regional water authority could only influence the project through the 
water test, instead of actively being involved as in the case of a project plan.   
4.3.3 Emergency management 
This sub-FRGA plays only a minor role in the project. Emergency Management was reformed in the 
course of the project and the security regions are in a ‘learning curve’ to adapt to the multi-
disciplinary way of working (interviews 16 and 17). Nevertheless, it gave non-legally binding advice 
for the setting-up of the island, regarding evacuation and accessibility, which was accepted by the 
municipality. This advice was not specifically for flood issues. The security region Gelderland Zuid has 
a special Disaster Management Plan in case of a dike breach and flooding (Rampenbestrijdingsplan 
Dijkdoorbraak en Overstroming, 2012). In this respect, the cooperation with the regional water 
authorities is very intensive, because the information delivered by the regional water authority is 
essential for setting up the disaster management plan (interview 17). This plan is linked to the 
emergency response plan (calamiteitenplan) of the water authority (Article 5.29 Water Act). 
Cooperation between water and emergency managers is generally perceived as positive (interviews 
16 and 17).  
4.4 Explaining dynamics in flood risk governance at the case study level  
4.4.1 Explanandum 
It is indicated that, without the national programme, FRM in Nijmegen would not have changed 
(interview 22). The city was chosen in an exploration phase as one of 39 implementation sites of the 
project, because of its location at the bottleneck of the river Waal, which results in a high flood risk. 
Its physical situation was therefore decisive. For the case study Nijmegen the focus will be on 
explaining the shift within the defence strategy from a dike-approach to a water system-based 
approach. This correlated with a governance shift from sector-based to integral management. The 
new approach developed in addition to the existing approach, which means that the approach based 
on structural measures is still relevant. We can speak of a layering of new approaches (for theoretical 
background see Valman, 2012).  
The chain of change is therefore: change in national discourse triggers change in national rule 
dimension due to the introduction of a new instrument (Spatial Planning Key Decision Room for the 
River).49 This change in the rule dimension at the national level had consequences for the FRGA at 
the local level in Nijmegen. For the rule dimension at the local level this meant that the decentralised 
authorities needed to set up new spatial zoning plans, project plans and water permits suitable for 
the new approach to FRM. The preceding exploration phase for the project, which consisted of an 
extensive consultation of a broad range of stakeholders, had already shown a new approach. In 
general a greater number of actors were actively involved in the project (e.g. municipality, nature 
organisations, citizens, commercial bodies, province etc.). A new feature was that the municipality, a 
decentralised, spatial planning authority, had a strong position in the project (interviews 11, 12, 13 
and 15). Subsequently, the cooperation between water managers and spatial planners increased. The 
regional water authority took no leading role in the project and had to cooperate with a greater 
number of other interested parties (interviews 15 and 16). The national SPKD also influenced the 
                                                          
49
 This is an instrument of the old Spatial Planning Act. This instrument does not exist anymore.  
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discourse at the local level. The municipality of Nijmegen adapted its views on the river and its spatial 
planning by not turning its back on the river anymore, but instead it is ‘embracing the river’ 
(interview 15). The regional water authority started to think in a more integrated manner, focusing 
not only on the dike, but on the broader region where the dike is embedded (interview 12). The 
project was financed by national financial means, which were spent on spatial quality and flood 
safety (interview 11). That constitutes an important change (see table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2: Overview of main dynamics in FRGA of Nijmegen  
The dynamics are either addressing the overarching FRGA, or particular sub-FRGAs 
Dimension Dynamics in the PAA dimensions Dynamics 
Rules  • SPKD Room for the River 
• New spatial zoning plans 
• Voluntary advice from security region for spatial 
planning of island 
 
• Safety standards and procedures 
• Change for sub-FRGA 
WSM + Spatial planning 
(SP) 
• Change for sub-FRGA 
Emergency 
Management + SP 
• Stability of sub-FRGA 
Water system 
management (WSM) 
Actor • Accountability distributions 
 
• Increased cooperation between water managers and 
spatial planners 
• Private parties to implement the project (design and 
construct) 
• Decentralised authority (municipality) leading role 
• Stability of sub-FRGA 
WSM 
• Change in FRGA 
Discourse  • From only controlling water to integrated 
management ‘more space’ 
• Local discourse of ‘embracing the river’ 
• Change in FRGA (esp. 
Sub-FRGA WSM) 
Resources  • National financial means for double objective: safety 
and spatial quality 
• Change in FRGA 
 
Based on those observations, the changes for the Room for the River project in Nijmegen can be 
described as what Hall (1993) calls second order changes, i.e. a new policy instrument is used, but 
the goal is still to avoid flooding.  
4.4.2 Explanatory factors 
The changes occurring in Nijmegen in the course of the Room for the River project are a direct result 
of a paradigmatic shift in the discourse towards ‘integrated water resource management’ that took 
place at a national level and which was translated into a national programme. IWRM had already 
been a part of Dutch policy since 1985 (V&W, 1985). However, a shock event in the form of high river 
discharges along the Meuse and the Rhine in 1993 and 1995 respectively, accelerated the ‘more 
room for the river idea’, which had been formerly introduced by NGOs like WWF. An environmental 
actors coalition, also partly situated within Rijkswaterstaat (Van der Brugge, Rotmans, and Loorbach, 
2005), used the shock event to lobby for a more integrated water system-based approach. The 
nature managers, public and private nature organisations, had a more rigorous view consisting of 
natural river corridors that would give even more room to natural processes (interview 18). The 
national water managers eventually chose a more moderate version that eventually satisfied water 
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managers and nature managers. The programme was set up in a time of economic stability, when 
financial expenses for the double objective were less closely questioned (interviews 11, 12 and 18).  
Even though the national level provided the structure for the project, the actual local 
implementation was influenced by local actors. The interactions between a number of actor 
coalitions played an important part here (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). On the one hand, the national 
government that wanted to implement the project had several legal instruments at its disposal to 
override local actors and carry out the project. However, the state secretary of the former ministry of 
Traffic and Public Works supported not just the new approach to FRM, but also the idea that 
decentralised authorities should take a more prominent role during the implementation of local 
projects (interview 11). That notion was supported by financial cuts suffered by Rijkswaterstaat, so 
that it had to reduce the number of project leaders (interviews 11 and 15). That increased the 
necessity to involve decentralised authorities more and more. On the other hand, the municipality 
was at first against the project. However, it eventually realised that it could not prevent the project 
and acknowledged that flood risk in Nijmegen, due to its location on a river bottleneck, needed to be 
managed. The eventual agreement between the municipality and the national government was 
achieved through negotiations. An alderman of the city had an important role here and achieved 
extra benefits for the city (e.g. a new bridge, compensation for houses that could not be built etc.) 
(interviews 11, 15 and 22). The municipality is historically a strong actor, and a very proactive city 
that supports urban expansion. It is also open to and interested in new approaches, which is shown 
by its close cooperation with regional and local knowledge institutes and also by its international 
involvement, such as in a number of Rhine Forums (interviews 11, 14 and 15). Another involved 
group were the citizens who were strongly against the project and also appealed against it, but their 
appeals were rejected by the Council of State (interviews 15 and 22). The regional water authority 
and the province were not involved in those discussions and cannot be identified as hampering or 
facilitating change (interviews 12 and 13). The advisory task of the emergency managers was 
facilitated by the formation of security regions in accordance with the national Security Regions Act, 
which strengthened their position in the region (interviews 16 and 17).  
Table 4.3: Overview of drivers of change for Nijmegen 
Significant explanatory factors are indicated in ‘bold’, and summarised in chapter 6. 
 Factor explaining stability  Factor explaining change  
Exogenous 
change  
 - Shock event 1993/1995 
- National discourse on integrated water 
management and decentralisation 
- Time of financial stability 
Endogenous 
change 
- Legal structure and distribution 
of responsibilities 
- National development of Room for the River 
programme 
- Minister who supported integrated approach 
- Strong local municipality, with talented policy 
entrepreneurs  
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4.5 Evaluating flood risk governance at the case study level  
 
Table 4.4: Overview of evaluation results 
Evaluation criteria +/- Features of governance 
Resilience + Enhances ability to resist water by decreasing the probability of flooding 
 +/- Limited measures are undertaken to improve the ability to absorb and 
recover 
 - Awareness of flood risk tends to be limited among non-water managers 
 + Learning measures to increase ability to adapt are present 
Efficiency + Programme office (PDR) supported resource efficiency, due to timely and 
efficient implementation of project  
 - Economic efficiency is often perceived to be lacking, due to no 
consideration of non-monetary values 
Legitimacy + Participation took place, information about project 
 + Procedural justice present, transparency and accountability ensured 
 +/- Project mostly accepted, also due to compensation measures 
 - No protection for areas outside the dike 
 
4.5.1 Resilience 
The following paragraphs will discuss the capacity to resist, respond/recover and adapt to flooding.  
Capacity to resist 
As demonstrated in table 4.1 a number of diverse strategies have been implemented within this 
Room for the River implementation site. The goal set by the Room for the River project, i.e. aesthetic 
quality and increased discharge capacity of the Rhine to 16,000 m3/s, has been fulfilled, according to 
calculations and models (interview 11). Those measures are calculated to solve the problem of the 
bottleneck in Nijmegen by reducing the probability of flooding. Although the focus is on resistance 
measures (increase the discharge capacity), in the course of the project also mitigation, and response 
and preparation measures were implemented, which to some degree increased the ability of the city 
to absorb and recover from flooding. Flooding has therefore been addressed in a holistic way, but in 
contrast to the other two case studies the focus on resistance is still even more prominent.  
Capacity to buffer and recover 
The sub-FRGAs SP and EM seem to be less stabilised and institutionalised in regard to FRM than the 
sub-FRGA WSM. As an added confirmation of this, interviewees of the province and the municipality 
stated that they tended not to consider flood risk explicitly in their spatial planning (interviews 13, 
14, 15 and 22). The financial subsidies from the national authorities might have been a more 
important incentive for spatial planners than the increased perception of flood risk. Emergency 
management is, due to the merging into security regions, in a phase of re-organisation. The merger 
gave the security services more influence and improved the link between the spatial planning 
arrangement and the emergency management arrangement. This can be seen in the emergency 
planning advice given with regard to the accessibility of the island (interviews 16 and 17). There are 
indications that the merger has also improved cooperation between water managers and security 
regions, because a representative of the regional water authority is deployed to the security region 
(interviews 12 and 17). The exchange of information was described as positive (interviews 16 and 
17). Flooding is of course only one of many risks for emergency management, but the security 
regions have started to get involved in the discussions, due to the flood events of 1993/1995, but 
also due to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (interview 17). The involvement in the disaster 
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management plan (rampenbestrijdingsplan) was already legally embedded, but the involvement in 
spatial planning is currently increasing. 
The different strategies seem to be coordinated within the project, especially because the project 
has facilitated cooperation between all relevant stakeholders through the PDR. Outside the project, 
however, spatial planning actors tend to pay less attention to the issue of flood risk, because it is less 
urgent and only one of many concerns (interviews 15, 16 and 22).  
Capacity to adapt and learn  
The programme approach facilitated learning possibilities and the ability to adapt. The individual 
projects had different time frames, so that experimentation and lesson-learning between different 
individual projects was facilitated by the central programme management direction (Cook et al., 
2004). The implication is that innovation in the form of diversification of strategies is supported by a 
decentralised leadership and broad stakeholder collaboration including governmental and non-
governmental parties (i.e. the citizens and the commercial bodies implementing the project). Within 
Room for the River learning was furthermore encouraged by a wide range of audits, evaluations and 
monitoring assessments (Rijke et al., 2012).  
4.5.2 Legitimacy 
Stakeholder participation had already taken place in the exploration phase of the SPKD Room for the 
River. The aim was to improve understanding for certain measures among the different stakeholders 
(interview 11). Also during the implementation phase, information apps were available and 
discussion evenings were held to inform the citizens (interviews 15 and 22). Transparency was 
achieved by the publication of the plans; the time frame to inspect those plans was 13 weeks. Two 
residents appealed against the spatial zoning plan regarding (among other things) the problem of 
seepage, but their appeals were rejected by the Council of State. Most, but not all, citizens, accepted 
the outcome, and those who had to leave their houses (around 50 houses) accepted the 
compensation (interview 15). Most damage to property caused by the project will be compensated 
for and a special regulation and a special office have been established for this purpose. Close contact 
with possible affected parties increases public support (interview 19). That means in general that 
procedural justice seems to have been fulfilled. Rijk et al. (2012) argue that the large number of 
independent audits, evaluations and monitoring assessments by scientists and consultants, as well as 
parliament requesting progress updates, have improved the transparency and accountability of the 
project. The project is evaluated as fair because of its democratic distribution of power, i.e. the 
regional stakeholders getting design freedom under a centrally established framework with clear 
safety requirements and strict deadlines (Berkes, 2009).  
Despite the seemingly sufficient information provision within the project, a general aspect might also 
affect the area of the Room for the River project in the future. Risk communication is not 
systematically and actively carried out in Nijmegen. Governmental actors mostly start with crisis 
communication once the Waal has reached a certain level and the Waalkade (promenade along the 
Waal) needs to be closed down (interview 15). There are only occasional information meetings for 
the approximately 40 people living outside the dike in Nijmegen. There were discussions in Nijmegen 
about a communication strategy for informing people living outside the dike, which would include 
the regional water authority. However, it was decided that such a strategy was not relevant, because 
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it was considered that people living outside the dike had to inform themselves about the situation 
(interview 15).  
4.5.3 Efficiency 
From the point of view of economic efficiency, the Room for the River project is in general described 
as not cost-efficient, mainly because non-monetary values such as the increased aesthetic quality 
and the environmental benefits are not included in the calculations. However, the programme will 
most likely stay within budget, and also within the time frame (interview 11).50 The Programme Team 
Room for the River (programmadirectie Ruimte voor de Rivier) is seen as a decisive factor for this 
result, because it supported high goal consensus (Provan amd Kenis, 2008) and promoted a strict 
project schedule (interview 11; Van Herk, Zevenbergen, and Ashley, 2013). In this regard it tried to 
achieve resource efficiency. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The case study analysis reveals an important turning point in FRM in the Netherlands towards an 
integrated water system-based approach. How did the Room for the River programme influence FRG 
in Nijmegen? It is one of the first projects where the sector-based approach was widened to an 
integrated approach characterised by a collaboration of water authorities and (decentralised) spatial 
planning actors. From a legal point of view, the distribution of competences in the project is 
remarkable. Normally the water authority would (should) be the competent authority regarding 
primary flood defence structure because they will in the end be responsible to guarantee flood 
safety, but in this case it was decided that an instrument of the municipality was to be used to enable 
the relocation. The project widened the field of potentially involved actors and introduced 
mechanisms on how to organise cooperation among different actor groups, e.g. a central programme 
management team, agreement contracts between central and decentralised parties, but also 
governmental and non-governmental contractors, in addition to the general public participation 
procedure that was also used by the interested parties.  
This new approach is also of relevance beyond the Room for the River project, as the approach has 
been applied in the Delta Programme (interview 11), and also in the Flood Protection Programme, 
which is mainly a dike strengthening programme. Within the latter programme an attempt has been 
made to include local interests by combining dike strengthening and improvement with spatial 
quality and local infrastructure (interview 2).  
  
                                                          
50
Binnenlandsbestuur (2014) http://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/ruimte-en-milieu/nieuws/ruimte-voor-de-
rivier-binnen-budget.9447266.lynkx, accessed 10.1.2015. 
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5. Case study Dordrecht  
5.1 Introduction and scope of the analysis  
This chapter provides an analysis, explanation and evaluation of flood risk governance in Dordrecht. 
Dordrecht is one of around 18 pilot projects,51 where multi-layered safety is explored within the 
Delta Programme. The aim is to explore what the value of the case study is for the rest of the 
Netherlands.  
We will first provide the main characteristics of the case study area (§5.2). This is followed by an 
analysis of dynamics (stability and change) in the flood risk management strategies and their 
embedding in local/regional sub-arrangements (§5.3). We go on to explain these dynamics (§5.4) and 
to evaluate them (§5.5), before providing our conclusions for this case study (§5.6). 
5.2 Main characteristics of the case study  
The Island of Dordrecht is part of the Rijnmond-Drechtsteden area that also comprises the city of 
Rotterdam, a number of smaller cities and the surrounding highly productive agricultural and nature 
areas (south-west of the Netherlands). This area is essential for the Dutch economy, mainly due to 
the harbour of Rotterdam and the highly productive agriculture and horticulture industries. Besides 
that, due to its location in the estuaries of the Rhine and Meuse, it is also of great ecological 
importance (e.g. the Biesbosch, a Natura 2000 site). 
 
Figure 5.1: Map depicting the city of Dordrecht and the surrounding rivers. 
Source: MarCom-Carto – Faculty of Geoscience – Utrecht Univeristy 
                                                          
51
HKV, STOWA (2015) ‘Landkaart Meerlaagsveiligheid’, http://www.meerlaagsveiligheid.nu/, 2015, accessed 
2.5.2015. 
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The Island of Dordrecht (9,000 ha, 119,000 inhabitants)52 is part of the municipality of Dordrecht. 
Dike ring 22 protects 7,000 ha against flooding, with a safety standard of 1:2000.53 The historical 
port, parts of the historical centre and more recent housing and business areas (e.g. Stadswerven) lie 
outside the dike-protected area (Hegger et al., 2014). The embanked area has an average height of 0 
NAP. The unembanked area is situated higher (from 1.7m to 4m + NAP) and is therefore less 
vulnerable to flooding by the surrounding rivers and by the North Sea, than the embanked area. 
Nevertheless, Dordrecht is generally highly vulnerable to flooding. It is surrounded by the rivers Oude 
Maas, Nieuwe Merwede, Beneden Merwede, Hollands Diep, Wantij and Dordtsche Kil (see figure 5.1). 
Furthermore, it is situated in a tidal area. The accessibility of Dordrecht is limited, only three bridges, 
two tunnels and shipping connect it to the mainland. Accordingly, evacuation possibilities are limited. 
Only 15% of the residents could escape from Dordrecht in the case of flooding (Maaskant et al., 
2009). If a flood occurs, it will be deep and fast. Under present circumstances, the expected number 
of victims in the case of flooding will be 300 and the material damage is expected to be 7 billion 
Euros. The probability and impact of flooding is expected to increase due to sea level rise, an increase 
in extreme river discharges and land subsidence and an increase in economic value (Hegger et al., 
2014). 
 
Figure 5.2: Overview of flood defence structures in Dordrecht  
Source: Hegger et al., 2014 
Table 5.1 gives an overview of the FRM measures in Dordrecht. The city of Dordrecht is protected by 
flood defence structures: the Wieldrechtse Zeedijk and the Zuidendijk (both old, secondary dikes).54 
In addition, the construction of the Maeslantkering in the Nieuwe Waterweg in the delta of the Rhine 
has reduced the designated water level. Some houses function as flood defence themselves (e.g. the 
Voorstraat, see figure 5.4) (Hoss et al., 2013). To ensure safety, movable flood risk management 
barriers have been introduced to close off the entrance to the houses. The primary flood defence 
‘Voorstraat’ meets the legal standards applicable to primary flood defences in 2014,55 but will 
probably not meet the legal standards for primary flood defences after 2030. This part of the flood 
defence has to be raised by 75 cm to meet the standards for the next century (Pol, 2012); however, 
                                                          
52
 CBA, www.cbs.nl, n.d., accessed 13.10. 2014. 
53
 Current and future safety standards are addressed in § 2.3. 
54
 Waterplan Dordrecht 2009. 
55
 Extended Third National Assessment Primary Flood Defences 2014. 
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due to the historical location this is not feasible. Figure 5.3 gives an overview of the strategies 
present in Dordrecht.  
 
Figure 5.3: Schematic overview of strategies present in the case study Dordrecht 
Dark blue indicates the most dominant strategy, medium blue emerging strategies, and light blue minor 
strategies.  
 
Since a part of the primary flood defence structure is one of the main roads in the centre of 
Dordrecht, some houses have barriers that can be used to protect the centre from flooding in the 
case of high water discharges.  
 
Figure 5.4: Barriers in the Voorstraat during inspections56 
 
Additionally, it was decided that urbanisation should not develop further than the Zeedijk and the 
Zuidendijk, which are situated a little more north in the eastern part of the dike ring. The 
preservation of the agricultural landscape is the main reason for this agreement (Hoss et al., 2013). 
The increase in paved areas is compensated for by increasing the storage capacity for pluvial flooding 
for the whole area as a result of the water test. 
Table 5.1: Overview of FRM measures in Dordrecht 
Recovery is not included, because those measures are managed at the national level. 
 Flood 
prevention  
Flood defence  Flood mitigation  Flood preparation  
Pluvial   Increased water 
storage capacity of 
water system   
  
                                                          
56
 Waterschap (2011) www.waterinconen.nl accessed 4.2.2015. 
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Fluvial  Prohibition of 
construction in 
certain areas, 
e.g. in the 
south, or close 
to the dike 
Primary flood 
defence (dike ring 
22 and 
Maeslantkering), 
secondary flood 
defences  
E.g. Stadswerven: 
floor levels (0 m – 5 
m + NAP), most 
important living 
areas of houses on 
the first floor  
Evacuation exercise 
(Voorstraat) and Flood 
Risk Management 
Plans  
5.3 Analysis of flood risk governance in Dordrecht  
Dordrecht is a pilot project for the national climate adaptation programme, the Delta Programme57 
(DP). The policy concept of Multi-layered Safety (MLS) is further explored in Dordrecht. MLS requires 
a consideration of different measures in FRM: (1) probability reducing measures, e.g. dikes; (2) 
sustainable spatial planning; and (3) emergency management. In accordance with a risk discourse, it 
is believed that absolute safety does not exist. Even though the FRGA broadly reflects the national 
arrangement, it is noticeable that in practice the borders of the sub-FRGAs seem to be less rigid, so 
that sub-FRGAs tend to blend into each other (see figure 5.5), due to formal communication and 
information exchange within the DP, or informal communication between all involved stakeholders 
(interviews 31, 33, 35 and 36). In addition, research projects such as MARE, or the ‘Learning & Action 
alliances’ go beyond the borders of the sub-arrangements and adopt a holistic view.  
 
Figure 5.5: Overview FRGA in Dordrecht 
The sub-FRGAs are elaborated in the text below. The Water System Management, Spatial Planning and 
Emergency Management arrangements are closely linked through the Delta Programme, which functions as 
an important bridging and coordination mechanism. The Urban Water Management and Spatial Planning 
arrangements are also connected via the water test. The sub-FRGA Compensation is not depicted as it is only 
relevant for the national level. 
                                                          
57
 The DP is a national programme, where all governmental levels cooperate to develop solutions to improve 
the climate adaptability of the Netherlands for the future focusing especially on water safety and freshwater 
supply. 
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5.3.1 Water System Management 
Along with the regional water authority Hollandse Delta and Rijkswaterstaat, the municipality of 
Dordrecht and the province of South Holland are also important actors in this sub-FRGA. That 
indicates the close integration of the different sub-arrangements. Two parts of the dike are currently 
being strengthened (dike reinforcement Dordt-East and Dordt-West/Kop van ‘t Land), because they 
did not meet the necessary standards according to the national assessment of primary flood 
defences of 2006. From a resource perspective, the national government co-subsidises this 
reinforcement through the Flood Protection Programme (Hoogwaterbeschermingsprogramma) 
together with the regional water authorities (I&M and UvW, 2013). A project plan is necessary for 
the reinforcement, which is carried out by the regional water authority Hollandse Delta. The project 
plan has been subject to an appeal to the Dutch Council of State.58 The dike will be reinforced on the 
land side. The stakeholder argued (on appeal) that the competent authority had made an inaccurate 
balance of interests. The judge rejected this appeal, because it was not proved that the research, on 
which the decision was based, was negligent. Rijkswaterstaat is the competent water authority of 
the main waterways. It provides for information about (possible) water levels. In particular this is 
important for the unembanked areas of Dordrecht. Furthermore, it is responsible for the 
management of the Maeslantkering. 
Within the sub-Delta Programme Water Safety, new legal safety standards for the primary flood 
defences are being developed. At the moment those standards are so-called ‘working’ norms. The 
ways in which existing safety norms could be changed and the need to do so is still being discussed 
(the legislative proposal was available for consultation) (the maximum individual risk of dying in a 
flood, group risks and potential economic damage should be included in the safety standards). 
Concerning MLS, it should be noted that not only the regional water authority, but also the province 
and the municipality of Dordrecht are advising the Delta Programme Water Safety (as far as the 
standards for primary flood defences are concerned). Normally the provinces and municipalities are 
less actively involved in the Delta Programme. The municipalities lobby for the consideration of the 
‘group risk’ when setting up new norms (interview 31).  
The regional water authority has obliged the municipality to have movable flood defence barriers in 
the Voorstraat. The municipality uses the General Local By-law for Dordrecht (Algemene Plaatselijke 
Verordening Dordrecht) to fulfil this obligation. The by-law includes provisions for movable flood 
defence barriers on the Voorstraat (e.g. it is forbidden to remove them, to cause damage to them 
and there is an obligation to tolerate them).59 The province is involved in compartmentalisation of 
dike-protected areas, because it concerns secondary flood defence structures. The provincial 
regulation (Waterverordening Zuid-Holland 2009) provides standards for secondary flood defences 
and standards of water logging.60  
5.3.2 Urban Water Management 
The underlying discourse of this sub-FRGA is ‘living with water’. Different building methods, such as 
watertight ground floors, watertight doors, building on stilts, floating houses and escape routes, 
guarantee to the user that the building will function in all circumstances. Results of the study Urban 
                                                          
58
 ABRvS 24-04-2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:BZ8443. 
59
 Articles 2:21A and 2:21 B. 
60
 This Regulation will be changed in 2015 (Draft Decision of the Provincial Executive of January 2015, No 6770). 
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Flood Management Dordrecht have been applied in the district of Stadswerven.61 From an actor 
perspective, the municipality has the largest responsibility. Together with the regional water 
authority, it has established the Urban Water Plan 2009-2015, which is important for spatial 
development. It has no legal basis, but it is an administrative policy agreement about dealing with 
water logging (rainwater, groundwater), water safety, water quality and water quantity. The 
Municipal Sewerage Plan 2011-2015 of Dordrecht is relevant for the rainwater and sewerage water 
collection and ground water management (Article 4.22 Environmental Management Act; Articles 3.4 
and 3.5 Water Act). 
5.3.3 Spatial Planning 
The actors involved in this sub-arrangement are the municipality, the province and the regional 
water authority. From a discursive point of view, sustainability is an important aspect in this 
arrangement. The municipality wants to create a balance between People, Planet and Profit. The 
corresponding economic discourse addresses the strengthening of Dordrecht as a logistically 
strategic point (Kelder et al., 2013), the social component includes the development of housing areas 
(e.g. Stadswerven) and the environmental aspect as well as the protection of the national park 
Biesbosch (Kelder et al., 2013).  
The municipality is responsible for local ‘good spatial planning’.62 Accordingly, it has to consider 
water safety issues, which are the responsibility of the regional water authority. Furthermore, the 
municipality gives advice to the Delta Programme New Construction and Restructuring. The main 
rules applicable for this sub-FRGA for the municipality are the following. Every appendix of the spatial 
zoning plan contains references to the Urban Water Plan (e.g. how to deal with water storage if the 
amount of sealed surface increases, or what consequences does a proposed spatial development 
have for water safety). Besides that, the appendix also contains an elaboration of the consequences 
of spatial development for subsidence and water level management and the measures to be taken. 
Because it is not part of the rules of the spatial zoning plan, these references are not legally binding.  
The results of the research undertaken by Urban Flood Management Dordrecht (a research 
consortium of the community and the regional water authority) are applied to the development of 
the unembanked district of Stadswerven. A spatial zoning plan for this area provides the opportunity 
to ‘build’ ten floating ‘water houses’ and other urban developments. The height of the jetty, placed 
in front of the water houses, has to be adjusted to be resistant to (extreme) high and low water 
levels. Different floor levels have to be taken into account for this development. The residents will be 
aware of possible water logging, because some parts of the ground floor can be flooded (tide). It 
increases the awareness of living with water. It is also for that reason that the most important living 
areas of the houses are situated on the first floor and the residents have to be responsible for this in 
designing and building their houses. These conditions are laid down in the purchase agreement of 
every parcel of land, and therefore are firm conditions (interview 31). 
The province is responsible for coordinating water management and spatial planning at the 
provincial level. In unembanked areas the province influences water safety policies via spatial 
planning using the provincial building by-law (Bouwverordening Zuid-Holland 2014). It states that the 
appendix of each spatial zoning plan (in unembanked areas) should include an analysis of the number 
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 UFM Dordrecht is a research consortium supervised by the European Network COST C22. 
62
 Obligation of the Spatial Planning Act.   
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of estimated casualties if flooding occurs, if this spatial zoning plan provides new spatial (building) 
development opportunities, coupled with the assessment that is made to allow new spatial 
development. It also contains  an obligation for municipalities to include secondary flood defences in 
their spatial zoning plans. It provides the prior strategy (voorkeurstrategie) for the Deltaprogramme 
Rijnmond-Drechtsteden (in particular for the unembanked areas). The provincial water plan 
(Provinciaal Waterplan 2010-2015) contains the challenges, ambitions and policies of water safety 
(rivers, secondary flood defences, crisis management and vulnerable areas) and water logging 
(surface water, groundwater etc.). The provincial policy is laid down in the new policy framework for 
building in unembanked areas (Nieuw Zuid-Hollands beleidskader voor buitendijks bouwen).  
The regional water authority has no specific responsibilities in this sub-arrangement, but has 
influence through the water test and voluntary advice. It is involved in developments concerning 
(spatial) developments in unembanked areas, relating to safety in the dike protected areas (flood 
defences, water quantity and water quality). Apart from this, it is also a partner for sharing its 
knowledge and experience (formal and informal, e.g. evacuation plans, development in unembanked 
areas). The regional water authority is also involved in water safety developments. 
Rijkswaterstaat is involved in (spatial) developments in unembanked areas (e.g. as the competent 
authority for granting permits for activities in the rivers).  
5.3.4 Emergency Management 
This sub-FRGA is shaped by the local discourse, which is especially promoted by the municipality, 
which states that Dordrecht must become a ‘Self-reliant island’ by 2035. The term includes the fact 
that inhabitants have a clear plan of action, in case of flooding, to survive a certain amount of time 
on the island (Kelder et al., 2013). That comprises the realm of emergency management, which 
generally includes the following actors: security region, municipality, regional water authority, and 
also citizens.  
The municipality is responsible for the management of small-scale disasters in cooperation with 
other actors. Furthermore, it proactively informs citizens living in unembanked areas (not a legal 
responsibility) (interview 31). 
The security region sets up the Regional Risk Profile (Regionaal Risicoprofiel Veiligheidsregio Zuid-
Holland-Zuid), in which it is stated that the flood risk scenario with the greatest impact for the Island 
of Dordrecht is a breach of the dike at ‘De Kop van ‘t Land’. The profile contains a description of the 
warning system if a certain water level occurs and a division of responsibilities between the regional 
water authority, Rijkswaterstaat and security region and the probability and impact if a certain 
scenario occurs (specified in more detail in the Regional Crisis Plan (Regionaal Crisisplan 
Veiligheidsregio Zuid-Holland-Zuid). The Regional Operational Team (Regionaal Operationeel Team) is 
the operational leader in crisis management. The regional water authority has no specific tasks in this 
sub-arrangement, but it is a partner for sharing its knowledge and experience (e.g. evacuation plans) 
and is involved in the security region and the Regional Operational Team.  
Citizens living in unembanked areas are responsible for flood mitigation, preparation and recovery. 
The municipality practises emergency situations with the citizens living on the ‘Voorstraat’ every year 
(Interview 31; Kelder, Gersonius, and Hulsebosch, 2013: 16). 
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5.4 Explaining dynamics in flood risk governance at the case study level  
5.4.1 Explanandum 
FRM in Dordrecht is the result of two main factors. On the one hand, there is an active municipality 
that acknowledges the physical situation of the city and the consequent high flood risk. On the other 
hand, there is the national development of and the increased shift towards a risk approach to FRM 
that includes a management of the consequences of flooding. The definitive impact of this new 
discourse on the organisational dimensions is not yet clear. For the rules dimension new safety 
standards have been discussed (DP Water Safety), which are to be based on: a flooding probability; 
the individual and group risk of dying; and a social cost-benefit analysis. However, those changes are 
at the moment only under discussion. Despite the potential changes, the actor dimension would 
remain relatively stable, with regard to the distribution of responsibilities and tasks. An important 
aspect that has changed is the cooperation and deliberation between different stakeholders in the 
delta programme, especially because it is less about representing the interests of their relevant 
organisation and more about finding a solution together (interview 35). That implies that the 
involvement of non-water managers in aspects of FRM has increased and especially the involvement 
of spatial planners, i.e. province and municipalities, and emergency managers, i.e. newly formed 
security regions, has increased. This is also visible in the rules dimension with the water test and 
emergency plans. The changes in the resources dimension address in particular new knowledge and 
expertise developed within the Delta Programme, and several research programmes like MARE, or 
Urban Flood Risk Management (Kelder, Gersonius, and Hulsebosch, 2013). Financially, no particular 
redistribution of resources occurred from structural measures to other measures. However, the 
municipality in particular became active in investing in research, as did the national government, in 
the course of the delta programme (interview 31). The main change to be seen in the discourse 
dimension is the shift towards a risk approach with the island being self-reliant. However, that also 
includes the probability reducing approach, which is still pre-eminent. 
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Table 5.2: Overview of main dynamics in FRGA of Dordrecht  
The dynamics are either addressing the overarching FRGA, or particular sub-FRGAs 
Dimension Dynamics in the PAA dimensions Dynamics 
Rules  • Separate procedure for dike strengthening  
• Standards for dikes remained stable 
• Water test influences spatial zoning plans 
• Floor level regulated in agreements (Stadswerven) 
• Stability of FRGA 
 
• Change in sub-
FRGA Spatial 
Planning (SP) 
Actor  • Responsibility distribution stays mainly the same  
• Active municipality in regard to flood risk 
 
• Delta Programme as new communication venue for all 
stakeholders (also increasingly security regions)  
• Stability of FRGA 
• Change in sub- 
FRGA SP 
• Change of FRGA 
Discourse  • Self-reliant island of Dordrecht – risk approach 
• Sustainability  
• Change of FRGA 
Resources  • Financial distribution stays stable  
• Municipality and nat. gov. invest in expertise generation  
• Development of extensive knowledge  
• Stability in FRGA 
• Change in FRGA 
 
It is difficult to estimate to what extent these observations will constitute a marked institutional shift. 
The goal of FRM in Dordrecht has been adapted towards a more resilient-citizen approach that 
expects negative consequences of flooding and tries to minimise them. However, this is above all a 
shift in discourse. How far this shift will have impacted on the organisational dimension remains to 
be seen. In table 5.2, an increase in spatial planning measures and emergency management is 
already visible. However, the main accountability will probably remain with the water authorities, 
and from a financial point of view no clear change in resource distribution is visible.  
5.4.2 Explanatory factors 
FRM in Dordrecht is influenced by developments at the national level, as was the case with the other 
two case studies. The establishment of a risk approach and the concept of multi-layered safety at the 
national level was influenced by several factors. The idea of applying a risk approach had already 
been mentioned by the first Delta Commission in the 1960s; however the technology and knowledge 
was lacking to implement it. This improved in the 1990s due to advances in computer technology, so 
that water authorities started to develop a new safety norm that would also include the 
consequences of flooding (interview 9). Furthermore, Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans triggered an 
overhaul of crisis organisation and climate adaptation in the Netherlands by, in particular, climate 
adaptation scientists (interview 9). They stressed that 100% safety is not possible and that also the 
potential consequences needed to be managed (interview 43). This actor coalition (for theoretical 
considerations see Sabatier and Weible, 2007), was supported by the minister (interview 43), who 
was a proponent of the risk approach and might be described as a policy entrepreneur (according to 
theories of Kingdon, 1984). Those developments triggered the emergence of the multi-layered safety 
concept.  
Dordrecht was chosen as a pilot project, because it was identified as a focus area by the State 
Secretary based on a national security study. Such focus areas are characterised by either a high local 
individual risk (above 10-5), high group risk, or based on the social CBA it is seen as efficient to 
increase protection. For Dordrecht the CBA concluded that the current flood probability is twice as 
large as the economic optimal flood probability (Kelder, Gersonius, and Hulsebosch, 2013: 20). 
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Furthermore, in the historical part of Dordrecht possibilities to strengthen the dike or raise streets 
are limited (interviews 34, 35 and 36). Therefore, the physical circumstances of the municipality were 
crucial for facilitating change.  
From a local point of view the national Delta Programme can be seen as a window of opportunity (for 
a theory see Kingdon, 1984). The municipality of Dordrecht was already working on a risk approach 
to flood risk management before the Delta Programme started (interview 31). It is a very active and 
progressive municipality, which has a high awareness of flood risk, caused by its location on an island 
– which is difficult to access – in the delta (interviews 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36). The municipality, as 
policy entrepreneur (theory based on Kingdon, 1984), wanted a self-reliant island and for this reason 
it also favoured the strengthening of particular dike areas. However, that was not possible because of 
the different time schedule of the Flood Protection Programme, so that alternative measures needed 
to be undertaken (interview 31). Dike strengthening measures are also influenced by the type of 
dike. The national government is involved in primary flood defences and makes its decision among 
others highly dependent on CBA. A ‘secondary defence’ is solely financed by the regional water 
authority. The financial means can be more limited which sometimes makes the implementation 
uncertain (interview 31).  
The municipality has also played an important role in bringing all the actors together, it has good 
connections to (all) involved stakeholders and facilitates communication (interviews 33 and 36). As a 
policy entrepreneur it also introduced new ideas regarding the involvement of a broader range of 
stakeholders, e.g. security regions, or on how to deal with the areas outside the dike (interview 31). 
In this regard it also influenced the Delta Programme at a national level.  
The development of the strategies took place within several research programmes (e.g. MARE) and 
the Delta Programme. In those forums a lot of knowledge and expertise was generated and 
exchanged, which facilitated change and innovation. That means learning played an important role in 
the development of new ideas. The eventual decision for the preferred strategy was also based on 
scientific studies and cost-benefit calculations (Slootjes, 2013). Table 5.3 summarises the factors 
explaining the observed dynamics.  
 
Table 5.3: Overview explaining factors for stability and change 
Significant explanatory factors are indicated in ‘bold’, and summarised in chapter 6. 
 Factor explaining stability  Factor explaining change  
Exogenous 
change  
 - physical characteristics 
- importance in discourse of cost-efficiency: 
CBA 
Endogenous 
change 
- legal structure and distribution 
of responsibilities (path 
dependency) 
- national risk approach - Delta Programme 
- national security study: identified Dordrecht as 
focus area 
- local policy entrepreneur municipality 
- local learning within DP 
- mismatching time planning of dike 
strengthening project (Flood Protection 
Programme) and Delta Programme 
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5.5 Evaluating flood risk governance at the case study level 
 
Table 5.4: Evaluation of FRGA in Dordrecht 
Evaluation criteria +/- Features of governance 
Resilience + Resistance measures and measures to improve ability to absorb potential 
flood  
+/- Vertical evacuation as innovation, but due to lacking awareness or concrete 
stipulations success might be limited  
+ Delta programme facilitates the ability to adapt, due to learning possibilities 
and cooperation 
Efficiency + Cost-benefit analysis crucial for prioritisation of measures 
 - Financial efficiency of security region is questioned 
Legitimacy + Information of risk and for areas outside the dike 
 
5.5.1 Resilience 
The following paragraphs will discuss the capacity to resist, respond/recover and adapt to flooding. 
Capacity to resist 
Resistance is provided by structural measures, which are still the foundation for reducing the 
probability of flooding. As explained in the introduction, Dordrecht is highly vulnerable to flooding. 
The most difficult situation, which has a low probability, would be in case of fluvial flooding and 
flooding from the sea, which could trigger a closing of the storm surge barrier so that the water from 
the river could not drain away (interviews 35 and 36). Rijkswaterstaat coordinates and advises about 
both situations (interview 35). The awareness of consequence management is therefore high 
(interviews 35 and 36) and thus a number of other measures are discussed (see table 5.1).  
Capacity to buffer and recover 
To increase the ability to absorb the consequences of flooding and in order to give citizens an 
alternative, research has been done on vertical evacuation (interviews 31 and 32). It is not seen as an 
ideal solution, but generally preferred to the alternative scenario of potentially dying in a car while 
trying to leave the area (interviews 35 and 36). In this regard, it seems to be a good solution to 
increase self-reliance and resilience on the island. However, the solution of vertical evacuation has 
not yet matured, and it seems to have weaknesses. The security region is critical of the concept of 
vertical evacuation. It states that preconditions need to be improved, e.g. gas burners, food etc., 
because in the case of flooding there will be a lack of drinking water, heating, sanitary facilities and 
communication. There is a tendency not to listen to the concerns of the security region, which says 
that ‘generally they do not want to hear it’ (interview 33). Eventually further research needs to be 
done, to establish how vertical evacuation can be implemented (e.g. stipulating preconditions) to 
increase resilience. Another issue is the awareness of citizens, which seems to be generally low 
(interview 33), but can be perceived as the foundation of vertical evacuation. Measures are being 
developed to increase this awareness (e.g. flood app, interview 31).  
The formation of security regions is seen as an improvement for crisis management and cooperation 
with other actors. It has also had a positive impact on the awareness of the need for emergency 
management in the regional water authority (interview 34). 
The water test is evaluated positively by the regional water authority (interview 34) and by the 
municipality, which set up and adopted the plan and gave it to the regional water authority 
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(interview 31). The security region does not want to give spatial planning advice due to limited 
knowledge of water safety (interview 33).  
Capacity to adapt and learn  
The Delta Programme and related research studies offer learning possibilities and room for 
innovation to improve the situation in Dordrecht. They increase the ability to adapt. The cooperation 
within the Delta Programme is judged to be good and beneficial (interviews 31, 33, 34, 35 and 36), 
because people are not limited by the interests of their organisation (interview 36). It ensures a 
coordination of different measures, because they are developed as a whole. However, the dike 
strengthening measures (Kop van ‘t Land) of the Flood Protection Programme 2 were not linked to 
the DP (interview 31), which might indicate a general difficulty with coordinating measures due to 
programmes/projects with a different time frame.  
Despite the changes during the course of the DP (interviews 31, 33, 34 and 35) there are also 
obstacles that hamper the implementation of new ideas. For instance the regional water authority is 
legally responsible for FRM and has to stipulate certain safety demands, and implement them in a 
timely manner. That makes it difficult to link different interests (interviews 34 and 36). Another 
obstacle is its limited budget, especially for the management of secondary defence structures, which 
are solely financed by the regional water authority (interview 34).  
5.5.2 Legitimacy 
Democratically elected actors (municipality and regional water authority) give advice for the setting-
up of the safety norms (interviews 31 and 34). The municipality is very open and interested in the 
opinion of its citizens (interview 31). This could be seen as indirect participation. However, at the 
moment direct public participation does not take place in the course of the DP, because it is only an 
exploratory study. Nevertheless, if it is decided to conduct dike strengthening measures, then the 
citizens will be informed and consulted by the regional water authority (interview 36). In this case 
participation and transparency would be provided. However, the question arises as to when to 
inform citizens, because it might take several years (or decades) until the dike is actually 
strengthened. Therefore, the information is publicly available, but citizens are not actively informed 
in order to avoid panic (interviews 35 and 36).  
Citizens living outside the dike have no legal right to protection by the regional water authorities, a 
fact which might bring the social equity of protection into question. On the other hand, in general 
their vulnerability is more limited, because they are situated on higher ground (interview 35), and the 
probability of casualties is very small, with only material damage occurring (interview 31). 
Furthermore, especially in Dordrecht, citizens are informed by letter, and are generally aware of their 
situation, especially in the areas annually confronted with minor water logging (interview 31). Those 
citizens do not contribute financially to the regional water authority. 
The municipality has legally no responsibility regarding water management in areas outside the dike. 
However, Dordrecht provides a service of informing the citizens annually (interview 31) in 
cooperation with the regional water authority (interview 34). Furthermore, non-legally binding 
advice is given to citizens regarding private flood-proofing measures (interview 31). Annual 
emergency management exercises are carried out for the Voorstraat (interview 31). 
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The distribution of financial means to the security regions is not deemed to be transparent. The costs 
are based on expectations, but need to be compared with the actual objective (interview 33).  
5.5.3 Efficiency 
Resource efficiency is a relevant concern in the DP. For the central government the CBA is crucial for 
prioritising measures (interview 31). However, especially for the decentralised authorities there 
seems to be some lack of clarity connected to the actual carrying-out of the CBA (interview 31). 
Linking different interests (Dutch: meekoppelkansen) were an important aspect of the research 
carried out within the Delta Programme (Kelder et al., 2013). The measures have not been carried 
out yet, so no statement can be made on economic efficiency of actual costs and benefits.  
5.6 Conclusion  
How far will the case study of Dordrecht as a pilot study within the Delta Programme influence FRM 
in the Netherlands? Dordrecht had already started to work on risk issues before the Delta 
Programme. The municipality was therefore an important knowledge provider. It influenced the 
Delta Programme, for example by advising the consideration of group risk in the new safety norms, 
or the inclusion of security regions (interview 31). The municipality made it easier to look differently 
at safety, in particular because the alternative measures could actually be applied and tested in 
Dordrecht (interview 35).  
However, MLS, especially regarding the focus on the management of consequences, is not seen as an 
alternative for the remainder of the Netherlands, because structural measures are in most cases 
most cost-efficient (interviews 34, 35 and 36). For Dordrecht, however, these measures are not 
always available because of the physical situation. The knowledge and expertise developed in 
Dordrecht might be important for the whole country regarding the improvement of self-reliance for 
areas outside the dike (interview 36) and for areas that are difficult to evacuate (interviews 34, 35 
and 36). Furthermore, the pilot project helped to gain insights into alternatives in cases where the 
structural measures are not feasible, not efficient or for other reasons not applicable (interviews 35 
and 36).  
Furthermore, the clear administrative structure, i.e. one municipality, one province, one regional 
water authority etc., facilitated the elaboration of the concept of MLS. A higher number of actors 
might make it more complicated according to the experience of the interviewees (interviews 35 and 
36). 
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6. Explanations for stability and change in Dutch flood risk 
governance 
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter we aim to combine the findings at the national level and the three case study levels. 
After the storm surge of 1953, flood risk management in the Netherlands was characterised by a high 
degree of stability. Since the mid-1990s some degree of change can be observed, especially in the 
discourse dimension, but incremental changes are also visible in the organisational dimensions of the 
governance arrangement at the national level and at the case study level (see chapters 3-5).  
Those incremental changes in governance are layered next to the stable flood defence approach, i.e. 
other sub-FRGAs gained in importance in the realm of flood risk management. However, the case 
studies demonstrated that the sub-FRGAs are characterised by a high degree of interconnectedness 
(see figure 6.1), the quality of which is addressed in chapter 7. Within the case studies the 
interconnectedness is characterised by communication and cooperation between different 
stakeholders of different sub-FRGAs. This correlates with the Dutch culture of the Polder Model. The 
case studies showed that the blending of the different sub-FRGAs puts the traditional sub-FRGA 
Water System Management at the heart of Dutch FRM. It coheres as the basis of protection to which 
other sub-FRGAs are related and connected. Those other sub-FRGAs rarely act independently of the 
sub-FRGA WSM when it comes to FRM, and always in relation to it.  
 
Figure 6.1: FRGAs of the three case studies: Zuidplaspolder, Nijmegen and Dordrecht 
The sub-FRGAs are increasingly interconnected. In the ZPP the procedural instrument Water Test requires 
consultation of water managers in spatial planning. In Nijmegen, the Room for the River project is 
implemented by the close cooperation of water managers and spatial planners, with decentralised spatial 
planners having a leading role in a water safety project. And in Dordrecht, water managers, spatial planners 
and emergency managers are communicating and cooperating closely within the Delta Programme.  
6.2 Explanation of change in flood risk governance 
6.2.1 Trends of change 
In our analysis of flood risk management at the national level and the case study level, a number of 
dominant trends can be identified. Those trends are closely connected to each other. 
A first trend is the increasing attention on integrated water system-based solutions that aim to give 
more room to the river and allow natural processes. The idea was that structural measures like dikes 
would not be appropriate for the future, because the height of a dike cannot be raised indefinitely. 
This approach is closely related to the discourse of integrated water management, which aims to 
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incorporate a catchment-wide approach where different interests – water quality, quantity and 
ecological objectives – are integrated. This trend is implemented with the national programme Room 
for the River, which was described in chapter 4. It should be noted that this integrated water system-
based trend was especially dominant from the mid-1990s until the beginning of the 21st century. It 
seems to have lost momentum at the national level, because it only plays a minor role in the current 
Delta Programme, where only around €200 million are designated for integrated water system-based 
solutions. At a decentralised level, the trend is still visible and popular among nature organisations as 
can be seen in the network Natural Climate Buffer. 
A second major trend is a risk-based approach to flood risk management, i.e. an approach that 
considers not only measures to reduce the probability of flooding, but also the consequences (Delta 
Programme, 2015: 16). This risk-based approach is not new for the Netherlands, but it is gaining in 
importance and becoming more institutionalised, i.e. with the implementation of Floods Directive 
and the new safety standards that are based on a flood probability. This approach is characterised by 
the acknowledgement that absolute safety does not exist and floods – even though they have a low 
probability – can occur. A culmination of this trend is the introduction of the policy concept of Multi-
Layered Safety and new water safety standards (expectedly by 2017), so that there is a clear link with 
the trend of multi-sector governance.  
A third dominant trend – which closely relates to the second – is a shift from single-sector 
governance towards multi-sector governance. Traditionally, the water management sector is 
responsible for implementing the flood defence strategy and in this regard the sector is very 
dominant and central in flood risk management in the Netherlands. This is still the case; however, 
other sectors are gaining in importance. This is visible at a national and a case study level (see 
chapters 2-5) and it is especially the spatial planning sector and emergency management which are 
gaining in importance. A number of bridging and coordination mechanisms were introduced to 
support this multi-sector governance, like the water test and the Steering Group Water Management 
which have increased the integration of spatial planning and emergency management respectively. 
Furthermore, this trend is likely to increase in the future, because the new policy concept of Multi-
Layered Safety addresses strategies in all three sectors to minimise flood risk in the future.  
Another trend that is not that dominant or visible at the moment, but which might gain in 
importance in the future, is the shift towards interactive governance of urban pluvial flooding. This 
flood problem gained in importance in the past and is increasingly appearing on the political agenda 
of municipalities. However, from a legal point of view, property owners, supported by insurance, are 
primarily responsible for the management of pluvial flooding. In the context of climate change, the 
problem of pluvial flooding and a change in its management might become a more visible trend.  
6.2.2 Factors of change 
From the analysis at the national level and the case studies, a number of endogenous and exogenous 
factors explaining those trends were identified. At the national level, shock events played an 
important role in opening windows of opportunity for new discourses. They accelerated policy 
change. Actors played an important role in exploiting those shock events to bring about further 
change. International influences, e.g. EU Directives, played a minor role in policy change and acted 
only as a supporting factor. The EU Floods Directive, however, played a role in the implementation of 
the risk-based approach in Dutch FRM policy and legislation. Changes at case study level are 
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influenced by the physical situation of the respective case study that makes it prone to change. Here, 
the interaction between local and national levels can take many forms. In Dordrecht, a risk approach 
was initiated at the local level, and its further elaboration and implementation was only accelerated 
at the national level. The case study of Nijmegen illustrates a case where the local change was 
initiated at the national level. The Zuidplaspolder is an in-between case, where the change in strategy 
originates from local and national interaction.  
 Floods as shock events  
At the national level in particular and indirectly also at the case study levels, flood events that are 
framed as shock events play an important role in influencing incremental policy change. The fluvial 
floods of 1993/1995 along the rivers Meuse and Rhine stabilised the flood defence approach as a 
first response, but in a second step they accelerated the introduction of a more integrated water 
system-based approach in line with the integrated water management discourse. The flood defence 
approach was not seen as feasible for the future. From a governance perspective this triggered an 
increasing cooperation between spatial planning and water managers.  
The pluvial flood event of 1998, which affected large parts of the Netherlands, put the problem of 
pluvial flooding on the political agenda and demonstrated the shortcomings of the current policy 
instruments applied to integrate water issues in spatial planning, so that the water test was 
amended. This event also accelerated and facilitated the setting-up of an insurance scheme against 
pluvial flooding, and the establishment of a Calamities Compensation Act for governmental 
compensation against natural disasters.  
Shock events outside the Netherlands also influenced the Flood Risk Governance Arrangement. 
Hurricane Katrina, which affected a delta of a developed country, showed the weaknesses of those 
vulnerable areas and raised the question as to whether something similar could happen in the 
Netherlands. The event triggered the improvement of cooperation between water managers and 
spatial planners, and made a risk approach to flood risk management more popular in the 
Netherlands.  
 Agency 
Change in the Netherlands is predominantly agency-driven. The described shock events accelerate 
change (or further stability), but are ineffective without actors to exploit the window of opportunity. 
At the national level, changes in the epistemic community of governmental actors promoted new 
ideas, e.g. on integrated water system-based management, cost-efficiency, or a risk approach to 
flood risk management, because absolute safety was seen to be impossible. However, at the case 
study level the influence of strong actors was also visible; in Nijmegen and Dordrecht that was the 
municipality, and in the ZPP it was the province and the regional water authority. Those actors were 
very proactive and brought in their own innovative ideas. Additionally they took on the lead and 
brought all the stakeholders together to facilitate communication. Depending on the strength of the 
local actor and its attitude towards flood risk, changes in FRM can be facilitated or hampered.  
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 Physical circumstances 
The case studies indicate that change tends to occur in especially vulnerable locations, where the 
conventional probability-reducing approach is not feasible or is too costly to be implemented, e.g. 
the island situation in Dordrecht or the river bottleneck in Nijmegen. That means both were cases 
with high flood risk and the traditional approach had reached its limit of effectiveness due to 
extraordinary physical circumstances. That might indicate that change in the Netherlands is of an 
adaptive nature in cases where the traditional dike strengthening approach cannot be implemented. 
That also means the FRGA in the Netherlands is – despite its legal constraints (see §6.3) – flexible 
enough to produce solutions that go beyond the probability-reducing approach, at least in specific 
cases. Furthermore, the physical situation also influences the involvement and the commitment of 
the actors; flood prone areas tend to be more positive and proactive towards the policy concept of 
multi-layered safety. A potential explanation is that, because of the high urban density, dike 
strengthening is sometimes difficult (interview 34). However, in other, more remote, areas there 
could be possibilities for alternative strategies, but it is not clear as to how far they are being 
explored at the moment.  
 Multi-level governance – exchange of learning 
The information exchange between the central and the decentralised levels is an important pathway 
for exchanging learning processes that support (incremental) change and adaptation of the FRM 
approach. On the one hand, decentralised authorities have to implement national legislation, which 
is to some degree based on learning processes, e.g. water test, involvement of security regions, or 
new safety standards. On the other hand, the learning processes at the decentralised level also 
influence the national level, e.g. Dordrecht via the Delta Programme (the idea of group risk and the 
involvement of security regions came from the municipality), Nijmegen with the Room for the River 
programme (the set-up of a team controlling the quality of projects came from the municipality), or 
lobbying for the water test as done by the regional water authority in Zuidplaspolder. The exchange 
is further supported by joint organisations that represent regional water authorities, provinces, 
municipalities or interest groups.  
6.3 Explanations for stability in flood risk governance 
Changes in flood risk governance in the Netherlands are, above all, incremental in nature. They are 
layered next to the traditional sub-FRGA Water System Management. That means that (1) from a 
strategy point of view, the flood defence approach stays predominant, and is only supported by 
other strategies; and (2) from a governance perspective, flood risk remains a governmental 
responsibility and no changes occurred in regard to multi-actor governance. Private actors can be 
involved in public consultation and participation processes, but generally there is no tradition of this 
in the Netherlands. The case studies Nijmegen and ZPP showed that citizen groups become more 
active when they are directly affected by the adverse consequences of particular measures.  
This path dependency has its origin in the engineering approach, which has a very long tradition in 
the Netherlands and was reinforced and further institutionalised in the 1960s after a disastrous 
storm surge. By choosing this path, the number of future alternatives in the subsequent reactive 
sequence was reduced (see theory of Mahoney, 2000). The path dependency is especially increased 
because it is so highly stabilised in the institutional arrangements. It was more or less informally 
stabilised in the 1960s, but, after two major fluvial flood events in the 1990s, the arrangement 
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became even more firmly stabilised. A number of main factors that support path dependency in the 
Netherlands can be identified.  
Path dependency is supported by precipitated resources (Hughes, 1987). Due to the high investment 
in structural measures in the past, it is nowadays more cost-efficient to maintain defence measures 
than other measures (Rijk et al., 2003). Additionally, once a system of dike rings has been 
constructed, the physical possibilities to adopt another strategy are limited, because spatial planning 
is constructed in accordance with those dike rings. That also means that, in flood-prone areas like the 
western part of the country which are the economic centre of the Netherlands and have the 
necessary infrastructure, the need to protect those areas by means of dikes is reinforced. 
Furthermore, from a social perspective the perceived necessity to consider flood risk more explicitly 
in spatial planning also tends to be minimised, because actors rely on structural measures. This can 
be seen in the evaluation of the instrument of the water test (see §2.4). 
Path dependency is also supported by legal regulations. Safety norms, periodical assessments, 
accountability of water authorities etc. stabilise and reproduce the flood defence approach. Water 
authorities are legally accountable to meet the safety standards within strict deadlines. That reduces 
the flexibility to implement alternative measures. This governmental responsibility is constitutionally 
laid down and difficult to change. Furthermore, the financing system of this arrangement, i.e. 
specialised taxes, ensures the implementation of measures in most cases and especially in 
comparison with other countries, so that the government can provide the service of safety. That 
means, however, that the perceived responsibility is shifted away from citizens. The lack of 
awareness among citizens is another factor of path dependency, because it prevents private actors 
from becoming engaged with regard to property-based private flood-proofing, taking out insurance 
(where it is available), or preparing themselves in case of flooding.  
6.4 Conclusions 
Flood risk governance in the Netherlands is highly path dependent. From a strategy point of view, the 
flood defence approach remains predominant. From a governance point of view, governmental 
responsibility for providing safety remains. Nevertheless, signs of incremental changes are visible:  
from a strategy point of view, a risk-approach consisting of multiple strategies is gaining in 
popularity, and, from a governance point of view, a shift from single-sector based governance 
towards multi-sector governance is visible. Nevertheless, path dependency is predominant. New 
strategies and governance arrangements are mainly layered alongside the existing governance 
arrangement.  
Path dependency is supported by physical infrastructure, legal regulations, and a lack of awareness 
among non-water authorities and citizens. The incremental change is supported by shock events, 
active actors and exchange of learning processes across different governmental levels. 
It should be noted that changes in strategies and governance arrangements tend to be of an adaptive 
nature. Most changes occur in areas with high flood risk, where the flood defence approach cannot 
be implemented. That points to signs of flexibility in the Dutch system. 
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7. Evaluation of flood risk governance in the Netherlands 
7.1 Introduction 
The FRGA in the Netherlands is characterised by a close interplay of five different sub-arrangements, 
namely the sub-FRGAs of: (1) Water System Management, (2) Urban Water Management, (3) Spatial 
Planning, (4) Emergency Management, and (5) Compensation (see §2.3). The sub-FRGA of Water 
System Management represents the traditional Dutch way of managing flood risks and is still at the 
very heart of Dutch FRM. The other sub-FRGAs have emerged over time and play a complementary 
role. In this evaluation chapter we focus on the comprehensive Dutch FRGA. 
Within the STAR-FLOOD project, three evaluation criteria have been selected to assess the 
‘appropriateness’ of national systems of flood risk governance. Flood risk governance should: (1) 
enhance resilience to flooding, (2) make use of resources in an efficient way, and (3) be legitimate. 
Each criterion was operationalised by selecting more specific indicators. In §2.5, §3.5, §4.5 and §5.5, 
we evaluated the Dutch system of flood risk governance at a national and case study level in detail 
following these criteria and indicators. In the sections below (§ 7.2, §7.3 and §7.4), we summarise 
and discuss our main findings per criterion. In § 7.5 we draw some overall conclusions.  
7.2 Resilience 
Resilience is a multi-faceted and still very much a developing concept. For the purpose of the STAR-
FLOOD project, resilience has been conceptualised in terms of (1) buffer capacity and (2) adaptive 
capacity. Buffer capacity refers to the capacity to resist, to respond and to recover, whereas the main 
assumption is that diversity in arrangements and strategies increases resilience (in terms of buffer 
capacity), provided that these are effective. Adaptive capacity refers to the capacity to learn, to 
innovate, and to improve responses to flood risks. Our main conclusion is that the degree of 
resilience in Dutch flood risk governance is rather low, but increasing. Below, we will explain this 
conclusion in further detail.        
7.2.1 Assessment of capacity to resist 
Traditionally, flood defence is the predominant strategy in Dutch flood risk governance. The sub-
FRGA of Water System Management is the central arrangement in Dutch FRM. This sub-arrangement 
is highly institutionalised (e.g. safety standards, specialised authorities, tax system) and the 
implementation of the defence strategy can be considered effective: even though structural 
measures do not always fulfil legal standards, flood events are significantly minimised. This leads to 
the conclusion that the Dutch system of FRM generally provides a high capacity to resist.  
7.2.2 Assessment of capacity to buffer and recover 
During the previous two decades, new sub-FRGAs emerged within the framework of the broader 
policy domains of Spatial Planning and Emergency Management, putting more focus on other 
strategies, in particular on flood prevention, mitigation and preparation/response. On the practical 
case study level, this development was mainly evaluated as positive and beneficial. These sub-FRGAs, 
however, are still in a process of institutionalisation, and the implementation of the strategies 
mentioned can generally  still be considered less effective, mainly due to a lack of expertise, 
knowledge and (financial) resources, and the inevitable need of prioritisation of responsibilities in 
general administration. Moreover, in comparison with the other strategies, the flood recovery 
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strategy remains underexposed in the Netherlands, and the level of risk awareness and preparedness 
among citizens and the private sectors appears to be low (OECD 2014). This leads to the conclusion 
that – as the capacity to absorb, respond and recover are limited – buffer capacity in Dutch FRM is 
still rather limited. Recent developments (e.g. the introduction of the risk-based approach and the 
policy concept of Multi-Layered Safety) can be interpreted as efforts aimed at increasing buffer 
capacity, which are expected to have an effect in the near future. The exact effects of these 
developments, however, up to now remain uncertain.                
7.2.3 Assessment of capacity to adapt and learn 
The Dutch system of flood risk governance provides many possibilities to learn and innovate through 
time and across levels/dimensions/arrangements (e.g. planning cycles; evaluation mechanisms; 
bridging mechanisms; efforts of research institutes). Although we cannot make any firm statements 
about the effectiveness of all this, we can conclude that such arrangements foster adaptive capacity.     
7.3 Efficiency 
Due to a lack of data, it has proved hard to draw firm and overarching conclusions about the extent 
to which public and private resources in Dutch FRM in general are used in a resource-efficient 
manner. Evaluating outcome efficiency is, therefore, not our intention. Instead, below we put the 
concept of resource-efficiency in perspective, concluding that there is no clear proof of resource-
efficiency being a general and guiding principle at the abstract level of FRM, but it can be an 
explicit policy ambition on a project basis. In general, a trend is visible towards an increased 
consideration of efficiency values in FRM (e.g. cost-sharing arrangements between national and 
regional water managers, the approach taken in the Flood Protection Programme, MIRT procedure, 
the ‘Administrative Agreement on Water Issues’ of 2011 etc.), see §2.5.  
There is some scientific data claiming that the defence strategy for the Netherlands is the most 
efficient in terms of costs and benefits (Brouwer and Van Ek, 2004). Based on this claim, it can be 
argued that investment of any kind in other strategies will reduce the economic efficiency of Dutch 
FRM as such. This roughly means that the system of FRM with the introduction of the concept of 
Multi-Layered Safety (for instance) is becoming less efficient. Assuming this is correct, a discrepancy 
emerges: whereas investment of any kind in other strategies is claimed to increase resilience (which 
by many is assumed to be desirable), from a purely efficiency point of view, only investment in 
defence measures can be justified. In other words, there is a clash of two ‘goods’. However, creating 
optimal/maximal capacity to resist (i.e. to prevent an area from flooding as far as possible) is not per 
se less or more desirable than creating strategic back-ups to manage the consequences of a flood 
event. All this seems to end up in a paradox, but one should keep in mind that the nature of benefits 
differs per ‘good’ and even per strategy. The nature of the benefits, in fact, is a key factor for 
distinguishing between different strategies, which from different perspectives might be attractive to 
invest in for different reasons. This investment in turn can be made in a resource-efficient manner.   
As long as the defence strategy remains the dominant strategy in Dutch FRM (Delta Programme 
2015), it can – at a very abstract level – be concluded that Dutch FRM in general is rather resource-
efficient. Such a conclusion at this level of abstractness, however, is rather meaningless. At a lower 
level of abstractness, for instance at the level of concrete FRM projects, resource-efficiency can more 
clearly be an influential factor in decision-making, both regarding the sort of measure to be selected 
as well as regarding the concrete implementation of it. At this level, decision-makers, however, have 
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a wide margin of policy discretion both to determine their objectives and to define concrete 
measures to achieve their goals. This also means that they can prefer other benefits (e.g. more 
resilience, more sustainable or ecologically friendly measures, measures fitting better with the local 
environment) over resource-efficiency for any reason. As long as they can justify their choices, their 
decisions will be lawful; efficiency is more of a policy ambition than a legal standard in decision-
making. This, in the end, means that resource-efficiency levels in practice can significantly differ per 
project.                    
7.4 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy – just like resilience – is a multi-faceted concept, which is closely related to other 
concepts, such as democracy, transparency and participation. Within the STAR-FLOOD project, access 
to information, participation (stakeholder engagement), transparency, and access to justice have 
been selected as main indicators for legitimacy. As a general remark, it can be stated that the Dutch 
FRG system meets all selected criteria for legitimacy, although there are some particularities 
regarding participation and awareness. The most important provisions relevant to legitimacy are not 
incorporated in specific FRM legislation, but in general legislation in the field of administrative law 
(such as the General Administrative Law Act (GALA) and the Access to Information Act (AIA)). These 
provisions are generally applicable within the framework of FRM. 
The AIA provides for appropriate provisions to guarantee access to the extensive body of information 
about FRM in the Netherlands. The GALA provides appropriate provisions granting stakeholders 
possibilities to participate in FRM policy-making and decision-making procedures, and to give them 
an insight into such procedures and the rationale of policies and concrete decisions. All stakeholders 
can, moreover, participate in FRM through their entitlement to vote and to stand for elections. The 
GALA, lastly, provides for appropriate provisions granting stakeholders access to administrative court 
procedures, although these are inevitably subject to restrictions and strict rules. Thus, the law 
provides equal chances to be properly informed, to participate in policy-making and decision-making 
procedures (in a properly informed way), and to effectuate the right to seek legal protection. So on 
the basis of these criteria, the Dutch system of FRM can be considered legitimate.  
Besides this overall positive conclusion, it is worth mentioning that, although the legitimacy of Dutch 
FRM is appropriately safeguarded by the law, the factual level of stakeholder participation in Dutch 
FRM traditionally appears to be rather low. There is no clear data available explaining why both 
public participation in FRM and voter turnout in regional water authorities’ elections remain 
relatively low. Allegedly, this is due to a low level of public awareness about flood risks (Terpstra and 
Gutteling, 2008; OECD, 2014) in combination with a high level of reliance on the expertise of 
authorities involved in FRM and the effectiveness of the system of flood defence. Creating and 
raising awareness (e.g. through risk and crisis communication) can increase participation, as well as 
the effectiveness of FRM as such. The Dutch (central) government has taken some initiatives to make 
flood risk information even more accessible, to communicate flood risks, and to involve stakeholders 
in policy-making and decision-making, e.g. by launching websites (www.overstroomik.nl) and apps. 
However, at a decentralised level, which is supposed to be closer to the citizens, initiatives of risk 
communication differ markedly between municipalities. Risk and crisis communication is more and 
more becoming the subject of debate, but there is no clear policy on this matter yet, and – at least at 
a local level – the responsibilities in this respect remain unclear. The effectiveness of these and other 
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efforts, moreover, remains uncertain, even though it is indicated that the national website is often 
visited (Workshop 2).          
From an equity point of view, a number of potential tensions could develop in the future. First, the 
introduction of a basic safety level promises an equal minimum level of protection, but only within 
dike rings this can be provided through structural defensive measures. Areas outside the dike ring, 
which generally have a higher risk of flooding, are not protected from flooding by flood defence 
structures and, thus, have to rely on other types of measures/strategies. Second, there has been 
criticism that the distribution of costs and benefits might cause equity issues in the future (OECD, 
2014). The OECD (2014) has pointed out that defensive measures encourage development in high 
risk areas, which increases the risk further. It is argued that in the future the benefits will become 
increasingly unevenly distributed. Citizens living in high risk areas will be the main beneficiaries, 
whereas the rest of the tax payers will only benefit indirectly, i.e. from the high economic value of 
the flood-risk areas (Filatova, 2014). Additionally, whereas the spatial developers will get the benefits 
from the increased economic value, the water managers will bear the costs for the increased flood 
risk (OECD, 2014). However, the scientific proof for this projection is lacking. Nevertheless, the case 
study Zuidplaspolder might be seen as an example of this development, but the mitigative measures 
might reduce flood risk in the future and are carried by the individual property owner. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In the next chapter, we will summarise and further elaborate on the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Dutch system of flood risk governance, and also present our recommendations for improvement. 
Here, we summarise the main conclusions of the evaluation of the Dutch system of flood risk 
governance. Our overall conclusion is that the Dutch system of flood risk governance in general is to 
be considered appropriate, but there is also room for improvement. The system is considered to be 
effective in reducing flood probability, but less effective in mitigating the consequences of a flood 
event. The capacity to resist, in other words, is high, whereas the system’s buffer capacity remains 
limited. The system generally favours resource-efficiency as a policy ambition, but at the same time 
generates an appropriate amount of flexibility for other ‘benefits’ to influence policy-making and 
decision-making. It, finally, meets all selected legitimacy requirements (i.e. access to information, 
participation, transparency, and access to justice), but the factual degree of participation in FRM 
turns out to be rather low.  
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8. Moving forward – suggestions for strengthening flood risk 
governance in the Netherlands 
8.1 Introduction 
According to our research questions, in the previous chapters we analysed the structure of the NFPR 
and three case studies, the emergence of new strategies, their institutional embedment and 
coordination of strategies. Our evaluation (see §2.5, §3.5, §4.5, §5.5, and chapter 7) shows that the 
Dutch system of flood risk governance – following the criteria of resilience, efficiency and legitimacy 
– is to be considered as appropriate, but there is also room for improvement. The system, in other 
words, has its intrinsic strengths and limitations. Strengthening the system would mean both to 
further exploit these strengths and to combat its limitations. With the aim of presenting our six main 
recommendations for strengthening the Dutch system of flood risk governance in §8.4, we first 
summarise its four main strengths and three main limitations (§8.2). Thereafter, we summarise the 
main factors fostering or hampering development in Dutch flood risk governance (§8.3). Below, we 
only summarise and shortly set out the facts; for a discussion of the arguments we refer to the 
relevant sections in chapters 2, 6 and 7.        
8.2 Identifying the strengths and limitations of current arrangements of 
flood risk governance 
8.2.1. Strengths 
1) Highly institutionalised flood defence strategy that provides a high level of protection. The Dutch 
flood defence approach is characterised by a clear division of responsibilities, highly specialised 
actors, clear norms, standards and regulations, and secure financing. It, moreover, is relatively 
independent of political whims. This approach appears to be effective and, thus, creates a high 
capacity to resist.       
2) Strong knowledge and expertise base. A strong knowledge and expertise base ensures a sound 
implementation and maintenance of structural measures and an ongoing adjustment and 
improvement of the flood defence approach. It can also help in identifying the limitations of this 
approach, which can foster the development of new approaches/types of measures. It, moreover, 
produces innovative technologies that can be exported.  
3) Provision of a high level of safety to a majority of the Dutch population. The high level provision 
of water safety across the whole country (except areas outside the dike rings) through the Dutch 
flood defence approach can be considered as one of the major strengths of Dutch FRM. However, 
this is also claimed to have a possible downside, as a high level of safety might negatively influence 
flood awareness and public preparedness.   
4) Polder model and subsidiarity. The case studies demonstrate the advantages of the Dutch polder 
model culture in combination with the subsidiarity principle. They illustrate the advantage of local 
projects, decentralised leadership and broad stakeholder collaboration including governmental and 
non-governmental parties (i.e. the citizens and the commercial bodies implementing the project) as a 
fruitful way to integrate several interests and address complex issues. Nevertheless, the cooperation 
and communication between different actors could still be strengthened on a broader scale. 
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8.2.2. Limitations 
1) Management of potential consequences of flooding is marginal. Although the Dutch flood 
defence approach creates a high capacity to resist, the buffer capacity of the Dutch system of flood 
risk governance is limited. In other words, if a safety mechanism fails, there is hardly any reliable and 
effective ‘back-up’ to mitigate the consequences of a flood event. Other strategies (prevention, 
mitigation, and preparation/response) have not yet been appropriately implemented and 
institutionalised in order to prove effective. Although implementation of such strategies since 
recently receives more and more attention, this still is a major concern, as full safety cannot be 
guaranteed and the flood defence approach undeniably has its limitations. Moreover, more attention 
should be payed to the roles and responsibilities in consequence-reduction of private or semi-public 
organisations managing vital infrastructural networks, such as electricity companies, drinking water 
companies, and ICT or other communication services (Runhaar et al., 2014; Gilissen et al., 2015).     
2) Lack of awareness and preparedness among citizens. Most Dutch citizens are not properly aware 
of flood risks. Others are aware of such risks, but are still reluctant to take any precautionary 
measures themselves, mainly because of the high level of trust in the expertise of the authorities 
involved in FRM and the effectiveness of the defence strategy. This results in a generally low level of 
public preparedness. Thus, Dutch citizens are less likely to respond effectively to flooding; they 
might, for instance, not have stored proper supplies (e.g. water, food, warm cloths) at a dry place to 
survive for a longer period of time without any help, or, panicking, they might make wrong decisions, 
reducing their chances of survival (e.g. leaving their houses, instead of taking refuge to higher floors). 
This is another main concern, as a low degree of preparedness statistically increases the number of 
casualties and/or the amount of damage caused by a flood event, especially in areas with low 
evacuation capacity. National awareness-raising campaigns, however, have not yet proved to be very 
effective.  
3) Residual risk is to some degree carried by citizens. It is feasible that the financial risks of flood 
events are (partly) carried by private actors (e.g. homeowners, owners of cattle, agriculturalists, 
company owners). There is no wide-spread flood insurance system, and national compensation 
mechanisms are not sufficient to compensate for all damage from large flood events. This is not 
problematic per se, as long as private actors are aware of this, so that they can internalize their costs. 
This, however, generally seems not to be the case.        
8.3 Barriers to and opportunities for moving forward 
8.3.1 Barriers 
The external barriers that hinder FRM from moving forward are limited in the Netherlands. On the 
one hand, this is due to the lack of an urgent need to change the existing approach; on the other 
hand this is due to the high stability of the existing governance arrangement. The approach to FRM 
was slightly affected by the economic crisis in the 1970s and at the beginning of the 21st century: 
efficiency gained in importance. However, it did not influence the foundations of Dutch FRM. Also, 
EU Directives had only a marginal influence: they did not disturb or hinder the Dutch approach. 
Climate change and population growth could be potential barriers, but are perceived more as 
challenges to be tackled, for instance, in the Delta Programme.  
There are, however, internal barriers that make it difficult to change the approach to FRM in the 
Netherlands – as far as this is aimed at. This is due to the high path dependency (see §6.3). 
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Accordingly, internal barriers can be technical feasibility, a lack of social and political willingness, 
legal barriers, e.g. with regards to the strict distribution of responsibility and accountability, and 
unclear financing and cost-distribution in cases of change.  
8.3.2 Opportunities  
At the moment, FRM in the Netherlands is in a comparatively dynamic period. Due to the projected 
threat of climate change, adaptation programmes were initiated that offer opportunities for change.  
The main opportunity for the Netherlands is the Delta Programme. This national climate change 
adaptation programme offers an opportunity to improve the integration of spatial planning, 
emergency management and water system management through the introduction of the risk 
approach and the policy concept of Multi-Layered Safety. Even though the programme states that 
MLS is to be implemented through existing institutional arrangements, it improved cooperation and 
communication between different actor groups and it is stated that spatial planning policies must not 
increase risk by 2050. That might be an incentive to improve the integration of spatial planning and 
water management.  
8.4 Recommendations for flood risk governance in the Netherlands 
1) Keep a strong focus on flood defence, but also implement other strategies. Historically, the 
Netherlands are very vulnerable to flooding. This explains why the flood defence strategy struck deep 
roots into Dutch FRM and became the most dominant strategy by a long way. In the future, 
vulnerability is expected to increase due to socio-economic developments, soil subsidence and 
climate change. Confronted with these risks, it is highly recommendable to keep reducing flood 
probability as much as possible. However, the limitations of this strategy also have to be kept in 
mind. It is important to realise that providing absolute safety is not possible. Therefore, it is sensible 
to effectively implement other strategies – especially prevention, mitigation, and 
preparation/response strategies – in order to create adequate back-up aiming at the reduction of the 
consequences of potential flood events. In this respect, the recent developments within the 
framework of the Delta Programme are a major step in the right direction. It is highly 
recommendable to carry on with and intensify these developments, both at a strategic level and with 
a more practical orientation. Below, we formulate a number of recommendations to give shape to 
this general recommendation.                         
2) Strengthen the implementation of the flood prevention and mitigation strategies in spatial 
planning. Although there are some good examples, the prevention and mitigation strategies in 
general have not yet proved to be very effective in the Netherlands, especially in contrast to other 
countries. It is to be considered a positive development that ‘risk-neutral’ development – i.e. urban 
development which must not increase flood risk – is an objective of the Delta Programme. 
Implementing preventive and mitigative strategies and measures in spatial plans can reduce damage 
potential in yet undeveloped flood-prone areas. This can also have advantageous side-effects, as it 
can avoid unnecessary increases in (future) costs for water management authorities, because fewer 
resources have to be spent on defensive measures. Implementing the prevention strategy in spatial 
plans for developed areas seems to be less appropriate; implementation of other strategies – in 
particular the mitigation and preparation/response strategy – seems to be more appropriate for such 
areas. To increase the effectiveness of such strategies, it is sensible to create more explicit 
responsibilities for the reduction of consequences of flood events in the policy domain of spatial 
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planning. Research should focus on opportunities in this respect. Another suggestion is to strengthen 
the advisory position of water management authorities in spatial decision-making through a more 
formalised and legally more strongly embedded water test procedure. This can improve the quality 
of spatial decision-making and decrease flood risks and damage potential.                     
3) Strengthen the implementation of the preparation/response strategy in emergency 
management. The establishment of security regions is mostly seen as a positive development in 
Dutch FRM. These public bodies – as specialised authorities in the broad field of emergency 
management – can add valuable insights, as they look at flood risk management from a different 
perspective (e.g. evacuation possibilities/impossibilities), and they have an overview of different 
kinds of risks in a region and their interaction. For the flood preparation/response strategy to be 
effective, it generally seems to be necessary to increase the capacity of the security regions in this 
respect, in terms of financial resources, as well as in terms of personnel, knowledge and expertise, 
and the ability to influence decision-making in other policy domains (in particular spatial planning) 
through advisory or consultancy arrangements. Moreover, the interaction between security regions 
and water management authorities can be further intensified and/or formalised in order to improve 
information exchange. Finally, we agree with the conclusion of the Hoekstra Committee that 
criticised the fact that city councils, to a significant extent, decide on the security region’s budget, 
since this makes flood preparation and response largely dependent on political issues. The 
reorganisation of this system might need to be taken into consideration, for instance by granting 
security regions a fixed budget sufficient to fulfil their responsibilities concerning flood 
preparation/response.     
4) Increase awareness among citizens in order to strengthen their preparedness. The awareness 
issue had already been raised by the OECD in 2014 and is still a major concern in the Netherlands. 
Dutch citizens appear to be insufficiently aware of flood risks and the potential effects of flooding, 
and especially of their opportunities to take adequate actions themselves in order to increase their 
chances of survival. Their levels of preparedness, in other words, can be considered to be rather low. 
Therefore, it is highly advisable to keep investing in awareness-raising measures in order to make 
them both more aware of the risk and potential effects of flooding, and of their opportunities to be 
better prepared and to be able to effectively respond under certain emergency circumstances. This 
requires both general risk communication and communication focused on specific local or regional 
circumstances, as these can highly differ across the country and can ask for different preparatory and 
responsive measures. In addition to recent technological communication measures (e.g. websites 
and apps), specific communication measures – partly based on good practice abroad – might be to 
inform citizens through brochures on flood risk and potential action (e.g. vertical evacuation), to 
organise neighbourhood information meetings, or to indicate the projected water level in the streets. 
Informing citizens about flood risks in purchase contracts for houses and other property, as is done in 
Flanders, can be taken into consideration. Informing the citizens can, moreover, increase their ability 
to recover after a flood event.   
5) The ability to recover via insurance systems can be taken into consideration. Due to the strong 
focus on flood defence, the recovery/compensation strategy does not play as important a role in 
Dutch FRM as it does in other countries. However, there is a public compensation mechanism and 
compensation can also be claimed in civil liability procedures. There is hardly any experience with 
insurance systems for fluvial or coastal flooding in the Netherlands. It is questionable whether there 
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is even a market for such a system as insurance companies, after the 1953 flooding, argued that the 
Netherlands is not insurable against floods of such extent. This possibility, however, should not be 
excluded beforehand. An insurance system for fluvial flooding can, on the one hand, be 
advantageous from a solidarity point of view, as it can relocate damages from a party with limited 
means to a party with a greater financial capacity. The introduction of a mandatory insurance for all 
Dutch citizens could, on the other hand, hamper the incentive not to build, invest and live in flood 
prone areas and could, moreover, shift the financial burden to those who are not responsible for 
increasing flood risks in such areas. Introducing a system where the premiums are based on the 
individual risk, might prevent this and give an incentive to avoid flood-prone areas. It should also be 
kept in mind that such a system has its limitations, especially in the case of severe flood events.      
6) Avoid fragmentation. The strength of the Dutch FRM system is its relatively clear responsibility 
distribution for water authorities, which is facilitated by the main focus on one strategy. Diversifying 
strategies might increase fragmentation, complexity and legal uncertainty. This should be avoided as 
much as possible in measures undertaken to increase the system’s buffer capacity.   
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Annex 1 List of interviewees 
The Annex lists the interviews conducted within the course of the STAR-FLOOD project. The purpose 
of the interviews has been to receive information, or as an additional validation for other sources. 
The interviews are used in this report and/or other STAR-FLOOD papers written by the authors. The 
numbers of the interviews referred to in the text of the report do not correspond with the numbers 
of the interviews in the list below, in order to have a fully anonymised list of interviews.  
Interview 
date 
Name Position Organisation Topic Interviewer(s) 
1.7.2014  Nathalie 
Asselman 
Senior Advisor Deltares 
 
Assessment of flood 
risk in ZPP 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
Maria Kaufmann 
3.2.2014 Cor Beekmans Project 
manager 
Rijkswaterstaat 
 
Development of Room 
for the River 
Programme 
Maria Kaufmann 
Herman Kasper 
Gilissen 
20.5.2014  Judith van den 
Bos-Scholtes 
Senior Policy 
Consultant 
UvW 
 
Changes in FRM, the 
role of the water 
managers 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
Maria Kaufmann 
19.11. 2014* Rudi Buis Spokesman 
Association 
Association of 
Dutch Insurers 
 
Insurance policy for 
pluvial flooding 
Julian Kevelam 
22.04. 2014 Anja van Dam Senior policy 
advisor 
Min. Justice and 
Security, NCTV 
Crisis management  Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
Maria Kaufmann 
2.12.2014 Tijs Dekker Project leader DP Rijnmond 
Drechtsteden 
Delta Programme, FRM 
in Dordrecht 
Maria Kaufmann 
Julian Kevelam 
18.11. 2014  Chris Dekkers Programme 
manager  
Security Region 
South-Holland 
South 
Role of security region 
in Dordrecht 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
Julian Kevelan 
27.03. 2014 Gerben 
Ekelmans 
Specialist area 
development 
Staatsbosbeheer 
 
the role of nature 
managers in the case 
study Nijmegen 
Maria Kaufmann 
 
25.3. 2015* Hugo 
Gastkemper 
Manager 
RIONED 
RIONED 
 
Urban water 
management, pluvial 
flooding 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
15.10. 2014* Isabel van de 
Geer 
Policy Advisor Rijkswaterstaat 
 
Developments in FRM Maria Kaufmann 
18.11. 2014  Berry 
Gersonius 
expert flood 
risk 
management 
Advisor 
municipality 
Dordrecht 
FRM in Dordrecht Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
Julian Kevelam 
26.2.2014 Maarten van 
Ginkel 
Policy advisor Municipality 
Nijmegen 
 
Role of the 
municipality in case 
study Nijmegen 
Maria Kaufmann 
Herman Kasper 
Gilissen 
5.3.2014 Henk de 
Hartog 
Project leader Province 
Gelderland 
 
Role of the province in 
case study Nijmegen/ 
FRM 
Maria Kaufmann 
11.2.2014 Sander van 
den Hoogen  
Specialist risk 
and security 
Veiligeidsregio 
Gelderland Zuid 
 
Emergency 
management and role 
of security region in 
case study Nijmegen 
Maria Kaufmann 
Herman Kasper 
Gilissen 
27.8.2014  Cor Habben 
Jansen 
Director 
Grondbank 
Grondbank RZG 
Zuidplas 
 
Role of the land bank 
in the Zuidplaspolder 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
Maria Kaufmann 
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18.11. 2014  Ellen Kelder Programme 
leader 
Municipality 
Dordrecht 
 
FRM in Dordrecht, role 
of the municipality in 
Dordrecht 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
Julian Kevelam 
7.5.2014  Eric-Jan Kijkuit Policy Advisor Min. Infrastructure 
and Environment 
EU Floods Directive Maria Kaufmann 
24.3. 2015* Lisette 
Louwman 
Policy Advisor Gemeente 
Dordrecht 
FRM in Dordrecht, 
responsibilities 
municipality 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
5.3.2014 Marko van 
Leeuwen 
Policy Advisor Association of 
Dutch Insurers 
 
Insurance against 
flooding 
Maria Kaufmann 
22.04. 2014  Nils Lighart Project leader Min. Justice and 
Security, NCTV 
 
Crisis management in 
the Netherlands 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
Maria Kaufmann 
26.9. 2014  Leo Loch  Milieuvereiniging 
Zuidplas 
 
Participation of 
interest group in 
Westergrouwe/ ZPP 
Maria Kaufmann 
 
2.12.2014 Pim Neefjes Policy Advisor Rijkswaterstaat FRM in Dordrecht Maria Kaufmann 
Julian Kevelam 
5.2.2014 Henriëtte 
Nonnekens 
Policy Advisor  Waterschap 
Rivierenland 
 
Role of regional water 
authority in case study 
Nijmegen 
Maria Kaufmann 
Herman Kasper 
Gilissen 
11.2.2014  Mieke 
Okhuysen 
 
Policy Advisor Veiligeidsregio 
Gelderland Zuid 
 
Emergency 
management and role 
of security region in 
case study Nijmegen 
Maria Kaufmann 
Herman Kasper 
Gilissen 
10.7.2014  Frank van Pelt Programme 
manager 
Provincie Zuid-
Holland 
 
Role of the province in 
Zuidplaspolder 
development project 
Maria Kaufmann 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
21.8.2014  Joost van der 
Poel 
Project 
Coordinator  
Schadeloket 
 
Compensation during 
Room for the River 
project 
Maria Kaufmann 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
30.09. 2014* Adrienne van 
de Sar 
Policy Advisor Staff Delta 
Commissioner 
Developments in FRM Maria Kaufmann 
3.12.2014 Jan Smits Policy Advisor Regional water 
authority Hollandse 
Delta 
The role of regional 
water authority in 
Dordrecht 
Maria Kaufmann 
Julian Kevelam 
18.12. 2014* Edwin van Son Senior policy 
advisor spatial 
planning 
Municipality 
Dordrecht 
 
Fluvial FRM, flooding 
Stadswerven 
Julian Kevelam 
15.4.2014  Marjolein 
Sterk 
 Coalitie Natuurlijke 
Klimaatbuffer 
Integrated water 
system-based FRM 
Maria Kaufmann 
6.2.2014  Hans Takke 
 
Project leader Province 
Gelderland 
 
Role of the province in 
case study Nijmegen 
Maria Kaufmann 
Herman Kasper 
Gilissen 
9.2. 2015* Leon 
Valkenburg 
Assistant 
Project leader 
Project office 
Westergrouwe 
 
Role of the 
municipality Gouda in 
the development of 
the Zuidplaspolder 
Maria Kaufmann 
7.5.2014  Claudia 
Veltrop 
Senior Policy 
Advisor 
Min. Infrastructure 
and Environment,  
Integration of spatial 
planning and water 
management 
Maria Kaufmann 
26.9. 2014  Bert Verduijl  Milieuvereiniging 
Zuidplas 
 
Participation of 
interest group in 
Westergrouwe/ ZPP 
Maria Kaufmann 
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9.10.2013  Ton 
Verhoeven 
Policy advisor 
 
Municipality 
Nijmegen 
 
Role of the 
municipality in case 
study Nijmegen 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
Maria Kaufmann 
Mark Wiering 
18.12. 2014* Jan-Jaap 
Visser 
 
Senior policy 
advisor spatial 
planning 
Municipality 
Dordrecht 
 
Fluvial FRM, flooding 
Stadswerven 
Julian Kevelam 
21.8.2014  Maarten Van 
der Vlist 
Senior 
strategic 
advisor 
Rijkswaterstaat 
 
Development of multi-
layered safety 
Maria Kaufmann 
4.9.2014  Lilian Weber Head planning 
department 
security 
region  
Veiligheidsregio 
Hollands Midden  
 
Development of 
Security regions, FRM 
Dordrecht 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-Hoekveld 
Maria Kaufmann 
 
9.9.2014  Hilde Westera Policy Advisor Hoogheemraadscha
p van Schieland en 
de Krimpenerwaard 
The role of regional 
water authority in 
Zuidplaspolder 
Maria Kaufmann 
7.5.2014  Marjolein van 
Zuilekom 
Policy Advisor Min. Infrastructure 
and Environment, 
DGRW 
 
Integration of spatial 
planning and water 
management 
Insurance against 
flooding 
Maria Kaufmann 
*Interview by telephone 
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Annex 2 List of visited events for participatory observation 
The annex lists the events visited by the authors for participatory observation.  
Date Event Organisers Speakers, Discussent, 
e.g. 
Topic Observer 
26.3. 
2014 
Participation Day 
Flood Protection 
Programme 
(Meeloopdag 
Hoogwaterbe-
schermingspro-
gramma) 
Rijkswaterstaat Ruud Wijdeven, 
Trainee Programme 
Direction, 
 
Richard Jorissen, 
Programme Director, 
Rijkswaterstaat 
Flood Protection 
Programme 
Maria 
Kaufmann 
12.11. 
2014 
Brandborrel 2014: 
Water en vuur 
Association of 
Dutch Insurers 
Harry van Luijtelaar, 
RIONED 
Bas Bieren, Arcadis 
Insurance against 
damage from 
flooding, 
Pluvial FRM 
Maria 
Kaufmann 
7.11. 
2013 
4 National Delta 
Congress 2013 
Delta 
Programme 
Wim Kuijken, Ellen 
Kelder 
FRM and the 
Delta Programme 
Maria 
Kaufmann, 
Willemijn van 
Doorn-
Hoekveld 
18.11. 
2014 
Meerjarig 
Expertise netwerk 
Ruimte en Water 
Eiland van 
Dordrecht 
Municipality 
Dordrecht 
Ellen Kelder, Berry 
Gersonius, Arwin van 
Buuren 
FRM in Dordrecht Willemijn van 
Doorn-
Hoekveld, 
Julian 
Kevelam 
12.5. 
2014 
Nijmegen Future 
Cities 
Municipality 
Nijmegen 
Karolien Andela, Ton 
Verhoeven, Veroniek 
Bezemer 
How to 
communicate on 
adaptation? 
Maria 
Kaufmann 
5.6.2014 Symposium 
“Meerlaagsveilig-
heidheid, en nu 
aan de slag 
Rijkswaterstaat, 
STOWA, Delta 
Programme 
David van Zelm van 
Eldik, Min. I&M, Koos 
Beurkens, DP 
Rivieren 
Policy Concept 
Multi-layered 
Safety 
Maria 
Kaufmann 
28.5. 
2014 
Symposium: 
Natuurlijke 
Klimaatbuffers – 
de kunst van het 
meekoppelen 
Coalition: 
Natuurlieke 
Klimaarbuffer 
Teo Wams, 
Natuurmo-
numenten, David van 
Zelm van Eldik, Min. 
I&M,  
Integrated water 
system-based 
approach to FRM 
Maria 
Kaufmann 
9.9.2014 STARFLOOD 
workshop 
STAR-FLOOD, 
regional water 
authority 
Rivierenland 
Willem Jan Goossem, 
Ton Verhoeven 
Integration FRM 
in spatial 
planning 
STAR-FLOOD 
Team 
26.5. 
2015 
STARFLOOD 
workshop 
STAR-FLOOD, 
Min. I&M 
Bas Kolen, HKV; Eddy 
van Well, Security 
Region; Klaas Koster, 
Min. I&M 
Risk and Crisis 
Communication 
STAR-FLOOD 
Team 
9.10. 
2014 
Excursion into 
Millingerwaard 
ARK Bart Beekers, ARK Integrated water 
system-based 
FRM 
STAR-FLOOD 
Team 
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